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Introduction: Fiction and Falsehood 
 
When the horror movie The Blair Witch Project hit screens in 1999, the internet 
was abuzz with debate and discussion among ardent theater-goers, many of whom 
were convinced that the events in the film had actually happened. They pointed to 
“real” police reports online and newsreel-style interviews about the missing teenagers 
featured on screen, and the very real nature of the film itself. Even a trip to the Internet 
Movie Database revealed that the actors were “missing” and “presumed dead.”1 
At the heart of this confusion was the movie’s documentary-style format, a 
format hitherto (with a few comic exceptions) reserved for actual documentaries. It 
authenticated itself in a variety of ways, stating in the beginning that what audiences 
were watching was the actual footage of three young people who vanished in the 
woods, and its cinematography presented a shaky, seemingly unscripted series of 
events that showed minimal amounts of traditional, horrific action. To make matters 
murkier, the filmmakers created a promotional website featuring those police reports 
and news interviews that believers were pointing to, leading many people to call the 
film the “first internet movie.”2 
In fact, the “found footage” format – now so common that fewer individuals 
might be persuaded to take a movie like The Blair Witch Project as actual, documentary 
material – is a device with its roots in antiquity. The Ephemeris Belli Troiani of Dictys 
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Cretensis, a supposedly first-person account by the Cretan Dictys of the Trojan War 
written in the first or second century CE,3 includes just such an authenticating preface: 
Dictys, genere Cretensis de civitate Gnoso 
iisdem temporibus quibus et Atrides fuit, peritus 
vocis ac literarum Phoenicum, quae a Cadrao 
Achaiam fuerant delatae. Hic fuit socius Idomenei, 
Deucalionis filii, et Merionis, ex Molo qui duces 
cum exercitu contra Ilium venerant, a quibus 
ordinatus est, ut annales belli Troiani conscriberet. 
Igitur de toto hoc bello sex volumina in tilias 
digessit Phoeniccis literis : quae iam reversus senior 
in Cretam, praecepit moriens ut seciim 
sepelirentur. Itaque ut ille iusserat, memoratas 
tilias,instannea arcula repositas, eius lumulo 
condiderunt.  
Verum secutis temporibus, tertiodecimo anno 
Neronis imperii, in Gnoso civitate terraemotus 
facti, cum multa, tum etiam sepulcrum Dictys ita 
patefecerunt, ut a transeuntibus arcula viseretur. 
Pastores itaque prastereuntes cum hanc vidissent, 
thesaurum rati, sepulcro abstulerunt : et aperta ea 
invenerunt tilias incognitis sibi literis conscriptas : 
continuoque ad suum dominum Eupraxidem 
quendam noraine pertulerunt: quiagnitas quaenam 
essent literas Rutilio Rufo illius insulae tunc 
Consulari obtulit. Ille cum Eupraxide ad Neronem 
oblate sibi transmisit, existimans in his quaedam 
secretiora contineri.  
Heec autem cum Nero accepisset, 
advertissetque Punicas esse literas, harum peritos 
ad se vocavit: qui cum venissent, interpretati suut 
omnia. Cumque Nero cognovisset, antiqui viri, qui 
apud Ilium fuerat, haec esse monumenta, iussit in 
Graecum sermonem ista transferri e quibus Trojani 
belli verior textus innotuit. Tunc Eupraxidem 
muncribus et Romana civitate donatum ad propria 
remisit. Annales vero nomine Dictys inscriptos in 
Graecam Bibliotliecam recepit. Quorum seriem, qui 
sequitur textus, ostendit. (Preface) 
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Dictys, a native of Crete from the city of 
Cnossos and a contemporary of the Atridae, knew 
the Phoenician language and alphabet, which 
Cadmus brought to Achaea. He accompanied the 
leaders Idomeneus and Meriones with the army 
that went against Troy. (Idomeneus and Meriones 
were the sons of Deucalion and Molus 
respectively.) They chose him to write down a 
history of this campaign. Accordingly, writing on 
linden tablets and using the Phoenician alphabet, 
he composed nine volumes about the whole war. 
Time passed. In the thirteenth year of Nero’s 
reign an earthquake struck at Cnossos and, in the 
course of its devastation, laid open the tomb of 
Dictys in such a way that people, as they passed, 
could see the little box. And so shepherds who had 
seen it as they passed stole it from the tomb, 
thinking it was treasure. But when they opened it 
and found the linden tablets inscribed with 
characters unknown to them, they took this find to 
their master. Their master, whose name was 
Eupraxides, recognized the characters, and 
presented the books to Rutilius Rufus, who was at 
that time governor of the island. Since Rufus, when 
the books had been presented to him, thought 
they contained certain mysteries, he, along with 
Eupraxides himself, carried them to Nero. 
Nero, having received the tablets and having 
noticed that they were written in the Phoenician 
alphabet, ordered his Phoenician philologists to 
come and decipher whatever was written. When 
this had been done, since he realized that these 
were the records of an ancient man who had been 
at Troy, he had them translated into Greek; thus a 
more accurate text of the Trojan War was made 
known to all. Then he bestowed gifts and Roman 
citizenship upon Eupraxides, and sent him home. - 
Trans. R. M. Frazer Jr. 
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Likewise, the Acts of Pilate, a fifth-sixth century treatment of the Gospels material,4 
contains a very similar authenticating story of an account by Nicodemus discovered and 
then translated from the original Hebrew: 
Ἔγω Ἀνανίας προτίκτωρ ἀπὸ ἐπάρχων 
τυγχάνων, νομομαθής, ἐκ τῶν θείων γραφῶν τὸν 
κύριον ἡμῶν ἐπέγνων τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν 
Χριστὸν πίστει προσελθών , καταξιωθεὶς  δὲ καὶ 
τοῦ ἁγίου βαπτίσματος. ἐρευμήσας δὲ καὶ τὰ 
ὑπομνήματα τὰ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον 
πραχθέντα ἐπὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 
ἅ κατέθεντο οἵ Ιουδαῖοι ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, 
ταῦτα εὗρον τὰ ὑπομνήματα ἐν ἐβραικοῖς 
γράμμασιν, καὶ θεοῦ εὐδοκίᾳ μεθερμήνευσα 
γράμμασιν ἑλληνικοῖς εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν πάντων τῶν 
ἐπικαλοθμένων τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ δεσπότου ἡμῶν 
Φλαβίου Θεοδοσίου, ἔτους ἑπτακαιδεκάτου, καὶ 
Φλαβίου Οὐαλεντινιανοῦ τὸ ἕκτον, ἐν ἰνδικτῶνι θ’. 
Πάντες οὖν ὅσοι ἀναγινώσκετε καὶ 
μεταβάλλετε εἰς ἕτερα βιβλία, μνημονεύετέ μου 
καὶ εὔκεσθε ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἵνα ἰλεός μοι γένηται ὁ 
θεὸς καὶ ἱλάσηται ταῖς ἁμαρτίας μου ἅς ἅμαρτον 
εἰς αὐτόν. 
Εἰρήνη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι 
καὶ τοῖς οἰκέσταις αύτῶν. ἀμήν. (Prologue) 
 
I, Ananias, an officer of the guard, being 
learned in the law, came to know our Lord Jesus 
Christ from the sacred scriptures, which I 
approached with faith, and was accounted worthy 
of holy baptism. And having searched for the 
reports made at that period in the time of our Lord 
Jesus Christ [and for that] which the Jews 
committed to writing under Pontius Pilate, I found 
these acts in the Hebrew language and according 
to God’s good pleasure I translated them into 
Greek for the information of all those who call 
upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, in the 
seventeenth year of the reign of our Emperor 
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Flavius Theodosius and in the sixth year of the 
‘Nobility’ of Flavius Valentinianus, in the ninth 
indiction. 
Therefore all of you who read this and copy it 
out, remember me and pray for me that God may 
be gracious to me and forgive my sins which I have 
sinned against him.  
Peace be to those who read and hear it, and to 
their servants. Amen. - Trans. Scheidweiler 
 
Both of these stories were read and probably believed, and that so many believed a 
fictional documentary was real as recently as 1999 I think provides us with a useful 
analogue to what happened in the early imperial period of Greco-Roman antiquity: a 
format hitherto used primarily for historical purposes, prose narrative, was adapted for 
use in fiction – and not just any fiction – not the primarily fabulistic or mythic literary 
works perhaps best known from antiquity, most of which were metric. This was prose 
fiction that was somewhat believable, that was written in a historical format, and that 
also authenticated itself so as to make its credibility part of the driving force behind its 
enjoyment. People may have known they were reading fiction when they read the 
Greek and Roman novels, but that does not mean they did not often question where, in 
works specked with historical allusions and written in a historical format, fact ended and 
fiction began, most especially in a world in which “the boundaries between creative 
imagination and willful mendacity, between fiction and lying, often proved impossible to 
determine.”5 
 Not that many ancients did not try to differentiate the various divisions between 
fact and fable. As will be demonstrated more extensively in Chapter 2, a tripartite 
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division between history, fiction, and fable developed and became widespread in the 
period coinciding with the rise of the novel, and shows up repeatedly as ancient 
rhetoricians and scholars attempt to navigate this new expressive reality. For now, the 
short outline provided by Sextus Empiricus in the second century will suffice:  
... τῶν ἱστορουμένων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἱστορία τὸ 
δὲ μῦθος τὸ δὲ πλάσμα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἱστορία ἀληθῶν 
τινῶν ἐστὶ καὶ γεγονόντων ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι 
Ἀλεξανδρος ἐν Βαβυλῶνι δι΄ ἐπιβούλων 
φαρμακευθεὶς ἐτελεύτα, πλάσμα δὲ πραγμάτων 
μὴ γενομένων μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς γενομένοις 
λεγομένων, ὡς αἱ κωμικαὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ οἱ μῖμοι, 
μῦθος δὲ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων καὶ ψευδῶν 
ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν φαλαγγίων καὶ ὄφεων 
γένος Τιτήνων ἐνέπουσιν ἀφ΄ αἵματος 
ἐζωγονῆσθαι ... (Contra Math. 263-264) 
 
... of things narrated historically, one is history, 
another is myth, and another fiction, of which 
history is the exposition of any true things that 
have happened, such as that Alexander died in 
Babylon, having been poisoned by conspirators; 
while a fiction is that of deeds having not 
happened but told like things that did happen, such 
as comic plots and mimes; but a myth is the 
exposition of  deeds that have not happened and 
indeed false, such as when they tell that the race of 
spiders and snakes  was spawned from the blood of 
the Titans... 
 
This tripartite division – history (ἱστορία), fiction (πλάσμα), and fable or myth (μῦθος) – 
and the uneasy relationship among the three parts, are outlined in Cueva’s discussion of 
the five canonical Greek novels in his The Myths of Fiction. Here Cueva charts the use of 
myth in the novels and asserts that, “of the many genres capable of influencing the 
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development of the novel, the most significant, in an unusual way, was history.”6 In fact, 
“the novelists employed what might be described as degenerate Hellenistic 
historiography in order to give their erotic writings a semblance of respectability.”7 
Cueva sees the emphasis on this as changing, however, as we approach the sophistic 
novels of Longus, Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus. “Notwithstanding the sources for the 
historical elements of the novel, it is undeniable that the earlier novels, Chaereas and 
Callirhoe and Ephesiaca, were more historical in nature than the later novels.”8  
We will be examining just this trajectory when analyzing the earlier novels of 
Petronius, Chariton, and Xenophon, against the later “sophistic” tales of Apuleius, 
Achilles Tatius, Heliodorus, and most especially Longus. As the novel develops away 
from a more strict emulation of historical narrative (with a few flourishes of its own, of 
course), it becomes more fantastical. And yet even amidst the fantastic – even amidst a 
greater comfort with divine and/or supernatural intervention – the authors continue to 
strive for plausibility. In part this is because, as we shall see, acceptance of the 
supernatural was commonplace among many of the ancients, despite the existence of 
some famous skeptics.9 But it also seems to suggest an acceptance of prose fiction as a 
genre, and a willingness to let it depart from its historiographic origins. Overall, we must 
always be aware of the often blurred lines between ancient myth and history, which led 
Brillante to suggest that the “notion of the historical content of a myth presupposes a 
distinction between myth and history which is fundamental for us but anachronistic for 
                                                          
6
 Cueva 2004, 4 
7
 Ibid, 10 
8
 Ibid, 10 
9
 See the famous verses of Xenophanes, or Lucretius’ account of the beginning of the world, for just two 
examples. Meanwhile, the contemporary Lucian’s skepticism will be treated at length in Chapter 3. 
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the Greeks.”10 But in light of this new prose format in the imperial period, these blurs 
are becoming ever sharper and more distinct, as sophists, rhetorical teachers, and critics 
like Lucian begin to navigate a landscape in which prose no longer carries an assumption 
of fact and authenticity, even while fictional narrative still attempts to legitimize itself 
with factual allusions and authenticating strategies.  
For us, fiction and lies are distinct, because fiction is picked up from a library or 
bookshop shelf (or in an online store category) so labeled, and thus the knowing 
suspension of the reader’s disbelief precludes the idea that he or she is being deceived. 
In this way, modern theory on deception often departs from ancient ways of thinking. 
Indeed, one way in which philosophical, theoretical definitions are necessarily 
complicated concerns the participation of the person being lied to or deceived. 
Philosophers like Carson have dispensed with certain definitions of lying on this score, 
for example, when they have shown how willing participation in a deception cannot be 
considered as true deception: if one is reading a book one knows to be fiction, then 
even the most vivid narrative cannot be called a deception, as the reader is a knowing 
participant in this game. However, such theorizing assumes a modern take on 
novelization or fiction. But how does this apply when genres are blurred and the viewer 
is left in a state of aporia, unaware of whether a work is fiction or fact, or which parts of 
it should be classified as each (as we have seen in our own time with Blair Witch)? As we 
will see, though boundaries existed between history and fiction among the learned elite, 
they did not always find themselves in the reception of our novelistic texts. Augustine 
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himself seemed unable to always appreciate these divisions. In his Soliloquies, he seems 
to outline a helpful distinction:  
 
Nam fallax id recte dicitur quod habet 
quemdam fallendi appetitum … Illud autem quod 
mendax voco, a mentientibus fit. Qui hoc differunt 
a fallacibus, quod omnis fallax appetit fallere; non 
autem omnis vult fallere qui mentitur: nam et mimi 
et comoediae et multa poemata mendaciorum 
plena sunt, delectandi potius quam fallendi 
voluntate … Soliloquies, 2.9.16 
 
For a thing is rightly called deceitful which has 
some sort of desire of deceiving … Moreover the 
thing which I call deceitful comes from those who 
are deceiving. These differ in this one point: that all 
who are deceitful seek to deceive, but not all who 
utter lies wish to deceive: for mimes and comedies 
and many poems are full of lies, but with the 
intention of delighting rather than deceiving … 
 
Yet in his Civitas Dei, Augustine seems unsure whether Apuleius’ Golden Ass, narrated 
over eleven books by a man magically turned into an ass, was reported or invented (aut 
indicavit aut finxit).11 Indeed, contemporary with our novelists is an entire genre of 
apista or incredibilia literature (paradoxography) which reports on “strange but true” 
tales and which are famously parodied by Lucian in his True History and also his Lover of 
Lies, both a direct satire of the notion that the tall tales in these works can be 
believed.12 In other words, the very theoretical notion of deception is complicated in 
this time period by the ambiguity regarding “fact” and “fiction” in these ancient novels, 
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 Civitas Dei 18.18. Indeed, Augustine’s entire purpose of bringing it up is to hush skeptics who might 
doubt the existence of demonic powers. Cf. the discussion on 188-189.  
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 Reardon 2008, 621; cf. Chapter 3. 
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and the novelists seem acutely and self-consciously aware of that fact, and how it 
affects the entire project they undertake, given their repeated use of lies and deception 
throughout their narratives.  
 And yet another layer of deception has been noted of liars as old as Odysseus: 
the sophistication of the audience being lied to (and by implication, the sophistication of 
the liars themselves). Here, I suggest Carson’s modern take can be directly applied to 
the ancient sophistic novelists: “Sometimes people are obtuse and fail to perceive that 
the things they are being told are said in jest.”13 This is directly related to a key portion 
of most philosophical definitions of lying: namely, the warranting by the speaker of the 
truth of what he says.14 However, Carson concedes that the sophistication of a given 
audience can throw into doubt this definitional aspect, for one could make an assertion 
that warrants the truth to part of an audience, but does not warrant it to a more 
sophisticated part. He uses the example of a description seemingly ripped from the 
pages of ancient paradoxography: “Consider, for example, a greatly exaggerated 
account of a past event told to a mixed group containing both sophisticated adults and 
young children: ‘The dog who was chasing me was huge; he was at least ten feet tall.’ ... 
In such a case, one warrants the truth of what one says to the children but not to the 
adults.”15 
With the authors of fiction, perhaps even still today, lying is just such a rhetorical 
exercise: an attempt to make the unreal as real as possible; an attempt to make perhaps 
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even the most sophisticated adult gain concern and investment in the plausible 
experiences of people and stories that do not in the most rigid sense exist. The ease 
with which a reader is able to suspend disbelief is in many ways the true measuring stick 
of good fiction, no matter the genre, and the ancient novelists, with their various 
attempts at creating plausible, believable narratives out of the stories they invented out 
of whole cloth, were among the first to hone and sharpen those skills, which still hold us 
in thrall today. 
12 
 
Chapter 1: Longus and the Art of Deception 
  
Of all the novelists who treat lying and deceit, none perhaps does so as overtly and 
repeatedly as Longus. 16 This may not be surprising, given that with Longus we have perhaps 
antiquity’s most psychological novel.17 Throughout Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe, the author 
makes us aware of the possibility of deceit, whether in storytelling (μῦθος) of how things 
happened, or in the skill (τέχνη) of how things are described or done. And while much has been 
made about how these two central foci of Longus – storytelling and skill – punctuate the entire 
program laid out by the author at the onset of his work, including the often-problematic ways in 
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 The manuscripts all give us the name Λόγγος, though the Florentine manuscript states Λόγος, which at 
one time led some to suggest anonymity (Hunter 1983, 101 n.5). An inscription (IG XII.2.88) from Mytilene 
listing important citizens and dated to the late first century BCE records a Γν. Πομπήιος Λόγγος, indicating 
a Roman family (or a family with Roman patronage and thus an adopted Roman name) lived on the island. 
Cichorius found it obvious that the Longus of our novel was no doubt connected to this famous Lesbian 
family, both thanks to his name and his familiarity with the island: Ich möchte nämlich auch an Longus, 
den Verfasser des erhaltenen Hirtenromans erinnern, der, wie allseitig anerkannt wird, nach der in seinem 
auf Lesbos spielenden Romane überall zutage tretenden ganz genauen Kenntnis der Verhältnisse auf der 
Insel notwendig von ihr stammen muß; undenkbar wäre es jedenfalls nicht, daß er zu der auf Lesbos 
bezeugten angesehenen Familie der Pompei Longi gehört hat (Cichorius 1922, 323). But other than that, 
we have no information or reference to the author. On Longus’ date we are on even softer ground: there 
is no evidence of it prior to the 12
th
 century Byzantine verse romance Drosilla and Charikles by Nicetas 
Eugenianus, 6.440-450 (Burton 2004, 130-131), which includes a short reference to “that famous boy 
Daphnis … only a shepherd” (Δάφνις ὁ παῖς ἐκεῖνος ... ποιμὴν μόνον) and his lover Chloe, who joined 
themselves together in marriage (συνῆψαν αὐτοὺς (sic) εἰς γάμον). A ninth century work may contain an 
allusion to it: McCail (1988, 115) argues that a passage of Constantine of Sicily’s Daphniaca might contain 
an allusion to Philetas’ encounter with Eros in Longus. He connects Constantine to Longus’ text through 
his onetime teacher Leo the Philosopher, who is thought to have held a copy of Achilles Tatius (122). 
Previous attempts at dating Daphnis and Chloe have centered on the three thousand drachmae Daphnis 
finds in 3.27.4, a sum that after the inflation of the latter third century would have been “virtually 
worthless” (Hunter 1983, 4). Otherwise, very little movement in dating Longus has happened in recent 
scholarship. The summary consensus thirty years ago was summarized by Hunter thus: “Most critics 
would now probably place Longus in the center of the ‘Second Sophistic,’ a movement which is usually 
regarded as a phenomenon of the period A.D. c. 50-250.” (Hunter 1983, 3; cf. p. 44 n.72). While Morgan 
just ten years ago stated about the same, still citing Hunter’s summary: “The scholarly consensus is to 
date the work to the late 2
nd
 or early 3
rd
 century, but none of the arguments adduced is in itself conclusive 
… Pending conclusive proof, a date in the second half of the 2
nd
 century is a plausible guess” (Morgan 
2004, 2). My treatment will make clear my opinion that Longus belongs firmly within the traditions of 
Achilles Tatius and Apuleius, both of whose dating is much firmer and whose sophistic, stylistic affinities, 
especially with respect to the narration of deceptive tales, Longus shares. 
17
 Kester (1973, 169): “Through pictorial space and chronological time Longus builds his detail to provide 
extraordinary psychological plausibility for the awakening sexual consciousness of the protagonists.” 
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which they appear incongruous with one another, little to no attention has been paid to the 
immense amount of deception at work overall in the story. 
 These deceptions take many forms, from outright lies (ψεύδη), to mimicry (μίμησις),  to 
“schemes” (τέχναι) designed to deceive, to lies of omission, and they seem to telegraph to us 
over and again that stories, events, people and even natural places are not always what they 
seem. This chapter will track such lies and examine the repercussions they could have on 
scholarship on Longus, of late so often focused on the author’s preoccupations with ecphrasis, 
narrative framing, and embedded storytelling. It then poses the question: how seriously should 
we take the author’s word when he tells us the impetus behind his story in the preface?  
Ἐν Λέσβῳ18 θηρῶν ἐν ἄλσει Νυμφῶν θέαμα εἶδον 
κάλλιστον ὧν εἶδον: εἰκόνα, γραφήν, ἱστορίαν ἔρωτος. 
Καλὸν μὲν καὶ τὸ ἄλσος, πολύδενδρον, ἀνθηρόν, 
κατάρρυτον: μία πηγὴ πάντα ἔτρεφε, καὶ τὰ ἄνθη καὶ 
τὰ δένδρα: ἀλλ ἡ γραφὴ τερπνοτέρα καὶ τέχνην ἔχουσα 
περιττὴν καὶ τύχην ἐρωτικήν: ὥστε πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν 
ξένων κατὰ φήμην ᾔεσαν, τῶν μὲν Νυμφῶν ἱκέται, τῆς 
δὲ εἰκόνος θεαταί. Γυναῖκες ἐπ αὐτῆς τίκτουσαι καὶ 
ἄλλαι σπαργάνοις κοσμοῦσαι: παιδία ἐκκείμενα, 
ποίμνια τρέφοντα: ποιμένες ἀναιρούμενοι, νέοι 
συντιθέμενοι: λῃστῶν καταδρομή, πολεμίων ἐμβολή. 
Πολλὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάντα ἐρωτικὰ ἰδόντα με καὶ 
θαυμάσαντα πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ: καὶ 
ἀναζητησάμενος ἐξηγητὴν τῆς εἰκόνος τέτταρας 
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 Longus’ association and/or familiarity with Lesbos has been an ongoing topic of debate, though most 
have seen in his descriptions a more or less accurate knowledge of the island. Perry (1967, 351) was 
emphatic on this score: “The close familiarity with the island of Lesbos shown by Longus in his romance, 
and his obvious fondness for its rural scenery, tend strongly to confirm our belief that he was indeed a 
native of that island.” Morgan (2004, 1) is likewise convinced: “Although some elements of [Longus’] 
countryside clearly derive from the convention of literary pastoral, too many details for co-incidence, on 
matters such as natural features, flora, fauna, climate and political organization, both reflect the realities 
of Lesbos and are not to be found either in other pastoral or, in many cases, in factual texts treating of 
Lesbos.” Still others have researched the matter more thoroughly. Responding to two much earlier critics 
(Nabor 1877, Hiller von Gartringen 1932) who suggested Longus’ distances were too far off for him to be 
properly familiar with Lesbos, Mason (1979) suggests that Longus (like others) has given us precise 
distances to help us locate his story. Green (1982), while critical of Mason’s prediction of precisely where 
on Lesbos Longus had set his tale, nevertheless praises Mason for dismantling previous assumptions 
about Longus’ ignorance of the island, including a recurring criticism that suggested that the heavy winter 
described in Book 3 (discussed on pp. 29-30 below) would never happen in such a mild climate, something 
belied by the harsh winters experienced within recent memory on Lesbos (Green 1982, 210). 
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βίβλους ἐξεπονησάμην, ἀνάθημα μὲν Ἔρωτι καὶ 
Νύμφαις καὶ Πανί, κτῆμα δὲ τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, 
ὃ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται, καὶ λυπούμενον 
παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ 
ἐρασθέντα προπαιδεύσει. Πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἔρωτα 
ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται, μέχρι ἂν κάλλος ᾖ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ 
βλέπωσιν. Ἡμῖν δ ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι σωφρονοῦσι τὰ τῶν 
ἄλλων γράφειν. 
 
On Lesbos while hunting in a glade of the nymphs I 
saw a sight most beautiful of the things I have seen: an 
icon, a painting, an account of love. The grove was 
beautiful, with many trees, flowered, and watered: one 
spring nourished it all, both the flowers and the trees: 
but the painting was more pleasing and had surpassing 
skill and an erotic subject: so much so that many 
foreigners came following after its reputation, 
suppliants of the nymphs and spectators of the image. 
Upon it were women giving birth and others adorning 
[their children] with swaddling clothes; an attack of 
pirates, an invasion of enemies. An urge seized me 
while looking and gazing at all the many other erotic 
things there to write in response to the painting. And 
having sought an exegete of the image I have worked 
out four books, an offering to Eros and the Nymphs and 
Pan, a possession pleasing to all people, which might 
both heal the sick and comfort the grieving, that will 
remind those having experienced love and teach those 
who have not. For no one has ever wholly escaped from 
love nor will escape, so long as there is beauty and eyes 
that see. And so may the god allow us to prudently 
write about the experiences of others. 
 
As I will attempt to make clear, Longus’ supposed inspiration for his story fails the standards for 
plausibility he himself lays out in his own tale, as almost none of what is to follow is spelled out 
in the painting that supposedly seizes his interest. Is it possible Daphnis and Chloe is not just one 
long μῦθος based on a painting as it purports to be, nor even (only) one long τέχνη or 
responding work of art as many have suggested, but perhaps even one long ψεῦδος? And given 
that lies and concealment form the backbone of the story as a whole, should this really surprise 
us? 
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 Several types of lies are told by the characters of the novel, the most basic described as 
simply that, “lies” (ψεῦδα). But even more often (and more significantly for our analysis) than 
forms of ψεῦδος that appear in the novel are deceitful τέχναι – schemes, ploys, or contrivances 
that are employed for the purpose of deception. Many have examined τέχνη in broader detail as 
it applies to the skill that Longus employs to construct his elaborate ecphrasis, which responds 
(ἀντιγράψαι) to the painting seen by the narrator in the proem of the work. At its most basic, 
discussion has noted how central τέχνη is to the work as a whole, as an artistic program. Thus 
Teske, though perhaps not innovatively,19 structures her entire monograph on how τέχνη makes 
for the program of the novel as a whole: “Die Hochschätzung der τέχνη, wie sie der Erzähler 
vermittelt, zeigt sich in der Ausarbeitung des Werks ... Die Favorisierung der τέχνη wird in 
gewisser Weise durch die akribische kunstlerische Gestaltung des Romans noch einmal zum 
Ausdruck gebracht.”20 Others have likewise seen a parallel between Longus and actual works of 
art. Mittelstadt meticulously divided the narrative of the novel into sets and subsets, attempting 
to show its conformity to Roman narrative painting, which, he argues, Longus sets up in his 
proem: “the skeletal structure of the plot as Longus envisioned it from the pictures.”21 He then 
divides the narrative neatly up into twelve episodes, grouped into four sets of threes: the 
static/descriptive (setting of the scene), the narrative (plot), and the lyric (Daphnis and Chloe 
together alone in idyllic landscape). Meanwhile, Kestner likewise sees the whole work as framed 
by the ecphrasis. Newlands, also, sees both the painting that begins the work, and the one 
described in Book 4, as framing the novel: “The two paintings in microcosmic form illustrate the 
aesthetics of the macrocosm, the work as a whole.”22 All of this is to say that the subject of 
                                                          
19
 Teske’s “general conclusion is succinctly anticipated on p. 45 of Hunter’s A Study of Daphnis and Chloe,” 
notes a review by Anderson (1992, 184-185). 
20
 Teske 1991, 117 
21
 Mittelstadt 1967, 52 
22
 Newlands 1987, 56 
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Longus’ work as it relates to art has been an unexhausting one for scholars, and most have 
attempted, with more or less complexity, to fit the narrative into the structure, program or 
other confines of a painted work.  Zeitlin, however, takes such an analysis much further, noting 
that the manner in which Longus unfolds his ecphrasis is wholly in line with the sophistic 
tradition in which he wrote: “In the texts of sophistic rhetoric ... there are other 
authors/viewers, who, for example, in collections of ecphrases of paintings ... have several 
underlying aims. The first is mimetic – to compete with the power of pictorial images through 
verbal means, while the second is didactic – to use description in order to make some moral (or 
aesthetic) point.”23 She links this to Longus’ other subjects, namely the erotic education of the 
two youths and the natural, pastoral world in which he sets the tale: “The author’s major 
innovation in plot is to center a romance on the extreme youth and naiveté of his lovers and to 
link up the ‘natural’ forces of eros to the processes of education, both innate (physis) and 
acquired by skill (techne), as well as the teaching (paideia) of others.”24 Therefore, we are 
treated to several layers of μίμεσις, τέχνη, and παιδεία as the narrator imitates the painting, the 
narrative works mimetic effects on the reader, and the children learn about Eros through 
μίμεσις.25 
 I would subscribe here to Zeitlin’s thesis with a significant modification: that is, that 
while μίμεσις, τέχνη, and παιδεία are indeed central to Longus’ work, they are all also wrapped 
up in the narrator’s preoccupation with deceit: that in addition to the erotic education and 
coming-of-age experienced by the two protagonists, part of the παιδεία they acquire or 
exemplify is detectable by tracking the lies they tell against the other (usually less sophisticated) 
lies of other characters. 
                                                          
23
 Zeitlin 1990, 432 
24
 Ibid, 430 
25
 Ibid, 435 
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But before examining sophisticated lies, we should take a look at the simple lying that 
happens often and early in Daphnis and Chloe, as if a telegraph to us to take especial note of the 
more significant deceptions which this chapter will outline more elaborately below. The first 
and, I will argue, perhaps ultimately most significant time we encounter it is, of course, in the 
discoveries of the two children in the countryside,26 abandoned by their biological parents and 
found by shepherds,27 two symmetrical episodes which both involve deceit on their adoptive 
parents’ parts, the continued concealment of which will, of course, eventually lead to the 
triumphant conclusion. Both children are found being suckled by an animal (Daphnis a goat; 
Chloe a ewe)28 and discovered with aristocratic recognition tokens. Daphnis is found first in the 
narrative, and his adoptive parents take every precaution to conceal his true status: 
τὰ μὲν συνεκτεθέντα κρύπτουσι, τὸ δὲ παιδίον 
αὑτῶν νομίζουσι …. Ὡς δ ἂν καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦ παιδίου 
ποιμενικὸν δοκοίη, Δάφνιν αὐτὸν ἔγνωσαν καλεῖν. 
(1.3.2) 
 
They hid the things exposed with him, and they 
considered the child their own. … And so that the name 
of the child should seem rustic, they decided to call him 
Daphnis.29 
 
Next Chloe’s foster parents, Dryas and Nape, come up with the same scheme in 1.6: 
                                                          
26
 Connor’s study of nympholepsy (1988, 178) is particularly applicable with respect to the two 
protagonists, especially in light of the nymphs’ prominent role in the story at large and the two youths’ 
divine favor (see n.28 below). Connor notes that the nympholept “had a significant social role and status” 
that included “an emphatic severance from the normal world of family, kin, village, and polis, followed by 
a withdrawal into the wild,” precisely the sort of journey the two youths will undergo. 
27
 A common theme through ancient myth and literature, including the novels, abandonment was 
nonetheless a real phenomenon in antiquity, and was frequently the subject matter of Roman 
controversiae and declamations (Boswell 1988, 56 n.5). 
28
 “The spontaneous suckling of a child by an animal implies superhuman status or divine favour, as with 
Asklepios (goats and hounds), Telephos (hind), Hippothoon, Pelias and Nereus (mares), Meletos, Romulus 
and Remus (she-wolves), Paris (bear) and Semiramis (doves); thus expectations are set at the start of the 
novel.” (Morgan 2004, 152) 
29
 Outside of Longus, Daphnis is best known as a herdsman who invents pastoral. For an interesting 
account of Daphnis’ relation to Near Eastern myths (in connection with Theocritus 1’s placement of him 
opposite Aphrodite), see Anagnostou-Laoutides and Konstan 2008, 499-503. 
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παρακελεύεται θυγάτριον νομίζειν καὶ 
λανθάνουσαν ὡς ἴδιον τρέφειν. … καὶ τίθεται καὶ αὐτὴ 
ποιμενικὸν ὄνομα πρὸς πίστιν αὐτῷ, Χλόην. (1.6.2) 
 
He bade (his wife) to consider the child her 
daughter and to nourish her secretly as though her 
own. And she gave a rustic name to the child for 
credibility: Chloe. 
 
Already then, at the outset of Book I, the entire narrative movement of the work is based upon a 
double deception: both sets of parents take extra precaution to pass the children off as their 
own, and yet even this will prove to be unconvincing in the end, as we shall see. Daphnis’ 
parents hide (κρύπτουσι) the tokens found with him, and Chloe’s mother is told to raise the 
child “secretly” or “under the radar” (λανθάνουσαν). But the crowning scheme by both pair of 
parents is to give the children “rustic” (ποιμενικὸν) names, so as to avoid suspicion. The entire 
plot of the novel, then, is predicated upon the deceits of the adoptive parents: these will be rich, 
aristocratic children raised in the poor humility of the countryside, unbeknownst to almost 
everyone, including the children themselves. 
 Ignorant though they may be about their parents’ deceit, neither Daphnis nor Chloe 
appear to need any lessons in outright lying, for both do so when expedient throughout the 
work, and this often takes shape through alternative stories or versions of events they tell in 
place of what really happened. The first example of an outright ψεῦδος occurs when Daphnis 
and one of his goats fall into a hole and are rescued by the cowherd Dorcon.   
Τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τυθησόμενον χαρίζονται σῶστρα τῷ 
βουκόλῳ, καὶ ἔμελλον ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς οἴκοι 
λύκων ἐπιδρομήν, εἴ τις ἐπόθησεν. (1.12.5)30 
                                                          
30
 This passage belongs to the (in)famous blotted-out page of the Flourentine manuscript, wherin the 
spilling of ink in 1809 was a bit of an international scandal. The passages were unknown until Paul-Louis 
Courier discovered the manuscript and set out to copy them, then somehow damaged the original, 
leaving his transcription as the only remaining witness. The incident caused an extensive flap and 
authorities in Rome actually forbade Courier from printing any form of the discovered and now 
obliterated text that he had transcribed. He later tricked a printer into printing it anyway, allowing for the 
hitherto unknown passage to be published and translated for the first time (Barber 1988, 57-60). 
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They thanked him by sacrificing (the goat) as an 
offering, and they were going to lie31 to those at home 
about an attack of wolves, if anyone should miss it. 
 
Daphnis makes up a similarly adventurous story in 3.20 when he has just had sex with Lukainion. 
Lukainion had herself made up a story (which we will examine presently) to lure Daphnis away, 
claiming that her prize goose had been snatched by an eagle, and Daphnis provides the equally 
fabricated sequel, lying to Chloe that he had snatched the goose from the claws of the eagle 
(τόν τε χῆνα τῶν τοῦ ἀετοῦ ὀνύχων ἐψεύσατο ἐξαρπάσαι, 3.20.2).32  
 As seen above, the characters of the work are often said to lie, but just as often they are 
said to contrive more elaborate deceptions. Thus, besides the skill that τέχνη often denotes, it 
just as often refers to contrivances and schemes aimed to deceive. The success of these τέχναι 
appear to be directly dependent on the education or intelligence of the person employing them, 
and the ability to successfully deceive overall is directly linked to the intelligence and the paideia 
of the character in question. And so, the first unsuccessful deception we hear of in the story 
proper is that of the unsuccessful wolf traps the villagers construct in 1.11. These “mimic the 
ground” (ἐμεμίμητο γῆν) and have the appearance of ground (γῆς εἰκόνα), but the wolf was not 
fooled because it knew the ground was contrived (αἰσθάνεται γὰρ γῆς σεσοφισμένης). The 
rustic villagers therefore only manage to lose many goats and sheep in the process (the very 
thing they were trying to prevent), but catch no wolves thanks to the crudity of their 
contrivance. 
                                                          
31
 This is admittedly not much of a crafty lie. The same excuse upon the loss of an animal can be found in 
Apuleius Met. 7.22, when rustics likewise plot to sacrifice Lucius the ass: ‘Obtruncato protinus eo intestina 
quidem canibus nostris iacta, ceteram vero carnem omnem operariorum cenae reserva. Nam corium 
affirmatum cineris inspersu dominis referemus eiusque mortem de lupo facile mentiemur.’/“Slaughter him 
straightaway and throw his intestines to our dogs, but keep all the rest of his meat for a dinner for us 
laborers. For we will bear back the hide to our masters firmed up by the sprinkling of some ash, and easily 
lie that his death was from a wolf.” 
32
 Morgan (2004, 161) suggests that the young couple’s readiness to lie is “excused by their innocence and 
piety,” but I would suggest the opposite: their readiness, and indeed ability to lie, which will be seen 
throughout, is in fact aided by their aristocratic intelligence and craft. 
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Meanwhile, the city parasite Gnathon, enflamed for Daphnis, does not so much deceive 
as contrive a sophisticated harangue for his master Astylus about how in love he was with the 
goatherd despite his low status, and why that was perfectly acceptable, prompting Astylus to 
laugh and remark that Eros makes good sophists (ὁ Ἔρως ποιεῖ σοφιστὰς, 4.18.1). It is true that 
Gnathon is ultimately foiled, but not because his scheme failed; on the contrary, it wins over 
Astylus, who twice agrees to ask his father for Daphnis to present to Gnathon (4.17, 4.18). But 
that is eventually spoiled when Daphnis turns out to be the master’s son. 
Contrast Gnathon’s sophisticated albeit sophistic argument with the attempt by the 
herdsman Lampis to sabotage Daphnis and his family. Lampis seeks “a device” (τέχνη) by which 
he might make the master angry with Daphnis and his family (τέχνην ἐζήτει, δἰ’ ἧς τὸν δεσπότην 
αὐτοῖς ποιήσει πικρόν 4.7.2), but it is little more than the actions of a rampaging animal: 
Δένδρα μὲν οὖν τέμνων ἔμελλεν ἁλώσεσθαι διὰ τὸν 
κτύπον: ἐπεῖχε δὲ τοῖς ἄνθεσιν, ὥστε διαφθεῖραι αὐτά. 
Νύκτα δὴ φυλάξας καὶ ὑπερβὰς τὴν αἱμασιὰν τὰ μὲν 
ἀνώρυξε, τὰ δὲ κατέκλασε, τὰ δὲ κατεπάτησεν ὥσπερ 
σῦς. Καὶ ὁ μὲν λαθὼν ἀπεληλύθει: Λάμων δὲ τῆς 
ἐπιούσης παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν κῆπον ἔμελλεν ὕδωρ 
αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς πηγῆς ἐπάξειν. Ἰδὼν δὲ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον 
δεδῃωμένον καὶ ἔργον οἷον ἄν ἐχθρός, οὐ λῃστὴς 
ἐργάσαιτο, κατερρήξατο μὲν εὐθὺς τὸν χιτωνίσκον, βοῇ 
δὲ μεγάλῃ θεοὺς ἀνεκάλει … (4.7.3-5) 
 
Since he was going to get caught cutting down the 
trees thanks to the noise, he took aim at the flowers, so 
that he might destroy them. Having watched by night, 
he climbed the wall, and some he dug up, others he 
snapped off, and some he trampled just like a pig. And 
concealing himself he left, and Lamon coming the next 
day into the garden was going to bring water to them 
from the spring. But seeing the whole place ravaged, 
and a deed as though done by a hated enemy, not a 
robber, he rent his garment straightaway and called out 
to the gods with a great shout … 
 
Lampis’ desecration of the garden is a crude τέχνη – in which Lampis is among other things 
compared to a rampaging pig (τὰ δὲ κατεπάτησεν ὥσπερ σῦς). He even forgoes the tools of a 
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human vandal (Δένδρα μὲν οὖν τέμνων ἔμελλεν ἁλώσεσθαι διὰ τὸν κτύπον) and instead uses 
his bare hands to rampage through the garden. It is thus not surprising that it also ends 
unsuccessfully. In fact, the sole bit of craft Lampis employs (tearing up the flowers instead of 
cutting down the trees), ends up being the family’s salvation. The master’s son Astylos, moved 
with compassion at their story of bad luck, (oἰκτείρει τὴν ἱκεσίαν ὁ Ἀστύλος), agrees to lie to his 
father and “accuse the horses” tied up there of running amok, snapping off, cutting down, and 
trampling the flowers there when they got loose (κατηγορήσειν τῶν ἵππων, ὡς ἐκεῖ δεθέντες 
ἐξύβρισαν καὶ τὰ μὲν κατέκλασαν, τὰ δὲ κατεπάτησαν, τὰ δὲ ἀνώρυξαν λυθέντες, 4.10.2). 
Hence the animalistic rampage Lampis decides upon as his τέχνη ends up providing Astylos with 
a handy excuse, for it did not look like the run-of-the-mill vandalism. 
 Over and again, this type of rustic deception is contrasted with the more urbane 
sophistry employed by the tale’s aristocrats in the service of deceit. But by far the starkest 
contrast occurs between two parallel characters with parallel pursuits: the rustic Dorcon, who 
attempts to pursue Chloe but more or less fails, and the sophisticate Lukainion, who pursues 
Daphnis, and succeeds. 
 The two passages beg comparison in a number of ways. Firstly, both characters are 
classed as predators of the two youths, and fittingly in a bucolic, are thus associated with 
wolves. Dorcon will don a wolf skin in an attempt to capture Chloe, and Lukainion’s name means 
“little wolf.” 33 Secondly, their initial tactics are the same: both at first resolve to win their 
targets (Chloe and Daphnis) with gifts: 
ἔγνω κατεργάσασθαι δώροις ἢ βίᾳ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ πρῶτα δῶρα 
αὐτοῖς ἐκόμισε τῷ μὲν σύριγγα βουκολικὴν καλάμων ἐννέα 
χαλκῷ δεδεμένων ἀντὶ κηροῦ, τῇ δὲ νεβρίδα βακχικήν: καὶ 
αὐτῇ τὸ χρῶμα ἦν ὥσπερ γεγραμμένον χρώμασιν. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ 
                                                          
33
  A name that no doubt has prostitution overtones. As notes Bretzigheimer (1988, 539), she appears 
both a benevolent teacher (wohltätige Lehrerin) and the good-hearted courtesan from New Comedy 
(gutherzigen Kurtisane in der Neuen Komodie). 
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φίλος νομιζόμενος τοῦ μὲν Δάφνιδος ἠμέλει κατ ὀλίγον, τῇ 
Χλόῃ δὲ ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν ἐπέφερεν ἢ τυρὸν ἁπαλὸν ἢ 
στέφανον ἀνθηρὸν ἢ μῆλον ὡραῖον. 1.15.1-3 
 
[Dorcon] decided to accomplish his goal with gifts or force. 
At first he brought gifts to them – a bucolic syrinx for him of 
nine reeds bound with copper instead of just wax, and for her a 
Bacchic fawn skin, and the color on it was as though it has been 
painted with colors. And then, when he was considered their 
friend, he began to ignore Daphnis little by little, but to Chloe 
every day he was bringing a soft cheese or a flowery crown or a 
beautiful apple. 
 
ἐπεθύμησεν ἐραστὴν κτήσασθαι δώροις δελεάσασα. Καὶ δή 
ποτε λοχήσασα μόνον καὶ σύριγγα δῶρον ἔδωκε καὶ μέλι ἐν 
κηρίῳ καὶ πήραν ἐλάφου. 3.15.2-3 
 
[Lukainion] set her mind to obtaining him as a lover by 
enticing him with gifts. And in fact, ambushing him alone she 
gave him a syrinx as a gift and some honey in a comb and a 
deerskin bag. 
 
Not only do they first attempt gifts, their gifts are similar, if not remarkably so (pipes and skins 
and honey and apples are typical pastoral favors). Thirdly, both stalk their targets by watching 
when and where they go, and thus are able to know when they might find them alone: 
ἔγνω διὰ χειρῶν ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ Χλόῃ μόνῃ γενομένῃ: καὶ 
παραφυλάξας ὅτι παῤ ἡμέραν ἐπὶ πότον ἄγουσι τὰς ἀγέλας 
ποτὲ μὲν ὁ Δάφνις ποτὲ δὲ ἡ παῖς (1.20.1) 
 
He decided to waylay Chloe with his hands when she was 
alone: and so having watched when during the day they led the 
goats to drink, when Daphnis did and when the girl did … 
 
Αὕτη ἡ Λυκαίνιον ὁρῶσα τὸν Δάφνιν καθ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν 
παρελαύνοντα τὰς αἶγας ἕωθεν εἰς νομήν, νύκτωρ ἐκ νομῆς 
(3.15.2) 
 
Lukainion herself, having watched Daphnis each day driving 
the goats out into the pasture in the morning, and at night out 
of the pasture … 
 
Also, in keeping with both of their roles as predators, both at one point hide in the bushes in the 
pursuit of their pray: 
23 
 
πᾶς ὁ τόπος ἀκάνθαις καὶ βάτοις καὶ ἀρκεύθῳ ταπεινῇ καὶ 
σκολύμοις ἠγρίωτο: ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐκεῖ καὶ λύκος ἀληθινὸς ἔλαθε 
λοχῶν. Ἐνταῦθα κρύψας ἑαυτὸν ἐπετήρει τοῦ πότου τὴν ὥραν 
ὁ Δόρκων … 1.20.3-4 
 
The whole place was grown wild with thorns and brambles 
and low-hanging juniper and thistles: easily a true wolf could 
have remained unseen hiding there. Having concealed himself 
here, Dorcon waited for the watering hour. 
 
αὐτοῖς παρηκολούθησε καὶ εἴς τινα λόχμην ἐγκρύψασα 
ἑαυτήν, ὡς μὴ βλέποιτο, πάντα ἤκουσεν ὅσα εἶπον, πάντα 
εἶδεν ὅσα ἔπραξαν. 1.15.4 
 
[Lukainion] followed behind them and having concealed 
herself in some thicket so that she might not be seen, she heard 
everything they said, and saw everything they did. 
 
Both thus attempt the same initial strategies to get their targets:34 both try gifts at first, both 
watch and wait, and both hide – all in keeping with their wolfish symbolism. Having realized 
something cleverer is needed, both then “scheme” to get what they want:  
ἐπιτεχνᾶται τέχνην ποιμένι πρέπουσαν … 1.20.1 
He schemed a scheme befitting a rustic. 
 
ἐπιτεχνᾶταί τι τοιόνδε. 3.15.5 
She schemed something of this sort … 
 
Thus we get the ultimate attempt by both wolves: a scheme of deception. Up until this point, it 
seems clear that Longus is inviting us to view these episodes in parallel. It seems only fitting, 
then, to compare the schemes both Dorcon and Lukainion come up with, and here they could be 
no different. Two things should be borne in mind while analyzing these two schemes: firstly, the 
characters, while obviously parallel, have vastly different statuses. Dorcon is a cowherd 
(βουκόλος) and a rustic (ποιμήν), as the above passage indicates with no little amount of irony, 
as we shall see. By contrast, Lukainion is a “lady from the city, young, pretty, and daintier than 
                                                          
34
 Dorcon also tries the traditional route of courting Chloe through her father in 1.19, offering gifts to him 
in exchange for his daughter’s hand, but is unsuccessful here as well. This is a strategy unavailable to 
Lukainion both because she is a woman and because she is already married. 
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country life” (γύναιον ἦν ἐπακτὸν ἐξ ἄστεος, νέον καὶ ὡραῖον καὶ ἀγροικίας ἁβρότερον, 
3.15.1).35 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that she ultimately possesses the sophistication to 
get what she wants through lies, unlike the bumbling attempt by Dorcon: 
Λύκου μεγάλου δέρμα λαβών, ὅν ταῦρός ποτε πρὸ τῶν 
βοῶν μαχόμενος τοῖς κέρασι διέφθειρε, περιέτεινε τῷ σώματι, 
ποδῆρες κατανωτισάμενος, ὡς τούς τ ἐμπροσθίους πόδας 
ἐφηπλῶσθαι ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τοὺς κατόπιν τοῖς σκέλεσιν ἄχρι 
πτέρνης καὶ τοῦ στόματος τὸ χάσμα σκέπειν τὴν κεφαλήν, 
ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς ὁπλίτου κράνος: […] Χρόνος ὀλίγος διαγίνεται 
καὶ Χλόη κατήλαυνε τὰς ἀγέλας εἰς τὴν πηγήν, καταλιποῦσα τὸν 
Δάφνιν φυλλάδα χλωρὰν κόπτοντα τοῖς ἐρίφοις τροφὴν μετὰ 
τὴν νομήν. Καὶ οἱ κύνες οἱ τῶν προβάτων ἐπὶ φυλακῇ καὶ τῶν 
αἰγῶν ἑπόμενοι, οἵα δὴ κυνῶν ἐν ῥινηλασίαις περιεργία, 
κινούμενον τὸν Δόρκωνα πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς κόρης 
φωράσαντες, πικρὸν μάλα ὑλακτήσαντες ὥρμησαν ὡς ἐπὶ 
λύκον καὶ περισχόντες, πρὶν ὅλως ἀναστῆναι δἰ ἔκπληξιν, 
ἔδακνον κατὰ τοῦ δέρματος.1.20.2, 1.21.1-2 
 
Taking the skin of a big wolf, which a bull had killed with his 
horns protecting the cows, he stretched it around his body, 
carrying it on his back reaching to his feet, so that the front 
paws reached to his hands, and the back paws reached to his 
legs all the way to his ankle, and the maw of the mouth covered 
his head, just like the helmet of a hoplite. […] After a little time 
had passed, Chloe drove the sheep to the spring, leaving behind 
Daphnis chopping some green foliage as food for the kids after 
the pasture. And the dogs, following for protection of the sheep 
and goats, with the sort of curiosity of dogs sniffing around, 
detected Dorcon moving toward his attack of the girl, and 
barking greatly and sharply, they set upon him as though upon a 
wolf, and surrounded him, until he stood up thanks to the 
disturbance and they bit him all over his flesh. 
 
Longus says Dorcon’s τέχνη is fitting for a rustic (ποιμένι πρέπουσαν), and this must have more 
than one layer of meaning. Most obviously, a rustic might think in terms of a wolf in predation, 
so it was perhaps in keeping with both his surroundings and the pastoral literary genre for him 
to don the wolf skin in his attack on Chloe. But all it gets him is a mauling by Chloe’s dogs, who 
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 It is perhaps no coincidence that this is the same word (ἁβρότερον) used to describe the fare Daphnis 
and Chloe are nourished on by their adoptive parents (τροφαῖς ἔτρεφον ἁβροτέραις, 1.8.1). 
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take him for a real wolf (ὡς ἐπὶ λύκον). Yet we are perhaps invited to raise yet another question: 
what, pray tell, is the purpose of the costume to begin with? If Dorcon is hoping to obtain Chloe 
by force as he had earlier resolved (ἔγνω κατεργάσασθαι δώροις ἢ βίᾳ), is he hoping the wolf 
suit will somehow disguise him? Despite his head showing through the open mouth like a 
helmet (τοῦ στόματος τὸ χάσμα σκέπειν τὴν κεφαλήν, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς ὁπλίτου κράνος)? And  
how would disguising oneself as a wolf divert attention away from oneself in a pastoral setting? 
Moreover, Longus tells us Dorcon hides himself in a thicket overgrown with brush, where “easily 
even a real wolf” could remain unseen (ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐκεῖ καὶ λύκος ἀληθινὸς ἔλαθε λοχῶν), until 
he can jump out and take Chloe. So why the need for a concealing disguise to begin with?  
 Clearly, this is not just a τέχνη ποιμένι πρέπουσα because he is dressed as a wolf 
attacking a shepherdess. This τέχνη is also befitting a rustic because it is so absurd, and thus we 
are not surprised when Dorcon’s bumbling attempt goes awry. Again, since Longus clearly sets 
Dorcon and Lukainion in parallel, the contrast of his scheme to Lukainion’s, a “series of 
unscrupulous and wholly charming lies,”36 could not be more obvious. The entire Lukainion 
episode is rife with lies and deceit from the opening of the scene, where she lies to her husband 
Chromis that she is going to visit a woman giving birth (σκηψαμένη πρὸς Χρῶμιν ὡς παρὰ 
τίκτουσαν ἄπεισι γείτονα, 3.15.4), a deception that apparently worked so well the first time that 
she is able to repeat it again (Τῆς ἐπιούσης ὡς πάλιν παρὰ τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν τίκτουσαν ἀπιοῦσα, 
3.16.1).37 Though Lukainion hides and waits in a thicket much like Dorcon, it is not to ambush 
the couple, but rather to gain information to assist her in her scheme. There she hears and sees 
everything, especially the couple’s attempts at 3.14.5 to consummate their love. When Daphnis 
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 Hunter (1983, 11-12) connects this with Aristophanes Ecc.528-529, when Praxagora is asked by her 
husband Blepyrus why she left the house silently at dawn: γυνή μέ τις νύκτωρ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη  
μετεπέμψατ᾽ ὠδίνουσα/“a woman, a companion and friend giving birth, sent for me.” Alciphron (2.7) also 
made use of this passage, albeit more verbatim: ὠδίνουσα με ἀρτίως ἥκειν ὡς ἑαυτὴν ἡ τοῦ γείτονος 
μετέπεμψε γυνή/“a woman, the wife of a neighbor just giving birth, sent for me to come to her.” 
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weeps that he is “more uneducated than the rams” in love (κριῶν ἀμαθέστερος, 3.14.5), not 
even Daphnis’ crying escapes her notice (ἔλαθεν αὐτὴν οὐδὲ κλαύσας ὁ Δάφνις, 3.15.5). She 
thus seizes upon a “double opportunity” (καιρὸν διττόν) to both satisfy her own desire (τὴν 
ἑαυτῆς ἐπιθυμίαν) and offer them help (τὴν ἐκείνων σωτηρίαν, 3.15.5): 
ἀπιοῦσα φανερῶς ἐπὶ τὴν δρῦν, ἔνθα ἐκαθέζοντο Δάφνις 
καὶ Χλόη, παραγίνεται καὶ ἀκριβῶς μιμησαμένη τὴν 
τεταραγμένην ‘σῶσόν με’ εἶπε ‘Δάφνι, τὴν ἀθλίαν: ἐκ γάρ μοι 
τῶν χηνῶν τῶν εἴκοσιν38 ἕνα τὸν κάλλιστον ἀετὸς ἥρπασε καὶ 
οἷα μέγα φορτίον ἀράμενος οὐκ ἐδυνήθη μετέωρος ἐπὶ τὴν 
συνήθη τὴν ὑψηλὴν κομίσαι ἐκείνην πέτραν, ἀλλ εἰς τήνδε τὴν 
ὕλην τὴν ταπεινὴν ἔχων κατέπεσε. [3] Σὺ τοίνυν, πρὸς τῶν [p. 
293] Νυμφῶν καὶ τοῦ Πανὸς ἐκείνου, συνεισελθὼν εἰς τὴν ὕλην 
῾μόνη γὰρ δέδοικἀ σῶσόν μοι τὸν χῆνα, μηδὲ περιίδῃς ἀτελῆ 
μοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν γενόμενον. [4] Τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀετὸν 
ἀποκτενεῖς καὶ οὐκέτι πολλοὺς ὑμῶν ἄρνας καὶ ἐρίφους 
ἁρπάσει. Τὴν δὲ ἀγέλην τέως φρουρήσει Χλόη: πάντως αὐτὴν 
ἴσασιν αἱ αἶγες ἀεί σοι συννέμουσαν.’ 
 
Going openly to the oak where Daphnis and Chloe were 
sitting, and accurately mimicking a distraught woman, she stood 
beside them and said, “Save me, Daphnis, I’m miserable. An 
eagle has snatched from me one of my twenty geese, the most 
beautiful, and he was not able to lift so great a weight from the 
ground, to carry it off to his high accustomed rock, but bearing 
it into this here wood, he dropped it. So you, by the nymphs and 
that Pan, accompanying me into the wood (for I am afraid to go 
by myself), save my goose. Please do not disregard a number 
that has become incomplete for me. And having quickly killed 
the eagle itself, it will no longer snatch so many of your lambs 
and kids. Chloe will watch over your herd in the meantime; the 
goats especially know her since she is always herding with you.” 
 
Lukainion thinks of everything. She acts the part “accurately” (ἀκριβῶς), mimicking a distraught 
woman,” (μιμησαμένη τὴν τεταραγμένην), 39 and not only comes up with a believable story, 
                                                          
38
 No doubt a reference to Odyessy 19.536ff, in which Penelope has a (prophetic) dream in which an eagle 
(Odysseus) kills her twenty geese (the suitors). Its playful irony here is surely no accident, for Lukainion 
has lost a goose (an extramarital lover) she wants to recover in the woods (where she will consummate 
her desire with Daphnis). Morgan (2004, 211) muses that this must make Lukainion the eagle, “who will 
take him into the wood and do her worst.” 
39
 Mimicry is another way in which Longus conveys deceit and/or illusion. Innocent mimicry is found in 
Daphnis and Chloe mimicking the sounds and sights of spring in 1.9, where they are both mimickers of the 
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albeit one with clear literary allusions regarding fidelity, she adds to its credibility by including 
the excessive detail so commonplace in liars: one might have objected that he cannot get to an 
eagle on its perch, so Lukainion believably invents details about the eagle being unable to fly 
because of the weight, and unable to reach his accustomed high perch. She even is ready with a 
way to keep Chloe out of the way – someone must watch the sheep and goats, after all, and she 
has watched the two of them enough to know they care for each other’s flocks. As if this were 
not convincing enough, she adds self-interest into the mix, offering that if the eagle is killed, it 
will “no longer snatch so many of your lambs and kids” (οὐκέτι πολλοὺς ὑμῶν ἄρνας καὶ 
ἐρίφους ἁρπάσει ). Now, there is no eagle – so presumably no kids or lambs have gone missing 
thanks to a nonexistent bird of prey. But surely lambs and kids did go missing from time to time, 
and Lukainion’s remarks, brazenly “reminding” Daphnis of this false fact, as though it has 
actually happened (and thus will “no longer” – οὐκέτι – happen), is a brilliant crowning touch, 
not only for convincing the naïve goatherd, but also his shepherdess girlfriend. Indeed, her spiel 
is so convincing, in fact, that Daphnis “suspected nothing of what was going to happen” (Οὐδὲν 
τῶν μελλόντων ὑποπτεύσας ὁ Δάφνις, 3.17.1). Lukainion then proceeds to convince Daphnis to 
have sex with her in order to learn “the deeds of love” (ἔρωτος ἔργα).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
things they hear and see (νέοι μιμηταὶ τῶν ἀκουομένων ἐγίνοντο καὶ βλεπομένων) and of the bees in 
gathering flowers (τὰς μελίττας δὲ μιμούμενοι ἄνθη συνέλεγον). Often mimicry takes this innocent hue, 
which nonetheless conveys a theatrical sense of playing a part. Daphnis and Chloe later “mimic” Pan and 
Syrinx after Lamon tells their myth, as Daphnis plays the part of Pan, Chloe of Syrinx (Ὁ Δάφνις Πᾶνα 
ἐμιμεῖτο, τὴν Σύριγγα Χλόη, 2.37.1), and Daphnis runs on his toes to “mimic hooves” (τὰς χηλὰς 
μιμούμενος, 2.37.2). In 2.38.1, after the conclusion of this mime, Daphnis is said to have kissed Chloe as 
though she had been found from a “true flight” φιλήσας ὡς ἐκ φυγῆς ἀληθινῆς εὑρεθεῖσαν τὴν Χλόην). 
But mimicry can just as often be used by the story’s foils. Thus the Methymnaean soldiers, after 
plundering the Mitylenaean countryside, are said to “mimic a victory festival” after they are temporarily 
relieved of duties in 2.25 (ἐπινίκιον ἑορτὴν ἐμιμοῦντο), and one of them helps lend to the appearance of 
a night battle by lying on the shore, “mimicking the sight of a corpse” (καὶ σχῆμά τις ἔκειτο νεκροῦ 
μιμούμενος). The parasite Gnathon in 4.17, making a sophistic case for his love for Daphnis, suggests he is 
“mimicking the gods” (θεοὺς ἐμιμησάμην) in his lust for the young shepherd, likening his case to Zeus and 
Ganymede or Aphrodite and Anchises. 
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It is typically here that commentators suggest Daphnis (with Chloe to follow) has begun 
to pass out of childhood and into adulthood, but his and Chloe’s ability to lie, and lie well, also 
sets them apart from the rustics whose schemes inevitably fail so miserably. It should be 
remembered that in addition to being in actuality aristocrats, the two are also fed daintier fare 
by their parents (αὐτοὺς καὶ τροφαῖς ἔτρεφον ἁβροτέραις) and taught to read (γράμματα 
ἐπαίδευον, 1.8.1). That they should enjoy the more sophisticated abilities, including craft and 
deceit, that come with that status and upbringing should therefore not surprise.40 
It is perhaps then not accidental that the most pregnant uses of deception happen when 
utilized by the two protagonists, whose education away from naiveté is the central focus of the 
work. As seen above, the two lie about an attack of wolves when presenting Dorcon with a goat 
for his saving of Daphnis at 1.12. Likewise, each lies to the other about extra-romantic 
entanglements.  As examined already, Daphnis lies to Chloe about rescuing Lukainion’s goose 
after the two have sex in a secluded part of the forest. And while the naiveté of Daphnis is 
stressed more than once in this episode, it is also telling that he never questions the contrivance 
Lukainion has devised to get him there, and even conspires within it afterward in telling Chloe 
that he had rescued the goose instead of servicing Lukainion. Likewise, Chloe lies to Daphnis by 
omission at 1.31, retelling him the whole story of Dorcon’s intervention via his syrinx-trained 
cattle but not telling him about the kiss he asked for in return because she was ashamed (μόνον 
αἰδεσθεῖσα τὸ φίλημα οὐκ εἶπεν, 1.31.2).  
It is also suggested that the two have an ability to distinguish fact from reality, even if 
not always perfectly. After Philetas tells the couple a story about Eros romping through his 
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 This falls in line with a general urban prejudice many observe in the author. As Morgan (2004, 155) 
notes: “The narrator’s urban assumption (shared by the characters from both town and country) is that 
real rustics are ugly and oafish, when not actively malevolent … As the pastoral elect, [Daphnis and Chloe] 
are distinguished from  the peasant community by their urban qualities of beauty, refinement and 
leisure.” 
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garden in 2.7, Longus suggests the couple enjoyed the account “as though hearing a story, not a 
fact” (ἐτέρφθησαν ὥσπερ μῦθον οὐ λόγον ἀκούοντες, 2.7.1).41 This calls to mind the perhaps 
most self-referential part of Longus, in which a Mythemnaean commander, having kidnapped 
Chloe, is beset by madness sent by the god Pan, who appears to him in a dream and admonishes 
him for, among other things, taking “a maiden about whom Eros wishes to make a story” 
(παρθένον, ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει, 2.27.2).  
But even if Pan’s remark in 2.27 is the most overt reference to the fictionality of Daphnis 
and Chloe at large, perhaps the most elaborate discourse on deception – and thus on the 
persuasiveness of invented fictions – occurs at the novel’s midway point, in the only winter 
narrated in this heavily seasonal work. Here, at 3.4, while the rest of the country is enjoying a 
respite from labor, Daphnis and Chloe are distressed by their separation, and Longus says they 
are seeking a τέχνη by which they might see each other (εὐχόμενοι τέχνην ἐζήτουν, δἰ ἧς 
ἀλλήλους θεάσονται). Chloe, we are told, was helpless and stumped (Ἡ μὲν δὴ Χλόη δεινῶς 
ἄπορος ἦν καὶ ἀμήχανος) because her mother was always nearby, teaching her new skills. 
Daphnis, meanwhile, having more leisure time and smarter than a girl (ὁ δὲ Δάφνις, οἷα σχολὴν 
ἄγων καὶ συνετώτερος κόρης) discovers a contrivance by which he might see Chloe (τοιόνδε 
σόφισμα εὗρεν ἐς θέαν τῆς Χλόης, 3.4.5). What follows is one of the novel’s most charming 
interior monologues, in which Daphnis, hunting birds near Chloe’s house as a pretext 
(προφάσει) and even catching many of them for credibility (ἐς πίστιν),42 looks for a further 
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 Much discussion has been made of the distinction between μῦθος and λόγος both in ancient literature 
and modern scholarship. Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias (523a) states the ancient differentiation succinctly: 
“Listen well, as they say, to a fine account, which you will regard a myth, I’m guessing, but I a fact: for the 
things which I am going to tell to you I tell to you as true things” (ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν 
σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν). For 
Morgan (2004, 16-17, 182) this passage epitomizes a program of Longus’ whereby he attempts to break 
down the Thucydidean dichotomy of the utility of history vs. the pleasure of fiction – for Longus, fiction 
can be both pleasurable and instructive. The ancient rhetorical categorizations of fable, fiction, and 
history will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
42
 Virtually the same construction used at 1.6.3, when Chloe’s parents named her thus “for credibility.” 
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pretext (again, προφάσει) to go to the door when those inside fail to notice him. Longus says he 
here examines what would seem most persuasive (πιθανώτατον), and embarks on a series of 
scenarios in which Daphnis foresees the implausibility of various excuses: 
‘Πῦρ ἐναυσόμενος ἦλθον.᾿ ῾Μὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἦσαν ἀπὸ σταδίου 
γείτονες;᾿ ῾Ἄρτους αἰτησόμενος ἧκον.᾿ ῾Ἀλλ ἡ πήρα μεστὴ 
τροφῆς.᾿ ῾Οἴνου δέομαι.᾿ ῾Καὶ μὴν χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐτρύγησας.᾿ 
῾Λύκος με ἐδίωκε.᾿ ῾Καὶ ποῦ τὰ ἴχνη τοῦ λύκου;᾿ ῾Θηράσων 
ἀφικόμην τοὺς ὄρνιθας.᾿ ῾Τί οὖν [4] θηράσας οὐκ ἄπει;᾿ ῾Χλόην 
θεάσασθαι βούλομαι.’ Πατρὶ δὲ τίς καὶ μητρὶ παρθένου τοῦτο 
ὁμολογεῖ; 3.6.3-4 
 
“I came to light a fire.” “But aren’t there neighbors a stade 
away?” “I came to get bread.” “But your bag is full of food.” 
“We’re in need of wine.” “But only just yesterday you picked 
the grapes.” “A wolf is chasing me.” “And where are the wolf’s 
tracks?” “I came to hunt birds.” “Why don’t you go away then, 
since you’re done hunting?” “I want to see Chloe.” But who 
would admit this to a girl’s father and mother? 
 
So here we not only have deception, but the inner psychological machinations of deception, in 
which Daphnis is sophisticated enough to examine what would be a likely successful deception 
and what would more likely not. It must have taught Daphnis a great deal, for after he is finally 
noticed and allowed inside and enjoys an evening with Chloe and her family, Longus says he 
made many more journeys to her house that winter with other schemes (ἄλλαις τέχναις). But 
the end is especially important here, for he notices the improbability of telling the outright truth 
– “who would admit this to to a girl’s father and mother?” It calls to mind Daphnis’ earlier 
crowning sophistic achievement, during the trial with the Methymnaean youths in 2.16. There, 
he ends his speech with the question, “Who having a brain would believe that a ship carrying 
such great cargo would have a shoot for a cable?” (τίς πιστεύσει νοῦν ἔχων ὅτι τοσαῦτα 
φέρουσα ναῦς πεῖσμα εἶχε λύγον;) It matters not that we know that this is exactly what 
happened – Daphnis is able to point out the incredible nature of such a claim, and thus wins the 
day. Yet earlier, he and Chloe lacked such sophistication when it came to seeing through 
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Dorcon’s or Lukainion’s ruses. However sophisticated or not the deceptions are early in the 
work, Daphnis and Chloe in their embryonic state(s) of learning are not able to divine such 
deception. This is particularly significant with respect to Dorcon’s scheme, which as we have 
seen, is a cartoonish disaster, but many have tied their ignorance of this and other matters to 
their general lack of (urbane) education: “Their misperception of this attempted rape is just that 
– a misperception due to their lack of education,” notes Winkler.43 Pandiri takes their ignorance 
one step further, applying it to her overall sense that Longus is sanitizing the world he is 
presenting for the (non-rustic) outsiders who are enjoying his work. Thus the children think it is 
pastoral fun, “as, in this artificial world, it must be.”44 
 Indeed, the realism of the novel or lack thereof has been most often of late wrapped up 
with scholarship’s preoccupation with art and ecphrasis in Longus. This still situates us in the 
realm of deceit, however, as art in this period was often aimed at deceiving the viewer into 
thinking it was real.45 Indeed, where the model of reading Longus as an idyllic work of art does 
get challenged to any degree, it is by those who see traces of undermining realism in his work.46 
Pandiri notes that in this artistic expression, Longus gives hints of the “more practical, realistic, 
cruder dimension to such idealized figures” as those in the country. 47 “Several observations 
force themselves even on the reader who has determinedly suspended disbelief,” she notes, “as 
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 Pandiri 1985, 122 
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 See discussion immediately below, and in Chapter 3. 
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 Though plenty do not: C'est un monde précisément pastoral, et des plus conventionnels … un monde des 
plus purs, des plus irréels, car Daphnis et Chloé sont tout aussi loin d'etre de vrais bergers qu'ils pourraient 
l'être; ils sont moins "réels" même que Chéréas et Callirhoé (Reardon 1971, 376). Bowie (1977, 95) sees 
Longus as representing an urban aristocratic point of view but nonetheless striving to present his world 
and its people in a realistic fashion: “Both characters and landscape … are seen selectively but realistically 
from the point of view of a rich city-dweller.” Tatum (1994, 197ff) includes an entire section on the 
novels’ relation to the “real world,” including Arnott (cited above). In contrast, Hunter (1983, 21) sees 
preoccupation with the realism of the story to be misplaced: “The modern study of ancient bucolic 
literature has, however, been too concerned to label a given landscape or individual detail as ‘realistic’ or 
‘idyllic’ where very often no such simple division is possible. There are many different shades of ‘reality.’” 
47
 Pandiri 1985, 120. 
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the preparations for the city-folk call attention to the normal state of the idyllic pastoral 
landscape in which Daphnis and Chloe disport themselves: the ground is covered with smelly 
dung, the streams are not pristine; animals get dirty; even the milking vessels are grubby ... 
Nature is fully pleasing only in art; to delight sophisticated eyes at all in the ‘real’ world, it must 
be carefully groomed, scrubbed, deodorized, pruned and arranged to suggest a painterly 
image.”48 The model of the novel as a painting then begins to break down, as we are made 
aware of the artifice of this world that Longus has created, which necessarily leads us to look 
outside the painting, perhaps even outside the novel itself. Thus Newlands, who takes Pandiri’s 
model still further, sees this “cleaning up” as part of the narrator’s program: “Lamo(n)'s cleaning 
and beautifying of the pastoral pleasance to suit urban taste is a metaphor of the narrator's own 
art, which seeks to obscure the harsh realities of rural life such as its dirt and its servitude by 
presenting an armchair view of nature. The visitors from the city, we are told, come to the 
country in order to find themselves en eikoni, in a picture (4.5). This is how the narrator has 
largely presented the countryside to us, as an illusionary painting in words.”49 Still, Arnott has 
set about suggesting that Longus wrote from accurate knowledge in the field of natural history, 
despite making a few mistakes. But the mistakes are where we might glean the most 
knowledge, for Arnott sees them in the trapping of animals, specifically the wolf traps and 
Daphnis’ trapping of birds. But as we have already seen, both are part of more or less successful 
attempts at deception. Arnott makes much out of the incorrect depths that the villagers dig with 
their wolf traps,50 but Longus is more concerned with their lack of artifice in covering the holes, 
which fails to deceive the wolf. And although the narrator calls Daphnis’ bird traps successful, 
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 Ibid., 125 
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 Newlands 1987, 57 
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 Arnott (1965, 206) notes they would only be 7.2 meters, not deep enough to trap a wolf at all. But then, 
Longus specifically claims they failed, so it is puzzling how this can be considered one of Longus’ 
“blunders” as opposed to one belonging to the characters of the story. 
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they are nonetheless part of an elaborate design by Daphnis to see Chloe, not to actually trap 
birds. 
Longus’ preoccupation with deception is thus apparent both in the text itself and in the 
central and cursory concerns of modern scholarship. He appears to make a direct connection 
between intelligence and the ability to deceive successfully, and the two children, who are on a 
journey toward self-awareness and adulthood, seem to illustrate their steps along that path 
through their own use of (successful) deceit. As readers aware of the Big Lie (that the 
protagonists are actually aristocrats, not lowly shepherds), we know that they will inevitably end 
up together once their true statuses are recognized. But as devotees of New Comedy (with 
which Longus’ educated readers were no doubt familiar), we also know that such a recognition 
will come with a goodly amount of complication. And with New Comedy, the status of only one 
of the lovers is typically in doubt, yet here both protagonists are being passed off as rustic while 
in actuality aristocrats, and neither set of parents is privy to the real status of the other set’s 
child. This poses more or less no problems until Daphnis is attempting to win the hand of Chloe. 
Here Longus presents us with a host of lies, ironies, and seeming contradictions for us to work 
out, requiring us to focalize the events through the eyes of each character to keep straight what 
is going on.  
First, Dryas (Chloe’s foster father) begins to get gifts from pastoral suitors for Chloe’s 
hand, and her mother Nape, despite knowing the status of her daughter, is elated at the 
prospect of marrying Chloe off to a well-off albeit farming suitor and getting money in return, 
and is likewise anxious that if this doesn’t happen soon, Chloe may “make a man of some 
shepherd for apples and roses” (ἄνδρα ποιήσαι τινα τῶν ποιμένων ἐπὶ μήλοις ἢ ῥόδοις, 
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3.25.2).51 Dryas is tempted, knowing that the gifts he is receiving from suitors are better than 
those afforded to shepherding girls (μείζονα γὰρ ἢ κατὰ ποιμαίνουσαν κόρην δῶρα). He 
demurs, however, knowing that she is better than rustic suitors (ὡς κρείττων ἐστὶν ἡ παρθένος 
μνηστήρων γεωργῶν, 3.25.3). So far, Longus appears to be sparing us the more ready conflict, 
which would see Chloe engaged to some farmer and thus unavailable for Daphnis. But the Big 
Lie allows for an even greater complication: for while Dryas is holding pastoral suitors at bay no 
matter the wealth they promise, hoping that if he preserves her and someday finds her true 
parents it will win him a fortune (εἴ ποτε τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς γονέας εὕροι, μεγάλως αὐτοὺς 
εὐδαίμονας θήσει, 3.25.3), Daphnis learns from Chloe about the numerous suitors and her 
mother’s desire to marry her off. Daphnis then decides to tell his mother Myrtale about the 
suitors and his desire to marry Chloe, and she tells his father Lamon, who becomes angry at the 
suggestion, prompting Myrtale to herself concoct a lie. 
Σκληρῶς δὲ ἐκείνου τὴν ἔντευξιν ἐνεγκόντος 
καὶ λοιδορήσαντος εἰ παιδὶ θυγάτριον ποιμένων 
προξενεῖ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς γνωρίσμασιν ἐπαγγελλομένῳ 
τύχην, ὃς αὐτούς, εὑρὼν τοὺς οἰκείους, καὶ ἐλευθέρους 
θήσει καὶ δεσπότας ἀγρῶν μειζόνων, ἡ Μυρτάλη διὰ 
τὸν ἔρωτα φοβουμένη μὴ τελέως ἀπελπίσας ὁ Δάφνις 
τὸν γάμον τολμήσῃ τι θανατῶδες, ἄλλας αὐτῷ τῆς 
ἀντιρρήσεως αἰτίας ἀπήγγειλε. ‘Πένητες ἐσμέν, ὦ παῖ, 
καὶ δεόμεθα νύμφης φερούσης τι μᾶλλον: οἱ δὲ 
πλούσιοι καὶ πλουσίων νυμφίων δεόμενοι. Ἴθι δή, 
πεῖσον Χλόην, ἡ δὲ τὸν πατέρα, μηδὲν αἰτεῖν μέγα: 
πάντως δή που κἀκείνη φιλεῖ σε καὶ βούλεται 
συγκαθεύδειν πένητι καλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πιθήκῳ πλουσίῳ.’ 
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With Lamon having taken the idea harshly and 
having abused her as if he should marry a daughter of 
shepherds to their son, whose recognition tokens had 
predicted great wealth for them, and who, having 
discovered his own family, might make them free and 
the masters of great estates, Myrtale, fearing that on 
account of his desire Daphnis, having despaired of his 
marriage, might dare something deathly, reported to 
him different reasons for his father’s answer: “We are 
poor, child, and we are in need of a bride bringing with 
her a bit more. But they are rich and are in need of rich 
bridegrooms. Come, persuade Chloe, and she her 
father, not to seek a great amount: after all, she loves 
you greatly, and would rather sleep with a hot pauper 
than a rich monkey.” 
 
These delays of the ultimate revelation of the status of the protagonists are stock comic motifs, 
but here they are further complicated by a narrative early in the story. For at 1.7, both Lamon 
and Dryas have identical dreams in which the nymphs give the children to Eros (whom they 
somehow do not recognize), who urges them to have the children tend the flocks. In 1.8, we are 
told that both were vexed at the notion that their adopted children should be herdsmen when 
they each showed such promise from their swaddling (τύχην ἐκ σπαργάνων ἐπαγγελλόμενοι 
κρείττονα, 1.8.1). They both decide to follow the dream, even tell each other about it 
(κοινώσαντες ἀλλήλοις τὸ ὄναρ, 1.8.2), and then make an offering together in the cave of the 
nymphs where Dryas had found Chloe. In order for the later narrative to hold water, we are 
forced to presume that they did all of this together without once revealing to the other the 
tokens found or the secret status of each’s own child – in other words, we are forced to believe 
that they lied to each other, maintaining the Big Lie that forms the basis of the story. For in the 
latter part of the work examined above, each remains ignorant of the secret status of the 
other’s child. Of course, their synchronized dream is one of several plot-turning dreams 
involving the nymphs in the novel (among others, Daphnis’ dream telling him where to find the 
treasure in 3.27, Daphnis’ dream instructing him to pay homage to Pan to rescue Chloe in 2.23), 
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all of which invite our scrutiny, for we are told of another dream of the nymphs’ guidance at 
3.17 – that of Lukainion’s, which is, of course, a lie: 
‘ἐρᾷς’ εἶπε ‘Δάφνι, Χλόης: τοῦτο ἔμαθον ἐγὼ νύκτωρ παρὰ 
τῶν Νυμφῶν. [2] Δἰ ὀνείρατος ἐμοὶ τὰ χθιζά σου διηγήσαντο 
δάκρυα καὶ ἐκέλευσάν σε σῶσαι διδαξαμένην τὰ ἔρωτος ἔργα. 
3.17.1-2 
 
‘Daphnis, you desire Chloe,” she said. “I learned this last 
night through the nymphs. They told me through a dream about 
your tears yesterday and bade me to save you by teaching you 
the deeds of love.” 
 
The nymphs did not tell Lukainion about Daphnis’ tears over his erotic failure, of course – she 
saw it for herself while spying on the couple in a bush. But this is a world where people, 
including the protagonists, have divinely inspired dreams all the time,52 so we can excuse 
Daphnis for failing to be suspicious. That the novel’s most consummate liar can make use of a 
fake dream in such a deceitful way should, however, beg consideration. It is precisely because 
rustics find such dreams compelling, and precisely because she is not, in fact, a rustic, that 
makes this particular ruse perfect for the urbanely educated Lukainion. 
But nowhere is the connection between education and lying made more apparent than 
at the story’s climax: after Dionysophanes has ordered Lamon to give up Daphnis to go home 
with Gnathon in exchange for two replacement goatherds, the aristocrat questions Lamon 
about Daphnis and at first is understandably skeptical of the rustic’s tale:  
τὸν δὲ Λάμωνα πάλιν ἀνέκρινε καὶ 
παρεκελεύετο τἀληθῆ λέγειν μηδὲ ὅμοια πλάττειν 
μύθοις ἐπὶ τῷ κατέχειν τὸν υἱόν. Ὡς δ ἀτενὴς ἦν καὶ 
κατὰ πάντων ὤμνυε θεῶν καὶ ἐδίδου βασανίζειν αὑτόν, 
εἴ τι ψεύδεται, παρακαθημένης τῆς Κλεαρίστης 
ἐβασάνιζε τὰ λελεγμένα. ‘Τί δ ἂν ἐψεύδετο Λάμων, 
μέλλων ἀνθ ἑνὸς δύο λαμβάνειν αἰπόλους; Πῶς δ ἂν 
καὶ ταῦτ ἔπλασσεν ἄγροικος; Οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἦν ἄπιστον 
ἐκ τοιούτου γέροντος καὶ μητρὸς εὐτελοῦς υἱὸν καλὸν 
οὕτω γενέσθαι;’ (4.20.1-2) 
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And Lamon questioned him again and ordered 
him to tell the truth and not to construct things like 
fables in order to hold on to his son. And when he was 
steadfast and swore by all the gods and offered himself 
to torture if he was telling some lie, with Kleariste (his 
wife) sitting by his side, he (Dionysophanes) began to 
examine the things that had been said. “Why would 
Lamon lie, when he’s going to get two goatherds in 
place of one? How could a rustic fictionalize such 
things? And was it not unbelievable that such a good-
looking son might come from such an old man and 
shabby mother?” 
 
It’s important to note the trajectory of Dionysophanes’ thoughts, all of which show an 
aristocratic bias: he begins by questioning the herdsman’s motives, and seemingly oblivious to 
the possibility that Lamon and his wife actually love their adoptive son and might want to keep 
him for purely affectionate reasons, concludes that he would have no reason to lie when he 
stands to profit by an extra goatherd. He next moves on to the story itself, and here I think 
Longus gives us an authorial wink, for the educated, urbane aristocrat essentially says that the 
story Lamon told is apparently too sophisticated or clever by far for a mere rustic to have 
invented it. The word Longus employs here, ἔπλασσεν, is in fact the verbal form of the word the 
rhetoricians use to denote “fictions” (πλάσματα), and it is used only here, with Longus 
preferring to focus more often on the word μῦθος for his tale. But μῦθος shows up here, too: 
Dionysophanes, having just heard the tale of Daphnis’ discovery, likens it to “things like fables” 
(ὅμοια μύθοις), and yet he only (quite literally) knows the half of it. Thus here, at the 
culmination of his novel, Longus provides us with the most authorial self-referential passage yet, 
an acknowledgment that what he has written is indeed a fairy tale (μῦθος), but one far too 
creative or sophisticated for any rustic to have concocted.  
Having gotten near the end of the narrative and still finding echoes of deceit there, are 
we perhaps tempted to look back at the beginning – to examine the program of the work as a 
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whole laid out in the proem? We have already examined the numerous ways in which the 
proem has been read as a program for the narrative as a whole – most often, as either a model 
for its narrative structure, or as a work of art (τέχνη) to which the author feels compelled to 
respond against (ἀντιγράψαι). But many have found gaps in the proem when it is compared to 
the work as a whole. MacQueen urges caution when examining the prologue, noting that the 
chronology of what is presented in the painting is different from how the novel itself unfolds. 
Not only that, most of the novel is not even present in the painting: “All the rest of Daphnis and 
Chloe is apparently subsumed in the vague πολλὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάντα ἐρωτικὰ (‘many other things, 
all erotic’). The erotic education of Daphnis and Chloe, which occupies most of our attention 
throughout the novel, is scarcely mentioned; and the various divine interventions are also 
apparently missing from the painting.”53 Mittelstadt, so set on finding narrative painting in 
Longus, dismisses these inconsistencies and suggests the remainder of the plot is depicted in the 
idyllic scene of the lovers exchanging oaths on the painting, this despite suggesting that the 
novel’s plot (“casually disconnected in its episodes”) displays a “psychological continuity”54 – 
precisely that (the erotic education of the couple) just noted by MacQueen, an overt mention of 
which is not in the painting. However, Mittelstadt offers an intriguing idea: that there was no 
painting. Comparing his work on Longus to scholarship on Philostratus – the Second Sophistic’s 
ecphrastic extraordinaire55 – Mittelstadt notes that one Philostratan scholar has conceded “we 
have no means of knowing whether the paintings and the gallery were real or figments of the 
imagination. Philostratus, however, was first of all a sophist who developed the description of 
paintings as a form of literary art. There would have been no inconsistency in describing 
imaginary paintings provided that he preserved the illusion that he was dealing with existing 
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paintings ... A student of Greek paintings may thus use his descriptions as data for his research 
whether or not the actual paintings existed.”56 However, Bartsch notes that several times 
Philostratus appears to “do violence” to the image he is supposedly describing. “Not that 
Philostratus has through careless or ignorance made a mistake; on the contrary, the sophist has 
chosen to reinterpret the picture to extract from it the sense that he himself wants.”57 But 
perhaps Mittelstadt is right and Longus has made up a painting that nonetheless adheres to the 
narrative style it otherwise would have. Still, another motivation should be considered here. 
MacQueen notes that “one of the great problems for any writer of antiquity was validation. 
Ancient readers were simply not prepared to accept out-and-out fiction,” comedy 
notwithstanding.58 Most of the prose fictions we have, and which will be examined in this 
dissertation, seem to address just this problem, and MacQueen sees in Longus a self-
consciousness here: “One might argue that Longus, too, feels compelled to find some external 
point of reference in order to validate his narrative. ... the fact remains that Longus, in the 
Prologue, clearly represents his work as his own creation ...The story derives its validation, not 
from any mythical or historical datum, but from itself, from its own construction.”59 MacQueen 
is not alone here. Morgan, in examining fiction with regard to the Greek novels, highlights the 
“illusions of authority” the novelists often seek, and though he finds Longus “the least 
representational of the novelists,” he notes that Longus uses his vivid visual program to point 
out the “ambiguities it raises about the relationship of art to nature.” Indeed, Elsner sees the 
possibility of incorrect description in ecphrasis as one of its main attributes with respect to the 
gaze: “If it is difficult, under the regime of naturalism, to be sure that the viewing subject has 
correctly understood and related to the viewed object, then the examination of that difficulty in 
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Roman writers and painters demonstrates an acute self-awareness about the gaze’s potential 
for failure, error, and deception. Ecphrasis itself, insofar as it provides a pedagogic model for the 
gaze, may be seen as both its enabler (in helping the viewers it is training to see) and its 
occluder (in the veil of words with which it screens and obscures the purported visual object).”60 
These occlusions or ambiguities, these gaps where others have attempted to find artistic 
structure, should, I believe, lead us to question the self-conscious fictionality of the story, which 
is, perhaps, as alluded to by both MacQueen and Morgan, telegraphed to us by the author 
through the various fictions he puts in the mouths and actions of his characters. Just as his 
characters’ abilities to lie seem linked to their education and intelligence, we might suggest the 
same of the narrator, who, everyone agrees, seems pre-occupied with impressing us with his 
ornate response to the painting he (supposedly) came across in the proem. 
 Such a model is hardly new, though I have yet to see it applied to Longus or even the 
Greek novel in general, despite routine attempts to divine the origin of this genre that takes as 
its subjects not established myth nor history (except tangentially), but rather wholly fabricated 
characters and stories. In her examination of archaic poetry, Pratt set out to establish just this 
relationship between poet, character, and lying in a model that seems applicable to Longus and 
the other novelists, their lying characters, and the deceits they try and sometimes accomplish. 
Though lying is assumed bad and truth-telling good in some ethical discussions in antiquity, Pratt 
notes that archaic narrative presents “a far more complex view.”61 It is worth noting 
(considering the lupine motifs throughout Longus) that in discussing one of the principles for 
lying she discovers in archaic poetry – namely, that lying to do one’s enemy harm is wholly in 
keeping with Greek ideology – Pratt quotes Pindar’s Pythian 2.84-85, where he promises to 
attack his enemy “in the manner of a wolf, treading devious courses.”  But another of her 
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principles seems most applicable here. Pratt finds a direct connection between lying (well) and 
intelligence, even noting that “everyone does not deserve to hear the truth; in fact, the inability 
to perceive the truth may itself be proof of one’s not deserving to.”62 In such an analysis of 
intelligence and lying, one should immediately think of Odysseus, and indeed much of Pratt’s 
analysis depends on the Odyssey. Ancient readers, she notes, not only saw connections between 
Odysseus and Homer in their storytelling, but also in their ability to lie, something Aristotle 
(Poetics 1460a) saw as an appropriate skill that Homer had taught other poets (δεδίδαχεν δὲ 
μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.). “In so doing, Aristotle does not 
distinguish between the poetic skill at fictionalizing possessed by the author and the verbal skill 
at lying possessed by the author’s character.”63 Pratt also finds that the poet regards poetry as a 
craft – a τέχνη – that is, a product of the poet’s “knowledge and intelligence.”64 She notes that 
the Odyssey, “with its depiction of Odysseus’ lies, warns us against assuming that all credible 
tales, knowledgeably shaped, are true. It may be natural to deduce truth from coherence or 
credibility, but the Odyssey shows itself well aware that the skill of the liar depends on creating 
this same semblance, this same appearance of truth. ... Odysseus’ verbal techne, his ability to 
speak well and knowledgably like a poet, makes him equally capable of truth (if he so desires) or 
of credible and persuasive lies.”65 Pratt goes on to make the very same distinction among 
archaic poets I have made here with regard to Longus – that τέχνη is closely associated with 
deception. “Like our word craft, techne describes both the cunning and the useful arts, and a 
clear distinction cannot always be drawn between the two.”66 Her ultimate conclusion to this 
particular examination of lying is one I wish to make about Longus: “The best way to reveal 
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one’s techne verbally is through a lie ...The more conscious the poets become of their techne, 
and the more anxious to call attention to it, the more they must call attention to the artificiality 
of their work, to their own poetic inventiveness. This creates a context within which it may 
actually be desirable to suggest an affinity between the poet and the liar.”67 
 Such a cynical interpretation of Longus is not new, even if no one, to my knowledge, has 
fully examined the ways in which deception plays such an integral thematic role in his work (or 
in the work of the other novelists). As McCulloh notes, Longus “refuses to be serious about his 
own ‘message’: he readily undercuts it at various points with foolery, irony, mockery, and 
lubricity.”68 McCulloh goes on to quote Rohde’s famously cynical reading of Longus, who, he 
says, by repeatedly whipping up the desire of the protagonists (and the reader) and leaving it 
ungratified, “makes us most unpleasantly aware that all the naiveté of this idyllist is only an 
artificial concoction, and that he himself is in fact nothing more than a Sophist.”69 Indeed, in the 
Romance language translations and articles on Longus, he is still called “Longus the Sophist” 
(Longo Sophista) by tradition, without any real examination of what the title might mean. 
 But by examining the deceitful sophistry of the period contemporary with Longus, in the 
textbooks from which he would have learned, in the prose authors contemporary with him, and 
especially in the other six novelists we have from antiquity, we can perhaps get an idea of how 
telling his title of Sophist might in fact be. After all, what is more sophistic than the assertion 
that the story itself – not whether or not it happened, not whether or not it is true – is what 
should be of paramount importance? Can we shrug that even if Longus is not describing an 
actual painting, he is still structuring his narrative in line with the paintings of his day? Or does 
this possibility throw the entire program of the work, explicitly stated by the writer, to the 
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wolves: namely, that he is going to write in response (ἀντιγράψαι) to this painting, to surpass or 
match its visual beauty – so stunning that the narrator suggests it was more pleasing with its 
τέχνη than the locus amoenus in which it sat – with his own verbal skill? For if there was no 
painting, then Longus’ attempt at surpassing its τέχνη would seem grossly rigged. And if the 
existence of the painting can be so easily doubted, it makes the whole of Daphnis and Chloe a 
literary Chinese box of lies: the two protagonists, through whose eyes we witness the idyllic 
countryside, are living a lie: not only are they not really herdsmen, their respective adoptive 
parents have ensured that they eat “daintier food” and are taught their letters, unlike their 
rustic peers. Thus the whole of their experience is perhaps not wholly rustic at all, just as our 
reading of it is not the portrait of real rustic life. 
 Finally, Daphnis and Chloe are both named thus by their adoptive parents in an explicit 
act of deception, and a rather crude one at that. For while their bumpkin parents think their 
rustic names will conceal their true statuses, their beauty is constantly remarked upon and 
noticed; their true statuses clear to those who truly look. Moreover, Daphnis and Chloe were 
not just the names their parents give them; it was also, if the naming conventions of the other 
novels are any indication, the name of Longus’ work. The Big Lie is, in the end, the entire work 
itself, and behind it – behind the “babes abandoned and shepherds picking them up” (παιδία 
ἐκκείμενα ... ποιμένες ἀναιρούμενοι), lies the painting. And if Longus himself gives us enough to 
doubt the painting’s existence, then behind its façade lies the author, and only the author, with 
a series of τέχναι of his own invention – the stuff fictions are born of. 
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Chapter 2: Deception in the Second Sophistic 
 
Lies, Fiction, and Ancient Rhetorical Theory 
As has been established, Longus is preoccupied with notions of deceit, but especially 
credible deceit. It is credibility, after all, that sets up the motion of the entire narrative, when 
the two sets of foster parents name Daphnis and Chloe as they do “for credibility” (πρὸς πίστιν, 
1.6). This credibility again becomes an issue at the end of the work, when Lamon tells the story 
of finding Daphnis to Daphnis’ biological father, Dionysophanes, who doubts the account and 
demands the goatherd tell it again truthfully, all the while wondering aloud how a rustic could 
make up such a thing (Πῶς δ´ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα ἔπλασεν ἄγροικος; 4.20). This same theme appeared 
earlier in the story when Pan warned the Methymnaean commander to let Chloe go, as Eros 
wished to make a μῦθος out of her (2.27), “an intensely and complexly self-referential 
moment.”70 Assuming that the work that Longus wrote was, indeed, titled “Daphnis and Chloe,” 
the meta-discussions regarding the two youths’ names and the credibility of their placement in 
the countryside (the setting of the entire novel) can be seen as yet more examples of “self-
aware and self-reflecting fiction.”71 
In his preoccupation with the nature of fiction and lies, and especially with notions of 
credibility, Longus was not alone among his contemporaries. Within the so-called Second 
Sophistic (50-250 CE),72 several authors likewise discourse on credible deceit, especially with 
                                                          
70
 Morgan 2004, 193 
71
 MacQueen 1990, 97 
72
 The dates are rough and the period (and terminology) notoriously difficult to define. Coined by Flavius 
Philostratus in the introduction of his Lives of the Sophists (230s CE), the term “Second Sophistic” initially 
denoted a practice, not an era, though the second usage is most common today, referring to the 
declamation-oriented display oratory of the imperial period. Philostratus deemed orators to belong to 
45 
 
regard to storytelling. But before looking at Longus’ literary contemporaries for complementary 
examples along these lines, it is perhaps instructive to start at a more basic level with some 
textbook examples (literally): namely, the rhetorical exercises with which many of them would 
have been trained – the various progymnasmata and the rhetorical theorists of his era. 
Several examples of these exercises survive, and many quoted here will postdate 
Longus, assuming his widely agreed-upon dating of the late second or early third century.73 
However, it is clear from reading over the various progymnasmata that many of the example 
speeches offered and the theoretical maxims that accompanied them were stock in trade going 
back centuries.74 And many of them are, in fact, contemporaneous with Longus or earlier. The 
earliest rhetorical theorists for our era are Theon, writing in Greek, and the Roman Quintillian, 
both contemporaries of the late first century and both concerned with credibility as a hallmark 
virtue of good narration. Both orators invoke a common tripartite division among rhetors in the 
Roman world: “the virtues of narration are three,” Theon notes in his section On Narrative 
(Spengel 4): “clarity, conciseness, and credibility” (ἀρεταὶ δὲ διηγήσεως τρεῖς, σαφήνεια, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
two sets: the first were those like Gorgias and Critias, who addressed philosophy (τὴν άρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν 
ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν, 480). The latter, “second” group practiced a form of display 
oratory that Philostratus dates all the way back to Aeschines upon his exile in the fourth century BCE (“we 
must not call the sophistic that followed that one ‘new,’ for it was old, but rather ‘second,’”/ ἡ δὲ μετ΄ 
ἐκείνην, ἣν οὐχὶ νέαν, ἀρχαία γάρ, δευτέραν δὲ μᾶλλον προσρητέον, 481), but practiced primarily by 
those in the first three centuries of the Common Era (the sophist detailed after Aeschines, after 
Philostratus skips over those he deems of lesser quality, was Nicetes of Smyrna, who lived in the time of 
Nero (511-512). On recent treatments of the Second Sophistic, see Anderson 1993, Schmitz 1997, and 
Whitmarsh 2005. 
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 Cf. 12, n.16 above. 
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 Clarke 1996, 166, n26: “Our knowledge of the progymnasmata comes from the writers of the empire, 
but the system no doubt took shape earlier, perhaps in the second century B.C.” Also, Bonner 1977, 250-
51: “It seems likely, therefore, that the formation of the standard set of preliminary exercises, known to 
us mainly from writers of the imperial period, was a gradual process, which took place during the 
Hellenistic Age. It must, however, have been fairly complete by the first century B.C., and maybe earlier 
…” And in addition to Theon, a contemporary of Quintilian, “mention may be made here of later Greek 
compilations, on which, in view of the remarkably faithful adherence to tradition, it would not seem 
unreasonable to draw from time to time for the better illustration of the subject.” See too T. Morgan 
1998, 3-4: “...surviving descriptions and examples of the exercises used to teach literacy and numeracy 
and their associated disciplines, suggest that much the same exercises in the same order were taught, 
from the third century BCE onwards, everywhere ...” 
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συντομία, πιθανότης). He is echoed by Quintilian, who attributes them to Isocrates: eam 
plerique scriptores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, volunt esse lucidam, brevem, verisimilem 
(Institutio Oratoria, 4.2.31).75 Likewise, Suetonius (d. 130 CE) lists much the same general topics 
of exercise that appear in the progymnasmata, not least of all those that concern us most: the 
credibility of fables.76 It is therefore not important that in the manuscript tradition, many of the 
progymnasmata collections postdate Longus and the other novelists concerned here (and not all 
do). Much of the material found in them is clearly drawn from a store of exercises and 
discourses much earlier, and their fixation on matters of oratorical style and performance (on 
apolitical topics such as mythology or distant history) match what we know of the declamations 
of Longus’ era and before. What is clear is that this training – what amounted to secondary 
education – had a tremendous impact on the novelists, as has been demonstrated by scholars 
before.77 At first blush, the exercises in fable and narrative can seem too simplistic to offer much 
in the way of comparative analysis with the novels. But the theorists exhausted these exercises 
with an enormous amount of commentary. As early as the Hellenistic schools, “teachers, 
meticulous, finicky as they were, showed tremendous enthusiasm and put all their power of 
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 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 4.2.31. Indeed, Quintillian himself is often used to date Theon, assuming 
he is the same man referenced twice in the Institutio Oratoria (95 CE). Quintillian refers to a Theon on 
status theory at 3.6.48: (fecerunt alii totidem status, sed alios, “an sit?” “quid sit?” “quale sit?” “quantum 
sit?” ut Caecilius et Theon) and a Theon the Stoic at 9.3.76 (Theon Stoicus πάρισον existimat, quod sit e 
membris non dissimilibus.) Whether either of these are Theon, allowing an earlier date than the Institutio, 
“it is the consensus of scholarly opinion that it is, in any event, the earliest surviving work on exercises in 
composition, certainly written sometime between the Augustan period and the flowering of the Second 
Sophistic in the second century” (Kennedy 2003, 1). See also Cicero, de inv. 1.27, apud Trenkner 1958, 184 
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 De Rhetoribus 1: “… often they would affirm or deny the credibility of fables” (saepe fabulis fidero 
firmare aut demere). 
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 See Bartsch 1989 on ecphrasis, the progymnasmata, and the novel; and De Temmerman (2010, 2014) 
on characterization, whose work builds on the numerous contributions by Kennedy, who will be also cited 
often here. As Reardon (1974, 26) notes, “What is common, ultimately, to novel and sophistic, is the 
education received in the rhetorical schools.” O’Sullivan (1995, 166) concurs: “Later, romance-writing 
became an activity for rhetoricians, a development eased by the fact that the stuff of the romances had 
for long been the subject-matter of exercises in the schools of rhetoric.” Trenkner (1958, 184-185) also 
sees the romances as influenced by the rhetorical exercises, but asserts that they both drew from popular 
story-telling: “These were traditional stories which had the character of novelle or novels and were in 
written or oral form, but were in all cases popular …. The motifs of pirates, abductions and searches – the 
very stuff of the novel – were part of this literature.” 
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analysis into these apparently insignificant exercises.”78 Not only the three cardinal qualities of 
brevity, precision, and verisimilitude need be present, but also a host of other sub-qualities: 
“agent, action, time, place, manner, and cause … and three or four species – mythical, poetical, 
historical or civic.”79 Even the final two species lapsed into purely literary exercises, as students 
were encouraged to make speeches in history that never actually happened or imagine events 
different from those that had originally occurred.80 And some of these students were future 
historians! It is enough to prompt Gibson to muse, at the opening of his article examining the 
influence of the progymnasmata on the writing of history: “Imagine a world in which 
prospective historians were required by their teachers first to write historical fiction (e.g., about 
trials for treason set during the American Revolutionary War), to invent stories in the science 
fiction genre of ‘alternate history’ (e.g., what if Hitler had won World War II?), and to perform 
impersonations of historical characters for school plays and public festivals. What would be the 
effect of such a course of training on historians? Would they see this training as being in any 
way at odds with the project of writing history?”81 Certain contemporaries, like Lucian, clearly 
did see such training as at odds with the project of writing history, as we shall see. But whatever 
its effect on history,  it becomes rapidly apparent when reading  the progymnasmata that 
Longus and the novelists are not alone in their preoccupations with fact, fiction, lies, and 
credibility. Rather, creating verisimilitude in a story they themselves invented – this was indeed 
what literate students (and future novelists) went to school to do, at least during a significant 
portion of their training, even if the primary purpose for that training was for the assemblies and 
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 It is a widely accepted view that roughly consonant with the close of the Hellenistic age (sometime 
around the first century BCE) and the advent of the Roman Empire, ancient rhetoric saw a shift that 
increasingly influenced later literature and narrative, a shift “from persuasion to narration, from civic to 
personal contexts, and from speech to literature,” a process that then cycles back and for which the 
Italian term letteraturizzazione has been coined (Kennedy 1980, 5). 
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 Gibson 2004, 103 
48 
 
law courts. Indeed, one walks away from the progymnasmata with the feeling that the novelists’ 
various meta-narratives on these topics are not terribly unique (a conclusion also supported by 
contemporaries who likewise treat such topics, as we shall see). Nevertheless, given that 
Longus, Chariton, Apuleius and others are writing in a somewhat novel format (prose fiction) 
that does not draw from existing historical or mythological narrative but rather from stories 
seemingly invented by their authors alone, discourses on these matters can illuminate for us the 
sort of intellectual process at work in creating a genre that many consider the birth of fiction as 
we now know it. That intellectual process was introduced to these authors at a very young age, 
and examining the rhetorical exercises of the progymnasmata is a good first step toward 
understanding said process. And when we look at these exercises, we see many of the same 
themes explored, most notably matters of plausibility (εἰκός) and credibility (πίστις) in 
narratives and fables, which are themselves often termed lies (ψεῦδα). 
As early as Quintilian, this association between fables (fabulae or μῦθοι) and lies had 
become engrained, most usually juxtaposed against history (seen as fact), and then a nebulous 
area in between that is the subject of this dissertation. Quintilian puts forth this triple divide 
(echoed by the later Greek rhetors below) early in his Institutio Oratoria: “We have received 
three types of narrative: the fable (fabulam), which is written in tragedies and poems, not only 
removed from the truth but also from any resemblance of the truth; the rational narrative 
(argumentum), which is false but is similar to the truth, as comedies fashion; and the history, in 
which there is an exposition of an event that happened (narrationum … tres accepimus species: 
fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus non a ueritate modo sed etiam a forma 
ueritatis remota; argumentum, quod falsum sed uero simile comoediae fingunt; historiam, in 
qua est gestae rei expositio, 2.4.2). Because rhetoric often lapsed into narratives of any of these 
three stripes, oratory was often accused of being at odds with the truth, its practitioners so 
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unconcerned with truth that they were themselves self-deceived. Not so, says Quintilian. An 
orator is not self-deceived because “an orator, when he makes use of falsehood in place of 
truth, knows that it is false and that he is using it in place of truth. He himself therefore does not 
hold a false understanding, but deceives another” (Item orator, cum falso utitur pro uero, scit 
esse falsum eoque se pro uero uti: non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium, 
Institutio Oratoria, 2.17.20-21). Responding to critics who refuse to call oratory an art because it 
contradictorily teaches what ought to be said and what not ought to be said (2.17.30-31), 
Quintilian instead asserts the difference is between what is probable and more probable: “if 
something is more credible than another, it is not contrary to it” (si quid est altero credibilius, id 
ei contrarium est, 2.17.34-35). Indeed, Quintilian writes that critics often claim that oratory is 
concerned not with truth at all, but only with what is probable (rhetorice non utique propositum 
habet semper vera dicendi, sed semper verisimilia, 2.19.39), to which he responds that the 
rhetor knows, in fact, that he is only concerned with probability, and so, again, he is not self-
deceived. 
It is important here to fully appreciate what the rhetoricians meant when they spoke of 
plausibility or credibility, especially when many of their exercises strayed often into the 
fantastic. The plausibility that the student is expected to render in a given speech in character, 
in a given narration or even in a given fable, is not dependent upon the underlying situation 
being itself plausible. Indeed, the rhetoricians divide fables into classes of the rational (involving 
human beings) and the ethical (when dealing with animals – from ἤθος, that is, pertaining to an 
animal’s innate character).82 And so, we must not import overly empirical notions of plausibility 
when examining these speeches, and in fact they invite us not to. Gibson’s comparison to 
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 John of Sardis, 1.8-9; Aphthonius the Sophist, 1.1; Nicolaus the Sophist 2.7 (sometimes, as in Nicolaus, 
simply broken down as rational vs. irrational, but almost always maintaining this human vs. animal 
dichotomy). 
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science fiction is an apt one: while it might be implausible for any number of reasons that Hitler 
might have won World War II, it is not in the protasis of a given sci-fi plot, or in the case of the 
progymnasmata, a fable or character speech (if a eunuch were to fall in love; if a painter were to 
desire his own painting) that begs for credibility. The more fantastical of the exercises make this 
apparent. It is rather in the apodosis that the student seeks plausibility. If X were the case, what 
then would the person say? How should the situation be narrated? And what would be the 
moral? Indeed, the more incredible a given situation, the greater the skill demanded of the 
student. As film critic Terrence Rafferty noted about Pierre Boulle’s 1963 novel Planet of the 
Apes, “It’s a witty notion, of a kind that characterized old-school science fiction: the fantastic 
‘what if?’ premise that allows the writer to examine the conditions of his own time from a 
different perspective.”83 The consumers of such fictions even today subscribe wholly to 
innumerably implausible protases, but each story’s success derives from the relative 
believability of its apodosis. Such is the nature of fiction and credibility in the progymnasmata, 
and then by extension, in the more sophistic of the novelists. If we look too skeptically at the 
stories themselves, with their supernatural interventions and all-too-tidy turns of fate (two 
youths exposed in the same way and adopted and reared in the same way, again with the aid of 
divine intervention), we miss the internal exercises in plausibility in which the authors invite us 
to engage. And, once again, these are quite literally textbook exercises: creating plausibility, 
even in so-called fables (μῦθοι), is what young writers were specifically trained to do in their 
secondary education.84 
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 Similar exercises are found in the controversiae (declamations) attributed to Quintilian. Here basic 
points of law (a son shall support his destitute father; a free man may not be submitted to torture), are 
used as pretexts for elaborate fictions in the form of court speeches, full of as much intrigue and 
whodunit spectacle as any modern pulp fiction: what if said son had not been ransomed by his father 
when he had been kidnapped by pirates, and had escaped, only to be then required to support his derelict 
father upon his return (Major Declamation V)? What if a poor but free man willingly wishes to submit to 
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For example, immediately following Theon’s above repetition on the virtues of 
narration, he specifically hones in on credibility: “It is necessary to cling always to credibility in 
narrative, for this is especially the unique aspect of it. With this lacking from it, the more clear 
and concise it may be, that much more non-credible it appears to those listening” (δεῖ γὰρ 
ἔχεσθαι ἀεὶ τοῦ πιθανοῦ ἐν τῇ διηγήσει. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτῆς μάλιστα ἴδιον ὑπάρχει. καὶ τούτου μὴ 
προσόντος αὐτῇ, ὅσῳ ἄν σαφὴς καὶ σύντομος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπιστοτέρα τοῖς ἀκούουσι 
καταφαίνεται).85 Similarly, Nicolaus the Sophist86 considered credibility the chief concern when 
writing a fable (a μῦθος): “And so fable is a false account resembling the truth in its persuasive 
composition. The account is false, since it unapologetically is composed from falsehood. But it 
resembles the truth, since it would not otherwise be like the truth. It should thus become like 
the truth from the credibility surrounding the invention” (μῦθος τοίνυν ἐστὶ λόγος ψευδὴς τῷ 
πιθανῶς συγκεῖσθαι εἰκονίζων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. λόγος μὲν ψευδὴς, ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ 
ψεύδους σύφκειται. εἰκονίζων δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὅμοιόντα. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
torture to prove his case against a rich man (Major Declamation VII)? One element to note in most of 
these declamations is their inclusion of both sides of a given controversiae: that is, two mutually exclusive 
narratives of events are given side-by-side, without regard to a “true” version of events, but rather an 
emphasis on the most probable (see discussion of Quintilian’s defense of this above). The instruction is in 
the vividness and persuasiveness (and thus credibility) of each side of the dispute. But like the “unreal” 
situations detailed above in the progymnasmata, the declamations also often include outlandish 
scenarios and even supernatural intervention: Major Declamation X deals with a woman who routinely 
saw her dead son in her dreams. When she revealed this to her husband, he enlisted a sorcerer, who cast 
a spell on the boy’s tomb, ending the dreams. The controversy? The mother accuses her husband of cruel 
treatment for depriving her of her son’s appearances! As Sussman (1987, v) notes, “The common criticism 
… is that cases such as these are unnatural and far removed from the world of reality. Yet one has only to 
scan the pages of a daily newspaper to find cases that parallel these, extreme though they are.” 
Similarities aside, the declamations will not be treated here, entertaining though they are. Quintilian 
himself exempted them from his “three types of narrative” (tres species narrationum) mentioned above 
(excepta qua in causis utimur, II.iv.1). 
85
 Sp. 4.79 
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 Nicolaus’ dating is possible thanks to the age of Proclus, who was the same age as Nicolaus, according 
to Marinus. Proclus’ birth year has been determined thanks to an astrological prediction, and hence 
Nicolaus is said to have been (also) born about 410 or 412 CE (Felten 1913, xxii). What little else there is to 
know of him comes from the Suda, which mentions his progymnasmata (Felten 1913, xxi). 
52 
 
γένοιτο δὲ ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὅμοιος ἐκ τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πλάσιν).87 He even goes on to 
outline the ways in which one can make a fable credible: 
Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἴρηται, ὅτι δεῖ πιθανῶς συγκεῖσθαι 
τὸν μῦθον, πόθεν ἄν γένοιτο πιθανὸς σκοπητέον. 
Πολλαχόθεν δὲ τοῦτο. ἐκ τόπων περὶ οὓς τὰ 
ὑποκείμενα ζῷα διατρίβειν εἴωθεν. ἐκ λόγων τῶν τῇ 
φύσει ἁρμοζόντων. ἐκ πραγμάτων, ἃ μὴ ὑπερβαίνει τὴν 
ἑκαστου ποιότητα, ἵνα μὴ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ὁ μῦς περὶ 
βασιλείας τῶν ζῴων ἐβοθλεύετο ἢ ὅτι ὁ λέων ἐζωγρήθη 
ὑπὸ τυροῦ κνίσης, κἂν λόγους τινὰς δεήσῃ περιθεῖναι, 
ἵνα ἡ μὲν άλώπηξ ποικίλα φθέγγηται, τὰ δὲ πρόβατα 
εὐήθη καὶ μέστὰ ἀνοίας. Τοιαύτη γὰρ τις ἡ ἑκατέρων 
φύσις. Καὶ ἵνα ὁ μὲν ἀετὸς ἁρπακτικος καὶ νεβρῶν καὶ 
ἀρνίων εἰσάγηται, ὁ δὲ κολοιὸς μηδὲν τοιοῦτον μηδὲ 
ἐννοῶν. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα ποτὲ γένοιτο χρεία τοῦ καὶ παρὰ τὴν 
φύσιν τι συμπλάσαι, δεῖ τοῦτο προοικονομῆσαι καὶ 
παρασχεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μύθου διάνοιαν. Οἷον εἰ 
διαλέγοιτο τὰ πρόβατα πρὸς τοὺς λύκους φιλικῶς, 
προοικονομῆσαι δεῖ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 
 
Since it has been said that a fable should be 
composed so as to be credible, we should consider how it 
may become credible. Many things can contribute to this: 
mention of places where the creatures imagined in the fable 
are accustomed to pass their time; from the occasions on 
which they are wont to show themselves; from words that 
harmonize with the nature of each; from actions which do 
not surpass the kind of thing each does-so we do not say that 
a mouse gave advice about the kingdom of the animals [8] or 
that a lion was captured by the savor of cheese-and if there is 
need to attribute some words to them, if we make the fox 
speak subtle things and the sheep naive and simple-minded 
things; for such is the nature of each; and so that the eagle is 
introduced as rapacious for fawns and lambs, and the 
jackdaw does not so much as think of anything like that. If 
there should ever be need to invent something contrary to 
nature, one should set the scene for this first and should 
connect the moral of the fable with it; for example, if the 
sheep were being described as having a friendly talk with the 
wolves, first you should set the scene for this friendship and 
anything else of that sort
 
(2.7). 
  
Meanwhile, John of Sardis88 simply divides fables into two camps with respect to their credibility 
or lack thereof: “Fable is of two sorts, either altogether fictitious, or credible (διχῶς δὲ ὁ μῦθος, 
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ἢ παντελῶς ψευδὴς ἢ πιθανός).89 Fable (μῦθος), according to the progymnasmata upon which 
he is commenting, is a false statement (λόγος ψευδής) that imagines truth (εἰκονίζων 
ἀλήθειαν). 
John expands on this succinct definition by focusing particularly on his earlier 
delineation between outright falsehood (one kind of fable) and that which is persuasive 
(πιθανός). For John, it is this second characteristic that takes the account from outright lie to 
something else altogether. Without persuasiveness, a fable can hardly be said to be 
accomplishing its goal. 
‘λόγος’ μὲν οὖν ‘ψευδὴς’ πρόσκειται, ἐπειδὴ 
ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ ψεύδους σύγκειται. ‘εἰκονίζων’ δὲ 
‘τὴν ἀλήθειαν’ ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκόνα ἀληθείας ἔχων. εἰκόνα 
δὲ ἀληθείας ἔχει ὁ μῦθος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἄν ἐργάσαιτο τὸ 
ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἔχων τινὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁμοιότητα. 
Γένοιτο δ΄ἄν τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὅμοιον ἐκ τοῦ πιθανοῦ 
τοῦ περὶ τὴν πλάσιν. ψευδὴς οὖν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, 
πιθανὸς δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 
 
And so, “false statement” is put there, since it is 
agreed it is composed from falsehood. And “imagining truth” 
(because) is has an image of truth in response. The fable has 
an image of truth, because it would not accomplish its own 
purpose without having something similar to the truth. It 
becomes something near to truth from the persuasiveness 
that accompanies the fiction. Therefore it is false according to 
nature, but persuasive in accordance with its telling (1.6). 
 
Indeed, John takes aim at those who consider fable to be useless with the rejoinder that while 
he agrees falsehood is useless in rhetoric, “if we set out the fiction in a simple way, teaching 
something credible from the fable while desiring only to give advice, the exercise is a useful 
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 Most probably the bishop to whom a datable letter (Theodore the Studite, Ep. 2.108, BG 1367-70) was 
written in 800 CE, John’s commentary may seem too late for our purposes, but his exegesis on Apthonius’ 
progymnasmata follows rather closely with authors of earlier date. Indeed, Kennedy (1983, 276) 
concludes that his work is “a compendium of earlier material strung together. … John himself seems to 
have no independent ideas and is not even bothered if inconsistencies arise among his sources.” I thus 
include his comments here, despite postdating the novelists by some five centuries, because original or 
not, John succinctly expounds on the differences outlined in the various progymnasmata between truth 
and falsehood, fable and outright fiction. 
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invention for the young” (εἰ δὲ τῆς συμβουλῆς μόνης γλιχόμεθα τὴν μὲν πλάσιν ἀφελῶς 
ἐκτιθέμενοι, τὸ δ΄ἀπὸ τοῦ μύθου πιθανὸν διδάσκοντες, οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἡ γυμνασία τοῖς νέοις 
εὑρίσκεται, 2.11). It is notable that fable is considered an exercise for the instruction of the 
young, and in fact, the moral is one of its defining characteristics, according to most teachers. 
Nicolaus the Sophist even notes that the moral can be attached to the fable in a number of 
ways, preferring to put it at the end, though noting, “Some put the moral at the beginning and 
call it a promythion.” One is perhaps tempted to see a promythion in Longus’ prologue when he 
notes that one of his motivations for the work is to “instruct those having not yet loved” (τὸν 
οὐκ ἐρασθέντα προπαιδεύσει), presumably the young. 
Indeed, Longus’ work especially appears to hug closely to the examples of speeches that 
have reached us from antiquity. This can be seen most readily in the most extensive of the 
various progymnasmata that survive: the exercises of Libanius, comprising just one tome of this 
prolific writer’s career. Libanius (314-393 CE) differs from the other theorists treated in this 
chapter in that whole speeches survive as examples of the sorts of exercises otherwise only 
described or explained. Other such sets of examples from late antiquity or later also exist, but 
the exercises collected under Libanius’ name, especially in the two categories that concern us 
most here (fable and narrative), are among the largest and earliest of their kind.90 
Among those exercises outside of fable and narrative that Longus especially appears to 
hone are those on refutation and confirmation. As noted already, Longus throughout his work 
examines lies or pretexts as to whether they are credible or sophisticated. The most notable 
example of this comes during Daphnis’ inner discourse on his stated reasons for showing up 
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 While the authorship of some of the materials collected under Libanius’ name have been questioned 
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which aims at demonstrating a literary milieu at the time of the novelists, especially preoccupied with 
fiction and falsehood. 
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outside Chloe’s house in the dead of winter. After going through a series of scenarios more or 
less credible, and imagining Chloe’s parents reacting with skepticism as to his pretexts for being 
there (If you’re running from a wolf, where are its tracks? If you needed a light, why not go next 
door instead of all the way here?),91 Daphnis gives up and decides to head home. Similarly, 
students were instructed to refute or confirm the plausibility (εἰκός) of characters’ actions in a 
given story. Examples include arguments over whether or not Chryses would have truly visited 
the harbor of the Greeks in the Iliad, and whether Achilles’ wrath, the accusations against 
Locrian Ajax, or the judgment of arms were plausible. Some of the specifics of the arguments are 
directly reflected in Longus, such as the recurring assertions that certain actions are out of 
character for the person involved (cf. Dionysophanes’ incredulity above that Lamon, a rustic, 
could create such a story).92 In the refutation of the accusations again Locrian Ajax, the example 
specifically casts doubt on the notion of love at first sight. Such things take a longer amount of 
time (χρόνου πλείονος), continuous gazing (συνεχοῦς ὄψεως) and a greater amount of time 
together (μακροτέρας ὁμιλίας). This is, of course, seemingly Longus’ opinion as well; it is here, 
after all, that he departs perhaps most dramatically from the other novelists of his time, who do 
in fact have their protagonists fall in love at first sight.93 In fact, one could argue that Longus 
uses just these ingredients to draw out the process of the two youths falling in love, the primary 
force of his narrative: he stretches it out over time, he includes several episodes of voyeuristic 
gazing (for the characters as well as the readers), and he gives them ample time together by 
having Eros direct their foster parents to send them out to tend the flocks. 
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 Libanius, Refutations 1 and 2.  
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 MacQueen 1990, 133: “In the other Greek novels, as we saw, the protagonists fall in love at first sight ... 
Daphnis and Chloe, by contrast, are raised in the same vicinity and are companions and playmates well 
before they become lovers.”  
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Meanwhile, in the progymnasmata, discourses on character are not surprisingly given 
the closest examination in exercises of ἠθοποιία, or speeches in character.94 Here the student 
would concoct speeches ranging from situations found specifically in myth (what Niobe might 
have said when she discovered her children dead; what Medea might have said before killing 
her children; what Andromache might have said upon the death of Hector; what Achilles might 
have said upon the death of Patroclus) to the fantastical (what a coward might say if someone 
were to paint a picture of a battle in his home; what a eunuch might say if he were in love; what 
a painter might say if he were to fall in love with his painting of a woman). Indeed De 
Temmerman has suggested that the characterization at work in the progymnasmata can serve 
as “a paradigm for the analysis of characterization in (ancient) narrative literature,”95 calling 
speeches in character (as they appear in the progymnasmata) “one of the techniques adopted 
to express fictitious emotions.”96 
As we have seen, those fictitious emotions have to be credible – they have to adhere to 
the expected characteristics of a person’s class, gender, and station – even if the situation 
underlying them is not. This is what lies at the heart of one of Longus’ most self-referential 
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 These have seen a flurry of attention in recent scholarship, most especially with respect to gender. 
Maud Gleason (1995) has argued that sophistic performance allowed the assertion of masculinity, such 
that a eunuch could portray masculinity through his performance; Bloomer (1997) has gone further, 
suggesting that speeches in character, more specifically the προσωποποιία in Greek or the fictio personae 
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orators in “creating and displaying a range of emotions not found in male impersonation” (465), outbursts 
of pathos that would otherwise have been met with the lash of their schoolmasters. 
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passages, when Lamon is asked at the end of Daphnis and Chloe to repeat his account of finding 
Daphnis as a baby, swaddled with recognition tokens and suckling on a goat, and 
Dionysophanes, his aristocratic inquisitor, orders him not to make up stories (μηδὲ ὅμοια 
πλάττειν μύθοις). Upon hearing it again, Dionysophanes believes Lamon in part because he does 
not consider the rustic to have the skill necessary to make up such a tale (Πῶς δ´ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα 
ἔπλασεν ἄγροικος;), but also because it seems incredible and out of character that Daphnis, so 
clearly beautiful and noble, could come from such parents (Οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἦν ἄπιστον ἐκ 
τοιούτου γέροντος καὶ μητρὸς εὐτελοῦς υἱὸν καλὸν οὕτω γενέσθαι;). All of these are 
considerations straight out of the rhetorical handbooks: making up such a tale was outside the 
expected character (and ability) of Lamon, as was his siring of such a child as Daphnis. It is in this 
way that the learned Dionysophanes is able to divine the “big lie” at the heart of the story (that 
Daphnis is a rustic, and was named to appear as such, when he is in fact an aristocrat from the 
city). It should be noted that both of Dionysophanes’ references to Lamon “making up stories” 
use the verb πλάττω, (ὅμοια πλάττειν μύθοις; ταῦτα ἔπλασεν) the only two times in Longus that 
he comes close to the noun πλάσμα, the term in the progymnasmata and elsewhere for a 
“fiction,” whether written or painted. It is perhaps significant, then, that if Longus includes meta 
discussions of fictionality, as Morgan, MacQueen, and I would argue; or if he includes such 
discourses on the nature of art, as Zeitlin, Kestner, Pandiri, or Teske would suggest, he never 
does so using the primary term for the so-called “plastic arts,” except here, in perhaps the most 
self-referential moment of his novel. This is made all the more significant when one notes how 
often πλάσμα is used referentially about the arts by both authors contemporary to Longus (as 
shall be shown later) and in the progymnasmata. Indeed, when the rhetorical handbooks aren’t 
discoursing outright on plausibility and believability, they are not sparing in their own meta 
discourses on πλάσμα as deceit in many of their example narratives. For example, when 
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Pasiphae falls in love with a cow and enlists the inventor (and programmatic artisan) Daedalus 
to assist her, he contrives (μηχανησάμενος) a wooden bull and puts skin around his contrivance 
(τὴν μηχανήν, Narration 22).  In a previous example, however, the skin is said to “conceal his 
fiction” (καλύψας το πλάσμα, Narration 21). As we have seen, both καλύπτω and μηχανή are 
used in Longus to connote deception, alongside his most loaded term for it, τέχνη, which occurs 
in a particularly amusing speech in character (No. 26), where a eunuch is imagined to give a 
speech upon falling in love. Here τέχνη plays a key role, as the eunuch laments that he has 
become “an ambiguous human being via techne” (γέγονα διὰ τέχνης ἀμφίβολος ἄνθρωπος). 
The imaginary eunuch then contrasts himself to Pasiphae, who “had techne to aid her in sexual 
intercourse” (τέχνην ἔσχεν πρὸς τὴν μίξιν επίκουρονίκουρον), whereas techne (the actions that 
made him a eunuch) keeps him from acting on his love even though he received everything 
initially from nature (τῆς φύσεως). Teske and Hunter have noted Longus’ dichotomy between 
nature (φύσις) and skill (τέχνη), but it is not exclusive to him. Both the progymnasmata and 
other contemporary authors (as shall be seen) discourse on it as well: the plastic arts, including 
both paintings and literature, are deceptions: images and narratives that seem real, “physical” 
or “natural,” but in fact are not. 
Aside from these largely meta-examples, many of the topoi in the progymnasmata make 
appearances in Longus. The story of Dorcon dressing up as a wolf to assault Chloe (particularly 
puzzling given the lack of any need for the disguise, since he likewise hides himself in some 
thicket), only to be attacked by her dogs, has similarities to Libanius’ first fable on the wolves 
and the sheep. Here, the wolves make a treaty with the sheep, promising not to attack them, 
but only if the sheep agree to send away the dogs, which harass the wolves. The sheep, 
considered excessively naive (εὐηθείας γέμον) agree and are, predictably, gobbled up. The 
moral here: don’t place credence in the words of your enemies (τοῖς ἐχθρῶν λόγοις οὐ 
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πιστευτέον). But it should be pointed out that Dorcon is not really a wolf: he is only dressed up 
as one, which explains why he in fact lacks the craftiness typical of wolves in ancient literature, 
or even the she-wolf mentioned in Longus 1.11, who is not fooled by the traps the villagers set 
for her. In contrast, Longus dismisses Dorcon’s plan as a scheme “befitting a rustic.” Meanwhile, 
a character who truly is a wolf, Lukainion, lives up to her lupine name in the cunning with which 
seduces Daphnis.97 
 Dorcon’s decision to disguise himself in the first place is a common enough motif: in 
Libanius’ third fable, a jackdaw gathers up feathers from other various birds to win a beauty 
contest, only to be outwitted by the owl, who with the help of other birds strips him and lays 
bare his deception. Deception (ἀπατή) also lands Acalanthis (Narration 8) into trouble when she 
imitated matters of rejoicing (ἐμιμεῖτο τὰ τῆς χαιρούσης) to trick Hera into loosening her grip on 
Alcmene, who was trying to give birth to Heracles. The goddess, having been deceived 
(παρακρυσθεῖσα), turned the woman into a weasel, an animal (again) befitting a deceptive 
character (ἔθος). 
Likewise, two narrative exercises in Libanius (4, 32), tell the story of Pan and Pitys, which 
Morgan has seen reflected in Longus’ first embedded myth (1.27) and throughout Daphnis and 
Chloe in various references to the pine (πίτυς). Here, Pan vies with Boreas for the affection of 
Pitys (Narration 4) by leaping and giving her gifts (cf. Dorcon to Chloe), ultimately attracting the 
nymph to him. This angers Boreas, who knocks her down onto the rocks and kills her. The earth 
makes her a pine tree, whose branches Pan uses to make his crowns (cf. Chloe’s crown of pine 
upon her rescue by Pan), and Boreas mourns her by blowing into the trees to make a funeral 
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dirge (cf. the pine trees’ piping in Theocritus Idyll 1, Longus 1.23). In a variant of the story in 
Narration 32, Pitys suffers the same fate but the blowing of the wind against the pine is said to 
be her own lamentation. Either way, Longus’ use of this stock pastoral motif, coupled with 
parallels of the story to Longus’ first embedded myth, suggest the myth of Pitys was, indeed, 
present in Daphnis and Chloe. 
Also present are the praises of farming and country life that serve as a constant 
backdrop in Longus. Much of the encomium on farming in Libanius resonates with Longan 
ideology about the countryside. Rather than sexual dalliances and excess, Daphnis and Chloe 
engage in the exploration and ultimate fulfillment of “rightful mingling for the sake of birthing 
children” (τὰς δικαίας ἐπίστανται μόνον μίξεις τὰς ὑπὲρ παίδων γονῆς, Encomium 7.5).98 Notes 
Libanius, “If someone thinks that life in the city is more pleasant, let him be reminded for 
himself what it is like to see a vine and grapes hanging, what it is like to sit under a pine or plane 
tree at noon, what it is like to see crops blown by the winds of the Zephyrs, what it is like to hear 
oxen lowing and sheep bleating, and what it is like to see jumping around and suckling milk” (εἰ 
δὲ τις οἴεται τερπνότερον εἶναι τὸν ἐν ἄστει βίον, ἐνθυμηθήτω πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οἷον μέν ἐστιν 
ἄμπελον ὁρᾶν καὶ βότρυς κρεμαμένους, οἷον δὲ ὑπὸ πίτυι καὶ πλατάνω μεσημβρίας κεῖσθαι, 
οἷον δὲ ἰδεῖν λήια ζεφυρων αὔραις κινούμενα, οἷον δὲ ἀκοῦσαι βοῶν μυκωμένων καὶ 
προβάτων βληχωμένων, οἷον δὲ θέαμα δαμάλεις σκιρτῶσαι καὶ ἕλκουσαι γάλα, Encomium 7). 
The picture painted by Libanius is the same one (drawn out, over four books) that Longus gives 
us.99 It is here, in such descriptions, or ecphrases, including especially those of the seasons which 
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 Cf. Comparison 5.7 (between country and city): … “they draw near even to their wives only for the sake 
of the procreation of children” (ταῖς γθναιξὶν αὐταῖς ὑπὲρ παίδων μόνον πλησιάζουσι γενέσεως). Cf. 
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 i.a., 1.9: “the leaping of the animals” (σκιρτήματα ποιμνίων ἀρτιγεννήτων); 1.23: “pleasant was the 
bleating of the sheep … and the wind piping upon the pines” τερπνὴ δὲ ποιμνίων βληχή … καὶ τοὺς 
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chart the narrative of Daphnis and Chloe, 100 that scholarship has been most preoccupied with 
the progymnasmata’s influence on the novels.101  Bartsch has examined these passages to 
illuminate the ecphrases in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, noting that they represent “the 
general interest of the epoch in the descriptive … the handbooks’ discussion of proper topics for 
description provides a common denominator for the passages in contemporary rhetoricians and 
in the novelists.”102 
These more superficial similarities could perhaps be dismissed as merely parallel 
exercises within the literary milieu of later antiquity, if not for the amount of self-referential 
discourses on plausibility, fictionality, deceit, and description that punctuate both Longus and 
the rhetorical exercises of the progymnasmata. Whether Longus read exercises similar to the 
specific ones that survive for us is perhaps unknowable, but the themes he presents throughout 
share currency with them over and again. And if these handbooks can be read to find topics of 
“general interest” and examples of a “common denominator” between them and the novelists, 
it seems only logical that we can extend that interest, that denominator, from the descriptions 
that have occupied Longan scholarship to the falsehoods and deceit on which I wish to focus. 
And if the progymnasmata represent rhetorical preoccupations regarding falsehood in 
Longus’ day that he also confronts in Daphnis and Chloe, one can naturally expect to find his 
classmates, the authors roughly contemporary with him, making use of them as well. It is to 
them that we now turn. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ἀνέμους συρίττειν ταῖς πίτυσιν ἐμπνέοντας; 3.12: “these [the flowers] were being nurtured by Zephyrus” (τὰ 
δὲ ἄρτι ὁ ζέφυρος τρέφων). 
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The Progymnasmata at Work: Contemporary Authors of the Second Sophistic 
Moving beyond the basic, educational, and rhetorical framework of Longus’ time that 
can be gleaned from the rhetorical handbooks (progymnasmata) already examined, we move to 
a brief examination of those authors contemporary with Longus, many of whom display similar 
affinities for notions of lies and fiction. The most famous and prodigious of these, Lucian of 
Samosata, will be examined lastly, and the other ancient novelists separately. That leaves us to 
start with a few self-styled sophists of the late imperial period, most importantly (and perhaps 
most complicated), the Philostrati.  
 Philostratus is a name ascribed to four of the period’s sophists. The most famous is 
arguably Philostratus “the Athenian,” or Lucius Flavius Philostratus, whose father was a sophist 
of the same name. This (the former) is the Philostratus (born about 170) who supplied us with 
many of the works roughly contemporary with Longus, including the Life of Apollonius of Tyana, 
the Lives of the Sophists, Gymnasticus, Heroicus and the Epistolae. His son-in-law or nephew, 
usually referred to as Philostratus of Lemnos (“the elder,” as he had a grandson also called 
Philostratus of Lemnos), is considered now the author of the Imagines, a series of ecphrases 
which will be examined below. To make matters even more complicated, the younger 
Philostratus of Lemnos (the other Lemnian’s grandson, and noted above) wrote an additional 
series of Imagines, which do not entirely survive, styled after his grandfather’s. 
When searching through the texts of those authors contemporary with Longus (and 
scholarship on the same), one finds the same preoccupation with credibility and fictionality 
apparent in the progymnasmata, albeit often in subtler form.103 Sometimes this depends heavily 
on genre – Longus is writing a fable, the very genre in which the progymnasmata is preoccupied 
with notions of credibility, believability, lies, and fiction. But when authors contemporary with 
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Longus venture into similar genres (when they either tell stories clearly invented or discourse on 
statues or paintings), attention rapidly turns to these matters as well. Thus, when we expect 
these other authors to engage in discourses similar to the ones being argued for in Longus, they 
do not disappoint. Rather, it is clear that they possess the same fascinations with the tensions 
present between a credibly invented reality and that produced in the natural world.  
Perhaps the best place to start this examination is an area on which much of Longan 
scholarship has already been focused: namely, the visual descriptions (or ecphrases) that occur 
in Longus’ work throughout, and indeed ostensibly give rise to his novel in the first place. Here 
Philostratus the Elder Lemnian’s Imagines is a helpful text, for just as the “real world” in Longus’ 
pastoral “must be carefully groomed, scrubbed, deodorized, pruned and arranged to suggest a 
painterly image,”104 so too Philostratus, in describing the statues and paintings of his Imagines, 
presents this tension, or lack thereof, between the plastic, created image and the real-world 
person or place it is supposed to represent. Yet even amid his discourses on the tensions 
between art and reality, there has been an ongoing debate in scholarship on Philostratus as to 
whether or not the images that he describes are real to begin with.105 More recently, scholars 
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 Lehmann-Hartleben (1941, 42) first asserted that the paintings described were real and Philostratus a 
good source for understanding painting in his own day: “As it is, these two books of the Elder Philostratus 
constitute a unique and very reliable source for the history of late antique painting.” And later: “The 
subject matter of these paintings, as the long previous discussion about their authenticity has shown, is 
also largely identical with that known from earlier Roman wall painting.” But fifty years later, Liz James 
and Ruth Webb cast serious doubt on the existence of an actual gallery being described, even if 
Philostratus had real paintings in mind that he had seen in the past: “But apart from occasional references 
to the technique and composition of these paintings, Philostratos concentrates on retelling the narratives 
depicted, constantly slipping from the material plane of the particular painting to the events behind. He 
situates the individual scenes within their narrative contexts, so that it is often unclear which particular 
moment is supposed to be depicted: figures are described as if they were moving, acting and feeling. His 
audience is also made to see more than could be visible in a painting: the sophist conjures up unseen 
figures and evokes appeals to senses other than sight, such as the fragrance of a garden, the sound of 
singing, or even the taste of fruit. … Philostratos clearly had real paintings in mind when he composed 
some of these ekphraseis … He is not, however, interested in reproducing the limitations of the visual 
arts. … But Philostratus’ gallery is surely a convenient fiction, constructed from a common knowledge of 
texts and images in the imagination of the sophist and his audience” (1991, 7). 
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like Bowie have deemed it unnecessary to declare them actual paintings in order to appreciate 
Philostratus’ fictional program: “The Pictures purport to describe a set of paintings in a gallery at 
Naples, chiefly mythological in subject, and naturally Philostratus chooses scenes and 
techniques of rendering them with which his readers will be familiar from the paintings that 
decorated their public and private buildings. That he is actually describing a set of paintings that 
he saw is a possible but unnecessary conclusion, and it would cohere better with his other 
literary activity to suppose that here too is a set of fictional entities.”106 Noting the same 
“literary rather than pictorial understanding” on one painting in particular (the image of Galatea 
in 2.18), Kostopoulou notes that in “deflecting attention away from the visual appearance of the 
painting, the passage directs the focus, inevitably, to the textual nature of the story behind it, 
giving prominence to a verbal dimension more accessible to the ear rather than to the eye.”107 
Indeed, whether the paintings are real or fictional, Philostratus’ main concern in 
describing them is just that difficult demarcation between the two. Immediately in his prologue, 
the elder Lemnian chides those who criticize art based on its seeming artificiality: “Whosoever 
scorns painting is unjust to truth ... for poets and painters make equal contribution to our 
knowledge of the deeds and the looks of heroes – and he (the scorner) withholds his praise from 
symmetry of proportion, whereby art partakes of reason (λόγου ἡ τέχνη ἅπτεται).” Going on, he 
asserts that “imitation (μίμησις) is an invention most ancient and most akin to nature (φύσις); 
and wise men invented it, calling it now painting (ζωγραφίαν), now plastic art (πλαστικὴν).” This 
concern for how well (too well?) the painter or sculptor represents nature and reality recurs 
throughout Philostratus’ descriptions. Thus in describing a painting of the Bosporus (1.12), he 
notes that it “gives the very image of things that are, of things that are taking place, and in some 
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cases of the way in which they take place, not slighting the truth by reason of the number of 
objects shown, but defining the real nature of each thing just as if the painter were representing 
some one thing alone” (ἐκμέμακται γὰρ ἡ γραφὴ καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ὡς ἂν γένοιτο 
ἔνια, οὐ διὰ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ῥᾳδιουργοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιτελοῦσα τὸ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖον, 
ὡς ἂν εἰ καὶ ἕν τι ἔγραφεν, trans. Fairbanks). Meanwhile, in perhaps the best mythological 
setting for a meta discourse on the inability to distinguish image from reality, Philostratus 
remarks on how real a bee appears painted on an image depicting Narcissus: 
καὶ ἄνθη λευκὰ τῇ πηγῇ παραπέφυκεν οὔπω ὄντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ 
τῷ μειρακίῳ φυόμενα. τιμῶσα δὲ ἡ γραφὴ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ 
δρόσου τι λείβει ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθέων, οἷς καὶ μέλιττα ἐφιζάνει τις, 
οὐκ οἶδα εἴτ᾽ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς, εἴτε ἡμᾶς 
ἐξηπατῆσθαι χρὴ εἶναι αὐτήν. (1.23)  
 
And white flowers have grown up beside the pool, not quite 
yet there, but growing forth for the boy. And the painting is so 
honoring of the truth that it pours forth some dew from the 
flowers, upon which a bee sits, whether a bee deceived by the 
painting or whether it is that we are deceived that it is really 
there, I do not know. 
 
Of course, Philostratus does not let the perfect opportunity to remark on an image’s ability to 
deceive pass by, providing Narcissus and his reflection with an extended description.  
σὲ μέντοι, μειράκιον, οὐ γραφή τις ἐξηπάτησεν, οὐδὲ 
χρώμασιν ἢ κηρῷ προστέτηκας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκτυπῶσάν σε τὸ ὕδωρ, 
οἷον εἶδες αὐτό, οὐκ οἶσθα, οὔτε τὸ τῆς πηγῆς ἐλέγχεις 
σόφισμα, νεῦσαι δέον καὶ παρατρέψαι τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τὴν χεῖρα 
ὑποκινῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ταὐτοῦ ἑστάναι, σὺ δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἑταίρῳ 
ἐντυχὼν τἀκεῖθεν περιμένεις. εἶτά σοι ἡ πηγὴ μύθῳ χρήσεται; 
οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὐδ ’ ἐπαίει τι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ ἐμπέπτωκεν ἐπὶ τὸ ὕδωρ 
αὐτοῖς ὠσὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς ὄμμασιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ 
γέγραπται, λέγωμεν. (1.23) 
 
But you, boy, the painting does not deceive, nor do you cling 
to colors or wax, but you do not know that the water models 
you in the same way you look at it, nor do you question the 
fiction of the pool, all that is needed is to nod or turn away from 
the image or move your hand or to not stand in the same way, 
but you are waiting as though you are going to meet a friend 
there. Do you think the spring will call out to you in speech? 
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This one does not give heed to anything from us. He has fallen 
into the water both in eyes and ears, and we ourselves must say 
just how it has been painted. 
 
 Thus Philostratus’ imitation of the painting in prose is a reflection (pun intended) of the 
imitation happening between Narcissus and the pool.108 
Interestingly, when Philostratus’ grandson, the so-called Philostratus the Younger, 
decided to write a series of Imagines in the year 300  that would mirror his grandfather’s 
treatments, he by and large removed this most famous aspect of the elder’s work. As Fairbanks 
remarks in his introduction to the Younger’s Imagines, “While the elder Philostratus constantly 
stresses the illusion of reality in the paintings, perhaps as an inherited rhetorical device, his 
grandson rarely mentions it.” While the younger mentions in No. 6 that the garments of 
Orpheus change color with his various motions (ἐσθὴς τε αὐτῷ μετανθοῦσα πρὸς κινήσεως 
τροπάς), and in No. 11 suggests the whirling of the wheels on Apsyrtus’ chariot almost creates 
the sound of it rumbling (ἡ τῶν τροχῶν δίνη μόνον οὐ προσβαλοῦσα τῷ ἁρματείῳ σύρματι τὰς 
ἀκοὰς), nevertheless, as Fairbanks notes, “he does not suggest that the painted object could be 
confused with the object itself.”109  
However, one contemporary of the younger Philostratus who quotes both sets of 
Imagines, and who indeed might have come much later,110 is not sparing in this “inherited 
rhetorical device,” namely, Callistratus, who imitated Philostratus’ Imagines with his own 
Ecphrases, descriptions of 14 statues, which over and again highlight the inability to distinguish 
painted or sculpted reality from actual reality. Though remarks about painted reality deceiving 
the viewer (as the real bee was deceived into thinking the flowers about Narcissus were real, or 
                                                          
108
 As notes Beall (1993, 362): “The entire painting … has to do with the ability of artistic imitation to 
shape one's perception of reality, for just as the pool “paints” Narcissus, the painter paints the pool. 
Philostratus' verbal imitation of the painting suggests that language also possesses this power of 
imitation.” 
109
 Fairbanks 1931, 277 
110
 Schenkl and Reisch 1902, xxii-xxiii. 
67 
 
conversely, the viewer himself was deceived into thinking the bee was real when it was part of 
the painting) appear in only a few instances in the elder Philostratus, Callistratus makes it a 
stock motif in nearly all his descriptions: “While the elder Philostratus emphasized the realism, 
the illusion of reality in the paintings he described, and at times mentioned the technique by 
which this illusion was produced; while the younger Philostratus treated paintings primarily as 
expressing the character and the inner experiences of the persons represented, it was the aim 
of Callistratus to glorify the success of the sculptor in making bronze or marble all but alive in 
the figures he created.”111 
 In Callistratus’ first description,112 that of a flute-playing satyr, he not only suggests the 
painting looks real, but that it makes you imagine how it might have sounded, too: 
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῇ μέλος οὐ προσῆπτεν αὐλοῦντος, οὐδὲ ἦν ὁ 
αὐλὸς ἔμφωνος, τὸ δὲ τῶν αὐλούντων πάθος διὰ τῆς τέχνης εἰς 
τὴν πέτραν εἰσῆκτο. εἶδες ἂν ὑπανισταμένας καὶ φλέβας ὡς ἂν 
ἔκ τινος γεμιζομένας πνεύματος καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐπήχησιν τοῦ αὐλοῦ 
τὴν πνοὴν ἐκ στέρνων τὸν Σάτυρον ἀνασπῶντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖν 
ἐθέλον τὸ εἴδωλον καὶ εἰς ἀγωνίαν τὸν λίθον πίπτοντα. εἶναι 
γὰρ ἔπειθε καὶ πνοῆς ἐξουσίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔμφυτον καὶ 
ἄσθματος ἔνδειξιν ἐξευρομένην οἴκοθεν ἐκ τῶν ἀμηχάνων 
πόρον. 
 
Though in reality the flute’s note was not reaching the 
player’s ear, nor yet was the flute endowed with voice, but the 
physical effect which flute-players experience had been 
transferred to the stone by the skill of the artist. You could have 
seen the veins standing out as though they were filled with a 
sort of breath, the Satyr drawing the air from his lungs to bring 
notes from the flute, the statue eager to be in action, and the 
stone entering upon strenuous activity – for it persuaded you 
that the power to blow the flute was actually inherent in it. 
(trans. Fairbanks) 
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art. Wolters (1885) was the first to suggest the sophist had simply invented the art he described, but more 
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In the next description, that of a Bacchante (2), Callistratus immediately notes that the statue, 
“has been transformed into a real Bacchante. For the stone, while retaining its own nature, yet 
seemed to depart from the law which governs stone; what one saw was really an image, but art 
carried imitation over into actual reality (ἀλλαττόμενον πρὸς τὴν ὄντως βάκχην. ἐν γὰρ τῇ οἰκείᾳ 
τάξει μένων ὁ λίθος τὸν ἐν τοῖς λίθοις νόμον ἐκβαίνειν ἐδόκει, τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενον ὄντως ἦν 
εἴδωλον, ἡ τέχνη δ᾽ εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὄν ἀπήγαγε τὴν μίμησιν, trans. Fairbanks).”113 In the very next 
treatment, a statue of Eros is said to be “ready to display motion; for though it was fixed solidly 
on a pedestal, it deceived one into thinking that it possessed the power to fly (ἕτοιμος ἦν δεῖξαι 
κίνησιν, εἰς μὲν γὰρ ἕδραν στάσιμον ἵδρυτο, ἠπάτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τῆς μετεώρου κυριεύων φορᾶς, 
trans. Fairbanks).” 
 It is perhaps significant that for Callistratus, it is not just that these statues are “life-like;” 
rather, he repeatedly suggests (perhaps hyperbolically) that they deceive the viewer into 
thinking that they are not fixed, static objects (the very definition of a statue). So of Orpheus in 
No. 7, his hair is so “luxuriant and so instinct with the spirit of life as to deceive the senses” 
(κόμη δὲ οὕτως ἦν εὐανθὴς καὶ ζωτικὸν ἐπισημαίνουσα καὶ ἔμπνουν, ὡς ἀπατᾶν τὴν αἴσθησιν, 
trans. Fairbanks). The bronze strings of his lyre likewise “acted the part of strings and, being so 
modified as to imitate each separate note, it obediently carried out the deceit” (νευρὰς 
ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου μίμησιν ἀλλαττόμενος πειθηνίως ὑπήγετο, trans. Fairbanks). 
Likewise, in No. 10 (about a statue of Asclepius), Callistratus flatly rejects that it is a statue at all: 
“To me, at any rate, the object being viewed seems to be, not an impression, but a fiction of 
truth (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐ τύπος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ ὁρώμενον, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀληθείας πλάσμα, trans. 
Fairbanks).” 
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 When not marveling at how alive a piece of plastic art can appear, many of the same 
authors are instead fretting over how plastic an alive person can appear. And so Philostratus the 
Athenian, writing presumably earlier than his nephew the Lemnian, writes in a series of love 
letters two treatises on cosmetics as a form of deception. He at one point admonishes a woman 
not to cover up her ankles, offering language replete with words of deception by now familiar:  
μὴ ὑποδήσῃ ποτέ, μηδὲ κρύψῃς τὰ σφυρὰ ἐψευσμένοις καὶ 
δολεροῖς δέρμασιν, ὧν ἀπατηλὸν τὸ κάλλος ἐν τῇ βαφῇ. … 
ὅπου μὲν γάρ τι ἡμαρτήθη τῇ φύσει, σοφισμάτων δεῖ πρὸς τὴν 
βλάβην, ἵνα κρύψῃ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς ἡ τέχνη (1.36) 
 
Do not bind and conceal your ankles with deceitful and 
deceptive skins, by which your beauty is beguiled in dye … 
When there has been some failing by nature, there is need of 
contrivances for the blemish, so that art/skill can cover the 
defects.  
 
But such is not the case with this woman, so he urges her to take heart in herself and trust in her 
feet (θάρσησον σεαυτῇ καὶ πίστευσον τοῖς ποσί). But to a boy who has shaven to maintain his 
youthful appearance, the Athenian takes precisely the opposite approach to phusis and techne 
(perhaps because he sees it is called for). Instead of castigating his reliance on techne, he 
congratulates him: 
ἐπαινῶ σε ἀντισοφιζόμενον τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ περικόπτοντα τὰ 
γένεια, ὃ γὰρ ἀπῆλθε φύσει, τοῦτο μένει τέχνῃ. 
 
I praise you, for contriving against time, and your closely 
shaven cheeks, which had left you by nature, but remain such 
with craft. (1.58) 
 
 Of course, these letters, too, are literary, not necessarily actual letters, and Bowie sees in them 
the same fictional program found in the progymnasmata’s speeches in character: “Such facility 
in the creation of verbal responses appropriate to particular situations occasions no surprise in a 
man who himself delivered Discourses and Declamations as a practicing sophist. The former 
might involve anecdotes which could be fictional, the latter required the sophist’s speech to 
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assume and exploit a set of circumstances which to him and his audience were equally unreal, 
whether based on an episode in classical Greek history on an imaginary and improbable legal 
dispute.”114 
 But beyond the issues apparent in the letters of Philostratus the Athenian, studies of 
him of late – when they turn to issues of credulity and fiction – often focus on those prose works 
of his that skirt extraordinarily close to the material of the novelists. This includes his dialogue, 
Of Heroes, which has “a double fiction at work,” as a vinter tells an at-first skeptical sailor about 
the ghost of the Trojan hero Protesilaus.115 As the dialogue goes on, the narrator tells of other 
unknown tales of Homeric heroes, all under the pretense that this vinter had access to a ghost 
from the past with knowledge beyond what readers then knew. Again quoting Bowie, this 
“framing of the far-fetched by the credible,” the “combination of a claim to a reliable channel of 
information and framing in a plausible material shows that Philostratus has some interest in 
presenting his fiction as truth.”116 
  Even more fertile for scholars contemplating the boundaries between fiction and reality 
have been works by Philostratus that up until recently were accepted as history. Swain 
examined Philostratus’ reliability in his Lives of the Sophists by noting that “the question of the 
reliability of Philostratus's testimony is still open,” and he connected his skepticism to 
Philostratus’ Apollonius of Tyana.117 Here, too, Philostratus lays claim to privileged information: 
“Philostratus's story of the origin of the work, ostensibly an assertion of the fidelity of his 
source, is in fact a novelistic topos. Philostratus says the work was written up first by a 
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contemporary of Apollonius, Damis, who hailed from Nineveh. The tablets on which Damis 
wrote his narrative were brought to light by a descendant, and Philostratus claims to be merely 
restyling the ὑπομνήματα he found.”118 This claim of authentication, typically at the outset of a 
narrative and purporting to give rise to it at the same time, is a stock feature of the novelists’ 
time that has been exhaustively studied in some of the most recent scholarship on the period. 
Notes Haag: “As is well known, the same type of fiction, or ‘pseudo-documentarism’ – the 
author has found an authentic report which he simply passes on to his readers – frequently 
occurs in the later history of the novel.”119 Hansen explores pseudo-documentarism at length in 
several works, even delineating “conventional,” “light,” and “heavy” pseudo-documentarism 
depending on their claims to authority (the last he reserves only for religious or magical texts 
claiming divine authorship). Mheallaigh recently took Hansen’s model120 and applied it to three 
texts, one of which (Lucian’s) we will reserve for the next chapter. Like my thesis on Longus, 
Mheallaigh sees in pseudo-documentarism not only a playful device the author can deploy with 
a wink to his educated and knowing readers, but one that at the same time undermines the 
text: 
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“Its most basic purpose is to lend the fiction an air of authenticity, 
veracity, and documentary importance by creating for the fiction an 
extra-literary referent such as that which is normally attributed to 
historiography. 
“…  yet paradoxically, its emphasis on the text’s materiality, and the 
constant reminder of the very process of reading itself, threatens to 
undermine that fiction. Pseudo-documentarism in its various 
manifestations raises the stakes sharply in the game of make-believe, 
because it asks readers not only to concede the text’s fictional truth 
but also to enter into the fantasy of historical truthfulness as well: in 
other words, it fictionalizes the issue of historical truth – an ethically 
worrying thing to do – and in doing so, it tests the limits of the 
reader’s grasp of the rules that govern the make-believe.”
121
 (404) 
 
Two of the works that Mheallaigh treats are common ones in the study of ancient fiction-
building: Dictys’ Journal of the Trojan War122 and Antonius Diogenes’ The Wonders Beyond 
Thule. The former claims to be the “true” account of the Trojan War, written in Phoenician and 
rediscovered in the time of Nero, then pain-stakingly translated into Latin for its contemporary 
readers. The latter is supposedly the dictated biography of Deinias, which he gave in his old age 
to a scribe, who wrote down the account on cypress wood and then, as bidden, sent one to 
Arcadia and left the other to be buried with Deinas. Both accounts employ the excessive detail 
that is reminiscent of pseudo-documentarism.123  
Among the “light” forms of the device seen by Hansen are those works which leave 
open the origin of their narratives but seem to suggest their roots at the end when the 
characters write down accounts of what happened to them. Into this class Hansen places the 
anonymous Apollonius King of Tyre (not to be confused with Philostratus’ similarly named title 
above), which ends with the king making two copies of his accounts and putting them in a 
temple and his library. Hansen also sees this convention in Xenophon’s An Ephesian Story, which 
ends with the lovers visiting the temple of Artemis and dedicating a record of everything they 
had suffered and done. Whitmarsh also sees Xenophon working this way: “In Xenophon, the act 
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of narrative control comes in the form of a ‘graphe of all that they had endured and all that they 
had done,’ deposited in the temple of Artemis. Graphe can mean either a ‘written record’ or a 
‘painted depiction,’ but the sentence obviously advertises its availability to self-reflexive 
interpretation, whereby the dedication actually constitutes the book we are reading now.”124 
Of course, readers of Longus should at once take note of Whitmarsh’s remarks on 
Xenophon, because Longus, too, sets up his narrative with a graphe – here clearly a visual image 
of some sort – in the prologue to Daphnis and Chloe. Indeed, Bowie extends his analysis of a 
“claim to a reliable channel of information” to Longus as well, seeing there a “remote but still 
analogous” claim to information in “Longus’ presentation of the story of Daphnis and Chloe as a 
local exegete’s interpretation of paintings seen in a shrine of the nymphs by the narrator while 
hunting on Lesbos.”125 Indeed, both Hansen and Mheallaigh consider Longus’ claim of a painting 
at the beginning of his work to be case of pseudo-documentarism. Mheallaigh mentions it 
merely in a footnote,126 while Hansen considers Longus “unusual in employing, as it seems, both 
(conventional and light) forms of authentication. 
“In the tradition of conventional pseudo-documentarism the 
narrator claims in a prefatory statement that he got his tale 
from a narrative painting that he had chanced upon in a grove 
of the nymphs on Lesbos, while in the tradition of light pseudo-
documentarism he says in passing at the end of his novel that 
the lovers dedicated images of themselves in the cave of the 
nymphs. Presumably these latter are the very same as the 
narrator discovered and used as his source, although the 
narrator makes no explicit connection between them.”127 
 
And so, an examination of authors contemporary with Longus brings us full circle, back to the 
same questions already posed with respect to the believability and fictionality present within 
Daphnis and Chloe. As Morgan notes, “If the discovery of the painting is a fiction, the discoverer 
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is fictitious too.”128 Yet an analysis of the lies, fictions, and deceptions within Longus would 
perhaps work better to point outwardly at the specious nature of these authenticating devices 
at the beginning and end. To bolster my claims that Longus engages in discourses of that sort, I 
turn next to a contemporary of his who made a virtual career out of it – Lucian of Samasota. 
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Chapter 3: Lies in Lucian 
 
So far, the progymnasmata have provided the framework for discourses on lies and 
fiction in Longus’ time. Authors like the Philostrati and Callistratus, roughly contemporary with 
Longus, have utilized that framework to discuss the illusion of reality through lively artwork, 
while still others, like Dictys in his “account” of the Trojan War, and the author of the Wonders 
Beyond Thule, have made use of pseudo-documentarism in presenting a fictional narrative as 
historical fact. Longus himself, in fact, seems to adopt certain features of pseudo-
documentarism.  
Yet we are still left with a gap: for while we can certainly connect Callistratus and the 
Philostrati to Longus via the use of ecphrasis, and have connected him to (light) pseudo-
documentarism via his prologue and epilogue, it would be even more valuable to find someone 
extending the discussions of fable, falsehood, and fiction found in the progymnasmata to a 
literary program not confined to visual description or pseudo-documentarism alone. We can find 
such a program, repeatedly, in the works of a direct contemporary to Longus who himself also 
forayed into the genre of prose fiction – Lucian of Samosata. 
 Writing in about the mid-second century, Lucian is about as contemporary with Longus 
as one can find in the classical corpus, assuming the now-prevalent dating of Longus is 
correct.129 And in Lucian, we are not only treated to fictional stories in the fabulistic style as seen 
in Longus (including some of the earliest examples of fantasy and science fiction as we know 
them today); Lucian also provides us with inset stories that discourse upon that sort of 
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storytelling and the lies that might be found therein. And he presents other narratives that flatly 
accuse the historians (who are supposed to be writing for posterity) of engaging in it as well.130 
Indeed, Anderson sees in Lucian’s variations an employment of exercises found in the rhetorical 
handbooks examined earlier: “Lucian did indeed have a rhetorical training, and the programme 
of elementary progymnasmata in the schools clearly encouraged pupils to practice variation. By 
their very nature some of the exercises called for ingenious but stereotyped reworking.”131 This 
applies not only to variations of specific fables in the progymnasmata’s repertoire, but also, as 
with Longus, to the credibility of storytelling and narration itself: “We should never 
underestimate the role of rhetoricians’ handbooks in a sophist’s education; but the novice in the 
schools was allowed to improvise muthoi of his own: he could take some of this material from 
tradition, some from his own reading; but the rest he could invent for himself. The same rule 
applies to diegemata, except that the writer had to confine himself to what was credible.”132 
Indeed, Lucian discourses on the traditional track to rhetoric in his Teacher of Rhetoric, in which 
the narrator (presumably Lucian) advises a young aspiring speaker to avoid the hard road of 
education that he had to endure. Personifying two schools of thought on such education, Lucian 
casts one as a masculine, tanned, and muscular man who will assist the student up the rigorous 
road to oratory, the path which involves reading the classic orators of yesteryear and emulating 
them (9-10). The other path is guided by an effeminate man (a very Agathon himself, he points 
out at 11), who urges the youth to eschew all traditional rhetorical training (ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρὸ τῆς 
ῥητορικῆς) and instead rush right in (14). In fact, the teacher urges him to bring ignorance 
(ἀμαθίας), rashness (θράσος), impudence (τόλμα), and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία, 15). He 
urges the young pupil to read only declamations, not the speeches of the classic orators (17), 
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and at the climax of caricature, Lucian has the charlatan teacher urge a ready lie and an oath 
always on his lips (καὶ ψεῦδος πρόχειρον καὶ ὅρκος ἐπ᾽ ἄκροις ἀεὶ τοῖς χείλεσι, 22). That the 
latter teacher of the easy road is the object of Lucian’s scornful satire is obvious;133 at the end he 
contrasts such a man with himself, suggesting he is bereft of the traits by which Lucian himself 
seeks to court Lady Rhetoric (ἀσύμβολος ὢν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὰ ὑμέτερα, 26). This echoes his earlier 
remark that he himself had taken the more difficult road to rhetoric (καὶ ἔγωγε κατ᾽ ἐκείνην 
ἄθλιος ἀνῆλθον τοσαῦτα καμὼν οὐδὲν δέον, 8). All of this is to say, given the clear denunciation 
of the new rhetorical training Lucian offers in this dialogue and the believably biographical 
nature of his comments about his own education, it is safe to assume that the traditional 
training provided to students in the progymnasmata was Lucian’s as well, including those 
exercises on fable, falsehood, and fiction, which figure among his favorite topics. 
 Lucian will apply his penchant for using fable sophistically to his own account of his early 
life in The Dream. Here, Lucian describes, purportedly for a crowd, why he chose to be a writer 
instead of a sculptor, the job to which he was apprenticed as a young man. He suggests that two 
figures appeared to him in a dream, Craft and Culture. Originally, Lucian calls Craft more 
specifically “Sculpture (Ἑρμογλυφική)” but later refers to her more generally as Τέχνη, while 
Culture is referred to throughout as Paideia (Παιδεία), that nearly universal, late antique 
preoccupation.134 Techne is referred to as stuttering and barbaric (διαπταίουσα and 
βαρβαρίζουσα, Somnium 8), while Culture shows to Lucian the many works of old, promising 
him like immortality. Ultimately, Lucian picks Culture, and Techne is so incensed she turns into 
stone. Lucian remarks, to the displeased crowd, that dreams are “wonder-workers” 
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(θαυματοποιοὶ) so this outcome should not be surprising (Somnium, 14). When someone in the 
crowd calls his narrative “lawyerly” (δικανικόν), Lucian summarily notes that it is no different 
than the dream that Xenophon had in his Anabasis (3.1.11), thereby offering a snide 
commentary on what passes for history.135 
 Indeed, this skewering of historical storytelling and its gullible audiences recurs 
throughout Lucian’s work. His most famous work, A True History, perhaps unsurprisingly 
highlights this tendency the best. Narrating a supposed trip to the heavens and the strange 
worlds he discovered on the voyage, Lucian presents the outlandish and asks us over and again 
to examine whether what he is narrating is all that different from the stories whose truth so 
many take for granted.136 
 Lucian does not make us guess whether he is alluding to poets, philosophers, and 
historians who have written unbelievable accounts. He tells us outright in the introduction to his 
True History, remarking on those who have written so many monstrous, fictional tales (πολλὰ 
τεράστια καὶ μυθώδη, V.H., 1.2). The founder of this sort of nonsense (διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης 
βωμολοχίας), he notes, was Homer’s Odysseus, who “spun many such marvels to the 
unschooled Phaiacians” (οἷα πολλὰ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἰδιώτας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς Φαίακας 
ἐτερατεύσατο, V.H., 1.3). In his own work, Lucian promises that he has put forth a variety of lies 
both persuasively and truthfully (ψεύσματα ποικίλα πιθανῶς τε καὶ ἐναλήθως ἐξενηνόχαμεν). 
Like those before him, Lucian wanted to be remembered by posterity without being denied the 
freedom to mythologize (τῆς ἐν τῷ μυθολογεῖν ἐλευθερίας). But since he had nothing of truth 
to report, he settled on lying (ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἱστορεῖνεἶχον … ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐτραπόμην, 
V.H., 1.4). Notes Jones: “The only difference between Lucian and his models is that they told 
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falsehoods in the guise of truth, whereas he truthfully declares his entire tale false.”137 Lest 
there be any lingering doubt as to the falsity of what it to come, Lucian concludes his 
introduction by warning his readers that nothing he writes should be believed at all:  
γράφω τοίνυν περὶ ὧν μήτε εἶδον μήτε ἔπαθον μήτε 
παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπυθόμην,138 ἔτι δὲ μήτε ὅλως ὄντων μήτε 
τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι δυναμένων. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς 
ἐντυγχάνοντας μηδαμῶς πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. 
 
And so I write about things I have not seen and have not 
experienced and have not learned from others, indeed 
things not existing at all or even able to exist to begin 
with. Therefore it is necessary that those meeting upon 
this believe them not at all. 
 
Indeed, Larmour sees Lucian as in a “dialogic tension” with himself – Lucian the author vs. 
Lucian the narrator. The former has told us not to believe anything, while the latter endeavors 
to make us do just that: “The dialogic tension and the truth-telling conventions of the narrative 
discourse work to ensure that the Otherworld of the Vera Historia is both credible and 
incredible: what appears to be believable is not necessarily true; likewise, what is patently 
untrue is not necessarily unbelievable.”139 However, this tension collapses at one point in the 
narrative when Lucian is given an epigram by Homer on the Isle of the Blest (VH 2.28), which 
“implies that Lucian the narrator has returned from his voyage and is identical with Lucian the 
author who presented the Vera Historia to us in the Prologue.”140 Indeed, Mheallaigh sees both 
this epigram and another Lucian finds on the Island of the Vine Women (recording Dionysus’ and 
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Heracles’ visit there) as parodic examples of pseudo-documentarism: “both the invention of 
obviously specious epigraphical texts and their use as an authenticating device within the 
avowed fantasy.”141 
But what is most fascinating about Lucian’s introduction for our purposes is not only 
that he provides a veritable condensation of the sorts of discourses on fiction that we hear in 
the progymnasmata (discourses that, I argue, we can also find in more subtle forms in Longus), 
but that after this warning, he continues with his narrative as though none of the preceding had 
been said, with all the same timeworn rhetorical tricks used by his forebears to lend credibility 
to their most incredible stories. “Lucian’s adventures may be so exaggerated and fantastic that 
no one could ever be expected to swallow them as having actually occurred (and in fact he 
acknowledges that they have not), but he goes out of his way to pepper his narrative with 
comments and mannerisms that are typically employed in historical literature to give assurance 
of credibility.”142 Thus in 1.13, the narrator holds off on describing the Crane Cavalry, because 
they never arrived so he never “saw” them, though reports of them were so “terrible” as to be 
“unbelievable” (τούτους ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐθεασάμην οὐ γὰρ ἀφίκοντο. διόπερ οὐδὲ γράψαι τὰς φύσεις 
αὐτῶν ἐτόλμησα: τεράστια γὰρ καὶ ἄπιστα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγετο). In 1.18, he likewise refuses to 
report the number of Cloud Centaurs, because it would be ἄπιστον – “unbelievable” (τὸ μέντοι 
πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀνέγραψα, μή τῳ καὶ ἄπιστον δόξῃ — τοσοῦτον ἦν). He employs the same 
hesitation again in 1.25 when describing the people of the moon. After already relating a host of 
unbelievable features, he hesitates to describe their eyes lest someone think him lying owing to 
the unbelievable nature of the account (περί μέντοι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, οἵους ἔχουσιν, ὀκνῶ μὲν 
εἰπεῖν, μή τίς με νομίσῃ ψεύδεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἄπιστον τοῦ λόγου). In the very next chapter, while 
describing a well whose reflection shows everything happening down on earth, he concedes it 
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sounds incredible but invites anyone who does not believe it to go to the moon themselves and 
see if he is telling the truth (ὅστις δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πιστεύει οὕτως ἔχειν, ἄν ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖσε 
ἀφίκηται, εἴσεται ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω). Not surprisingly (given his penchant for the fantastic), when 
the narrator and his travelers pass by CloudCuckooLand, he laments how so many did not 
believe Aristophanes, a “wise and truthful man,” regarding the things which he wrote (καὶ ἐγὼ 
ἐμνήσθην Ἀριστοφάνους τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς καὶ μάτην ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔγραψεν 
ἀπιστουμένου). Finishing off Book 1, Lucian launches into a description of the islands around the 
battlefield even though he knows they will seem “incredible” (οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἀπίστοις ἐοικότα 
ἱστορήσων,λέξω δὲ ὅμως, V.H., 1.40).  
 Book 2 continues the narrator’s fantastic adventures. At one point he finds the Isle of 
the Blest, where he asks Homer to write him the epigram referenced above. As if helping to 
imbue the writer with credibility, Homer writes that Lucian “saw all these things” (a common 
authenticating statement) and then went back home to his native land (Λουκιανὸς τάδε πάντα 
φίλος μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν εἶδέ τε καὶ πάλιν ἦλθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν, V.H., 2.28). 
Meanwhile, on the Isle of the Damned, those who had lied (including Herodotus), were 
subjected to the harshest of punishments:  
καὶ μεγίστας ἁπασῶν , τιμωρίας ὑπέμενον οἱ 
ψευσάμενοί τι παρὰ τὸν βίον καὶ οἱ μὴ τὰ ἀληθῆ 
συγγεγραφότες, ἐν οἷς καὶ Κτησίας ὁ Κνίδιος ἦν καὶ 
Ἡρόδοτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. τούτους οὖν ὁρῶν ἐγὼ 
χρηστὰς εἶχον εἰς τοὐπιὸν τὰς ἐλπίδας: οὐδὲν γὰρ 
ἐμαυτῷ ψεῦδος εἰπόντισυνηπιστάμην. (V.H., 2.31) 
 
And the ones having lied about something during their 
life underwent (awaited) the greatest punishments of 
everyone, and those having written down things not 
true, among whom was Ctesias of Cnidos and 
Herodotus. And seeing these things I had good hope for 
the future: for I do not believe that I have spoken any 
lie. 
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Perhaps Lucian’s greatest lie143 is reserved for the end of the True History. There, he promises to 
tell us about more marvels upon the earth in the books to come (τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν ταῖς ἑξῆς 
βίβλοις διηγήσομαι, V.H., 2.47) before promptly and abruptly ending the work.144 
 Discourses like this also recur (again, perhaps not surprisingly), in Lucian’s Lover of Lies. 
Here the storytellers, who repeatedly insist they are telling the truth, attempt to get a skeptical 
friend to believe in the supernatural by embarking on a series of ghost stories and other tall 
tales, including the first known account of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice.145 Tychiades, the skeptic, is 
prompted to relate tall tales he has heard when he asks his friend Philocles his opinion on men 
who like to lie. And so, in a richly ironic twist, the skeptic himself becomes the storyteller of the 
very “lying” tales he had not believed. Regardless, he laments that there are those who lie not 
for advantage or any other understandable reason, but just for the sake of lying (φημὶ οἳ αὐτὸ 
ἄνευ τῆς χρείας τὸ ψεῦδος πρὸ πολλοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας τίθενται, ἡδόμενοι τῷ πράγματι καὶ 
ἐνδιατρίβοντες ἐπ᾽οὐδεμιᾷ προφάσει ἀναγκαίᾳ, Philopseudes, 1). Here again, Lucian works in 
some invective for Herodotus and Homer, who not only deceived themselves, but so many 
successive generations after them (ὡς μὴ μόνους ἐξαπατᾶν τοὺς τότε ἀκούοντας σφῶν, ἀλλὰ 
καί μέχρις ἡμῶν διικνεῖσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἐκ διαδοχῆς, Philopseudes, 2). 
 Another work similarly replete with embedded narration, and deception as 
metafictionality, is Lucian’s Toxaris, in which a Greek and Scythian each tell five stories extolling 
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true friendship in a competition. Notes Anderson: “Like the [True History], Toxaris is another 
opportunity for pseudos.”146 The story begins, as so many of the narratives treated here,147 with 
an ecphrasis by Toxaris of the paintings in the Oresteion, to which Mnesippus responds that he 
is an excellent “painter” because he has brought the images vividly before his eyes with his 
description. The two agree to a story-telling contest similar to the pastoral singing contests 
famous in Theocritus148 but they utilize military imagery to describe their match. Thus 
Mnesippus frets about engaging in “single combat” (μονομαχῆσαι) with such an enemy 
(πολεμιστής) as Toxaris, who responds by saying that if Mnessipus’ stories are better, they will 
inflict more serious wounds (καιριώτερα … τραύματα) and he will succumb to the blows (τὰς 
πληγάς). The winner will be not the one who tells more stories (they end up telling an equal 
number), but the one whose stories are better and sharper (ἀμείνους καὶ τομώτεραι). But these 
goals seem to conflict with another ground rule: the stories cannot be fictions: to make up such 
things, Toxaris says, is not at all hard (ἄλλως γὰρ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν) and 
yet it is hard to refute them (καὶ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἀφανής, Toxaris, 11). Already, then, Lucian’s 
characters have traversed the boundaries of the progymnasmata – eschewing fictions 
(πλάσματα; cf the verb ἀναπλάττειν above), they swear oaths to tell only the truth (μὴν ἀληθῆ 
ἐρεῖν) yet their victories are dependent upon making the stories, though ostensibly true, as 
good (ἀγαθός) and sharp (τομός) as possible. In engaging in such a balancing act, “it becomes 
difficult to tell if Lucian is making fun of contemporary fiction, or paying it the compliment of 
imitation.”149  Rostovsteff sees an explicit novelistic influence, surmising that some of the 
Scythian material could be from lost Greek novels set in Scythia, fragments of which had been 
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recently published in his time, showing a setting in southern Russia.150 But Bompaire sees less 
evidnence of that than of Lucian’s academic training in the handbooks.151 Regardless of their 
origins, attention to their likely fictionality recurs throughout, most especially when the 
narrators are making claims to the contrary. When Mnesippus begins, he swears that whatever 
he tells to Toxaris, it will be either things he himself knows or things sought out from others with 
accuracy (ἂν λέγω πρὸς σὲ ἢ αὐτὸς εἰδὼς ἢ παρ᾽ ἄλλων ὁπόσον οἷόν τε ἦν δι᾽ ἀκριβείας 
ἐκπυνθανόμενος ἐρεῖν, Toxaris, 12)152 and that he will not add any theatrics of his own (μηδὲν 
παρ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιτραγῳδῶν). Indeed, like Longus’ characters, Lucian’s, although telling 
narratives they swear are wholly true, nonetheless obliquely alert us to the possibility of 
narrative deceit by peppering their stories with intrigue. The very first story told by Mnesippus is 
a famous one (ἀοίδιμον) among the Ionians, about an aristocratic youth named Deinias whose 
toadies ensnare him in a doomed romance with a married woman, Caricleia, via gifts and letters 
from her – the sorts of things, Mnesippus says, that procuresses use to “contrive against young 
men” (ὁπόσα αἱ μαστροποὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς νέοις μηχανῶνται, Toxaris, 13). In this way, Caricleia was 
clever (δεινή) and an artist (τεχνῖτις). The woman’s disingenuous acting convinced Deinias that 
he was in love:  
ἁλώσεσθαι ἔμελλεν ὑπὸ γυναικὸς καλῆς καὶ πρὸς 
ἡδονήν τε ὁμιλῆσαι ἐπισταμένης καὶ ἐν καιρῷ 
δακρῦσαι καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων ἐλεεινῶς ὑποστενάξαι 
καὶ ἀπιόντος ἤδη λαβέσθαι καὶ εἰσελθόντι 
προσδραμεῖν καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι ὡς ἂν μάλιστα 
ἀρέσειε, καί που καί ᾆσαι καί κιθαρίσαι. (Toxaris, 15) 
 
He was bound to be destroyed by a beautiful woman, 
who knew how to be in his company with pleasure, and 
how to weep at the right time, and how to moan 
piteously in the middle of conversations, and how to 
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embrace him before he was leaving and to run up to 
him when he was coming, and how to look as beautiful 
as would especially please him, and to sing anywhere 
and play the lyre. 
 
She did all this until Deinias ran into misfortune. Then she contrived another way to destroy the 
wretch (ἄλλο ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπενόει καὶ τὸν ἄθλιον ἀπώλλυε): she pretended to be with child from 
him (κύειν τε γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ σκήπτεται, Toxaris, 15). By the end, Deinias had killed both her and 
her husband and been exiled, and his poor friend Agathocles (mentioned in the beginning of the 
story but by now virtually forgotten) had agreed to go into exile with him. And so not only is the 
ostensible purpose of the story – the friendship of Agathocles – subsumed in the narrative by 
the lurid and sordid love affair between Deinias and a married woman, but the very theatrics 
that Mnesippus foreswore in its telling have been colorfully demonstrated by Caricleia’s 
machinations. No wonder, then, that in response, Toxaris remarks, “Oh if only, Mnesippus, you 
had narrated such things without being oath-bound, so that I might be free to disbelieve them” 
(καὶ εἴθε γε, ὦ Μνήσιππε, ἀνώμοτος ὢν ταῦτα ἔλεγες, ἵνα καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἂν ἐδυνάμην αὐτοῖς, 
Toxaris, 18). 
 Mnesippus begins his second tale (about a man washed overboard saved by a friend) 
with more authentication than the “famous” first one, asserting a specific chain of transmission 
from a Megarian sea captain, who himself had sworn an oath that he had seen what happened. 
When Mnesippus later mentions that the two men survived and are now in Athens studying 
philosophy, he ensures to provide a second source (since the sea captain would only have seen 
the two men go overboard) for what happened after they were spared. Mnesippus likewise 
authenticates his fourth story, suggesting that the man featured was pointed out to him when 
he was in Italy. This allows for an(other) embedded narrator to take over the tale, as the 
informant answers Mnesippus’ curiosity as to why the man – a handsome youth – was married 
to a woman who was an “unapproachable hobgoblin” (ἀπρόσιτον μορμολυκεῖον), with her right 
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side withered and her eye poked out (ξηρὰ τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένη, 
Toxaris, 24). Eventually we learn that the man wed her out of friendship with the woman’s 
father (in spite of some farcical pleading from her father not to marry the ugly and disfigured 
girl). 
 After Mnesippus’ final tale, Toxaris takes over, and after his first story (which does not 
suit our purposes to repeat), he asks Mnesippus how he could possibly tell a better tale, even if 
he were allowed to tell ten more and, without an oath, were allowed to “add many lies to them” 
(πολλὰ ἐπιψεύδοιο αὐτοῖς). He then berates his opponent for his embellishments (indeed, 
Toxaris’ tales are shorter and less descriptive), claiming that he himself has narrated the naked 
action (γυμνὸν τὸ ἔργοv), whereas if Mnesippus were telling the same story, he would no doubt 
have mixed elegant dressings with his story (κομψὰ ἐγκατέμιξας τῷ λόγῳ), the sorts of things 
Greeks are accustomed to contrive for their audience (ὁποῖα ὑμεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι εἰώθατε πρὸς 
τὴν ἀκρόασιν, Toxaris, 42). 
 Toxaris himself then launches into his own meta narrative on deceit. Arsacomas, a 
Scythian, falls in love with the daughter of the Bosporan king but his proposal is laughed at 
because he enumerates no property or possessions but merely boasts that he has two loyal 
friends. When he goes home to tell the two friends about the king’s insult, the three concoct an 
elaborate scheme of revenge. One friend goes back to the king and pretends to be an informer 
about Arsacomas’ planned revenge. He then lures the king into a sanctuary (away from guards), 
kills him, decapitates him, and smuggles his head out of the city to bring back to Arsacomas. 
Meanwhile, Arsacomas’ other friend rides out to the king’s new son-in-law (awarded the king’s 
daughter over Arsacomas) and tells him that he should go claim the throne, for otherwise it will 
be taken by the king’s illegitimate brother. He also claims to be a kinsman of the bride, and so 
he is allowed to conduct her back to Bosporus while her husband goes on ahead to try to take 
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the throne. But rather than take the bride to Bosporus, the friend of course takes her back to 
Arsacomas. A war ensues (which Toxaris himself fought in, allowing him another authenticating 
device), which Arsacomas and his friends win (Toxaris, 44-55) 
 Naturally, Mnesippus responds to this story with skepticism, much as Toxaris had 
responded to his story (also laden with deception) earlier. The stories were very dramatic 
(τραγικά), he observes, and similar to fables (μύθοις ὅμοια, Toxaris, 56).153 If someone were to 
disbelieve them (εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τις ἀπιστοίη αὐτοῖς), he would not altogether seem blameworthy (οὐ 
πάνυ μεμπτὸς εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, Toxaris, 56). This allows Toxaris to wryly reply, “See to it, noble 
one, that your disbelief is not jealousy” (ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα, ὦ γενναῖε, μὴ φθόνος ὑμῶν ἡ ἀπιστία ᾖ, 
Toxaris, 56). Indeed, throughout the Toxaris, “the Greek and Scythian storytellers make equally 
elaborate protestations as they vie to outdo each others’ lies.”154 Ultimately, the two swear 
friendship and hospitality to each other after remembering that because they had forgotten to 
appoint a judge, no one can be declared the winner. But key elements throughout make it clear 
why so many have seen in their tales echoes of the Greek romances, most especially their joint 
incredulity at each other’s stories (especially stories containing elaborate narratives of deceit), 
set against the criteria at the outset that the winner’s stories would be those told most 
vividly.155 Jones sees clear influences on Lucian on this score: “Lucian must have been aware of 
the fiction being produced in his own time. The chronology of the ancient novel is still far from 
settled, but like Apuleius in Latin some, at least, of the Greek novelists were active in Lucian’s 
day.”156 
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In addition to these references to fictionality as part of traditional tale-telling, Lucian 
also mentions lying and deception in his other dialogues, highlighting the thing that makes 
falsehood perhaps most dangerous: its seeming credibility. In his work On Slander, he warns at 
one point: “When someone comes to you and tells you [slanderous] things, investigate the 
matter in itself, not regarding the age of the speaker or his life otherwise, or the cleverness in 
his words. For the more plausible someone seems, the more careful scrutiny is required” 
(ἐπειδὰν τοίνυν τοιαῦτα προσίῃ τις λέγων, αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐξετάζειν, μήτε 
ἡλικίαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὁρῶντα μήτε τὸν ἄλλον βίον μήτε τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀγχίνοιαν. ὅσῳ γάρ 
τις πιθανώτερος, τοσούτῳ ἐπιμελεστέρας δεῖται τῆς ἐξετάσεως, On Slander, 31). Indeed, earlier 
the narrator had warned that slanderers take pains to make their lies credible and that the 
surprising nature of what they say lends them credence (On Slander, 13).157 This concern for the 
ability of slick talkers (i.e., sophists no different than himself) to dupe gullible followers recurs in 
one of Lucian’s preferred subjects: “If Lucian has a favorite topic, it is religion.”158 In a famous 
passage of the Peregrinus, Lucian describes the new religion of Christianity with contempt and 
ridicule, noting how Peregrinus, after joining their numbers, was worshipped by them second 
only to Christ himself. They showered him with elaborate meals and money, from which, Lucian 
wryly notes, he made not a little profit (πρόσοδον οὐ μικρὰν ταύτην ἐποιήσατο, Peregrinus, 13). 
Lucian famously goes on to indict the gullibility of Christians in general, alleging they receive 
their practices without any accurate proof (ἄνευ τινός ἀκριβοῦς πίστεως τὰ τοιαῦτα 
παραδεξάμενοι, Peregrinus, 13). Because of this, “should any sorcerer or trickster come among 
them, being able to profit from these affairs, he in short order becomes wealthy, gaping at 
uneducated folks” (ἢν τοίνυν παρέλθῃ τις εἰς αὐτοὺς γόης καὶ τεχνίτης ἄνθρωπος καὶ 
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πράγμασιν χρῆσθαι δυνάμενος, αὐτίκα μάλα πλούσιος ἐν βραχεῖ ἐγένετο ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις 
ἐγχανών, Peregrinus, 13). Indeed, Jones concludes that for Lucian, no matter how accurate his 
information may be about Christians, they are rather “merely another example of human 
incredulity and ignorance.”159  
 This twin danger of public gullibility and clever predators finds its greatest expression in 
perhaps the most famous invective of Lucian, Alexander the False Prophet. Here the topic not 
only allows Lucian to amuse his friend Celsus,160 who requested the work, but also affords him 
the opportunity to discourse yet again on lying, deceit, sophistry, trickery, and gullibility. Such a 
treatment starts early, as Lucian promises Celsus in his introduction to elaborate on Alexander’s 
“clever schemes (ἐπίνοια) and “sleights of hand” (μαγγανεία, Alexander, 1). Lucian starts with 
some boilerplate invective, including the common accusation that Alexander had been a male 
prostitute in his youth. Lucian then concedes that Alexander was brilliant but put it to poor use. 
Indeed, he was made from a mixture of lying and tricks and false swearings and wicked 
craftsmanships (ψεύδους καὶ δόλων καὶ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ κακοτεχνιῶν), but also plausible and 
convincing (πιθανὴν καὶ ἀξιόπιστον, Alexander, 4). Throughout the Alexander, it will be this 
combination of plausibility and deceit that will most rile Lucian. To fool the people of 
Abonuteichos, Alexander uses a number of “contrivances” or “devices” (μηχανᾶται), “a word 
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 Whether this is the same Celsus against whom Origen defended Christianity has been the subject of 
recurring debate. In Chadwick’s edition of the Contra Celsum (1953, xxv), he rejects the prospect, noting 
that “it is perfectly clear from almost every page of the contra Celsum that Celsus is far from being in any 
sense an Epicurean.” But in his more recent edition of Celsus’ On the True Doctrine, Hoffman (1987, 32) 
argues that “Epicurean” was a general term (often of abuse) and that in any case Origen himself notes 
Celsus had converted from Epicureanism. This, coupled with the fact that Galen, Lucian, and Origen all 
characterize Celsus as an opponent of magic, not to mention the matching chronology (both Lucian’s 
Celsus and Origen’s opponent are writing at about 180 CE), certainly does not rule out the possibility that 
this is one and the same Celsus. 
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which recurs in his account” a half-dozen times.161 First, in true authenticating fashion, 
Alexander “discovers” a snake and a goose egg after planting them the night before. Likewise, 
after setting up the oracle through which he would deliver prophecies, he had pilgrims deposit 
sealed scrolls and then returned them seemingly still sealed with answers to their questions. 
Lucian remarks that this trick was easy enough to see through, but the populace thought it 
amazing (ἄπιστα, Alexander, 20). He also devised a trick unworthy of an everyday robber 
(μηχανᾶταί τι …  τοῦ προστυχόντος λῃστοῦ ἄξιον), namely that he would keep inquiries made to 
the god that were embarrassing to the petitioners so he could use them as blackmail (Alexander, 
32). At one point, Lucian submits a phony inquiry just to trip the “prophet” up (Alexander, 53), 
reminiscent of his fabricated work by Hericlitus that he used to expose a philosopher and other 
grammarians unfortunate enough to be his target.162 Indeed, in sealing the drumbeat of deceit 
and gullibility throughout the Alexander, Lucian ends the piece hopeful that it will be “useful to 
those happening upon it” (τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσι χρήσιμόν) since it “refutes some things while 
confirming others in the opinions of those of good mind” (τὰ μὲν διεξελέγχουσα, τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς 
τῶν εὖ φρονούντων γνώμαις βεβαιοῦσα, Alexander, 61). 
 Indeed, in the tradition of Thucydides, usefulness is Lucian’s benchmark for recording 
things for posterity. And we need not rely upon the satirical discourses above to tease out his 
thoughts on history, myth, lies, and fiction: in his How to Write History – a correspondence to an 
otherwise unknown Philo – Lucian spelled out his thoughts on the current crop of historians, 
who were eager to record the events of the Parthian War (162-165 CE), and their myriad 
shortcomings.163 Despite the title, the majority of the work is occupied by Lucian’s laments 
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 Ibid, 19. The incident is mentioned by Galen. 
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 The work is thus easily dated: in section 31, Lucian criticizes a historian who has the temerity to even 
write “future history” (τὰ μέλλοντα) about how the war would end, including a city the Romans would no 
doubt build there – though the historian in question was unsure as yet what the name of it would be!  
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about the current state of historiography, but the recurring criticism is that history has become 
too blurred with poetry and fiction; that historians spend too much time on description; and 
that they insufficiently use truth as the measuring rod for their writings. 
 Lucian’s first complaint is that would-be historians neglect the facts and instead give 
generous amounts of time to eulogies (ἀμελήσαντες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ἱστορεῖν τὰ 
γεγενημένα τοῖς ἐπαίνοις ἀρχόντων καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐνδιατρίβουσι, 7). While panegyric can 
afford embellishment, history itself cannot tolerate a lie (ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἄν τι ψεῦδος ἐμπεσὸν ἡ 
ἱστορία, 7). What ails current writers of history, according to Lucian, is that these men seem not 
to know that the bar for history is not the same as for poems or poetry (ἔτι ἀγνοεῖν ἐοίκασιν οἱ 
τοιοῦτοι ὡς ποιητικῆς μὲν καὶ ποιημάτων ἄλλαι ὑποσχέσεις καὶ κανόνες ἴδιοι, ἱστορίας δὲ 
ἄλλοι). In poetry, freedom is utmost (ἀκρατὴς ἡ ἐλευθερία) and there is but one rule: what seems 
right to the poet (καὶ νόμος εἷς, τὸ δόξαν τῷ ποιητῇ). If history were to do the same, however, it 
is nothing but a sort of pedestrian poetry (πεζή τις ποιητικὴ), which lacks its lofty sounds 
(μεγαλοφωνία), but because it is bare of meter, it shows its marvels to be all the more suspect 
(τὴν λοιπὴν δὲ τερατείαν γυμνὴν τῶν μέτρων καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἐπισημοτέραν ἐκφαίνουσα, 8). 
Indeed, Lucian rejects outright that history need be something pleasurable (τερπνὸν) in addition 
to being useful (χρήσιμον). Such a division is spurious (κιβδήλῳ τῇ διαιρέσει) because history 
should have only one aim: the useful, which derives from one tool, the truth (ἓν γὰρ ἔργον 
ἱστορίας καὶ τέλος, τὸ χρήσιμον ὅπερ ἐκ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μόνου συνάγεται, 9). In fact, Lucian goes 
so far as to say that something fabulistic (μυθῶδες) doesn’t actually give pleasure anyway, 
except perhaps to the great unwashed (τὸν πολὺν δῆμον). Rather, one should be aware of those 
who will listen as judges or even fault-finders (τοὺς δικαστικῶς καὶ νὴ Δία συκοφαντικῶς), 
whom nothing will escape (οὓς οὐκ ἄν τι λάθοι). For they test each thing said like money-
changers (ἀργυραμοιβικῶς δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστα ἐξετάζοντας), throwing aside right away 
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the counterfeits (τὰ μὲν παρακεκομμένα εὐθὺς ἀπορρίπτειν, 10). Those who insist on the 
pleasurable in history are like ugly people (οἱ ἄμορφοι) who instruct artists nevertheless to paint 
them as beautifully as possible (τοῖς γραφεῦσι παρακελευόμενα ὡς καλλίστας αὐτὰς γράφειν, 
13). 
 Moving on to specific examples of bad historians, Lucian reserves special disdain for an 
unnamed historian who took pains to describe all cities, all mountains, all plains, and all rivers in 
the most detailed and striking way possible … so he thought (πάσας πόλεις καὶ πάντα ὄρη καὶ 
πεδία καὶ ποταμοὺς ἑρμηνεύσας πρὸς τὸ σαφέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον, ὡς ᾤετο, 19). Historians 
of that stripe have either a weakness as to what is useful (ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀσθενείας τῆς ἐν τοῖς 
χρησίμοις) or an ignorance about what should be said (ἢ ἀγνοίας τῶν λεκτέων) and thus take 
pleasure in ecphrases about places and caves (ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας τῶν χωρίων καὶ ἄντρων 
ἐκφράσεις τρέπονται, 20). 
 Nor does Lucian have much use for the various authenticating devices already 
examined. He notes wryly a writer who begins his narrative musing that “ears are less credible 
than eyes” (‘ὦτα ὀφθαλμῶν ἀπιστότερα’). He will thus “write about the things which I have 
seen, not those which I have heard” (‘γράφω τοίνυν ἃ εἶδον, οὐχ ἃ ἤκουσα.’). Said writer saw 
everything so accurately (καὶ οὕτως ἀκριβῶς ἅπαντα ἑωράκει) that he was able to report on 
dragons of enormous size (ὥστε τοὺς δράκοντας ἔφη… παμμεγέθεις εἶναι, 29)! Still another 
styled himself as an historian of the future (τὰ μέλλοντα συγγεγραφότος), predicting the end of 
the Parthian war and the capture of Vologesus. These are the many trifles among historians 
thanks to their lack of education (τοιαῦτα πολλὰ ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας). They simply dream up and 
fictionalize whatever is on the tips of their tongues (ἐπινοοῦντες δὲ καὶ ἀναπλάττοντες, ὅ τι κεν 
ἐπ᾽ ἀκαιρίμαν γλῶσσαν, 32). It is little surprise, then, that when Lucian turns to the subject of 
his discourse, his advice on how to write history, truth is the paramount virtue. A good historian 
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should sacrifice to truth alone (καὶ μόνῃ θυτέον τῇ ἀληθείαι), and must eschew all else (τῶν δὲ 
ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀμελητέον, 40).  
 This admittedly short treatment of Lucian’s vast corpus has I hope nevertheless 
illustrated that like his contemporaries (or indeed perhaps more so), Lucian was preoccupied 
with veracity and deceit, gullibility and credibility. When not lamenting the trends of his day in 
letters and dialogues, he often dovetailed these concerns into his own fictions and storytelling. 
He manages to treat such notions in stories intended by their tellers to be believed (as in the 
Toxaris), not believed (as in the Lover of Lies), or somewhere in between (as in the True 
Histories); when departing from narrative, Lucian’s fixation on deceit continues in his attacks on 
those who used it for personal fame and gain, as did Alexander and Peregrinus, or in merely his 
own playful ends. The clear demarcation is indeed for what ends the lies are being told, though 
for Lucian, as the True History seems to suggest, the easy blurring of the lines between plausible 
storytelling for entertainment and credible contrivance for guile seems always in the 
background. As Jones sums up: “Lucian disliked ‘lies’ but not elegant and beguiling fiction.”164 
 We thus have a direct contemporary to Longus whose own writings and whose laments 
on the writings of others illustrate a literary world preoccupied with credible storytelling and 
fiction; with the blurring of traditional demarcations between prose and poetry; and with the 
possibilities and challenges that await a skillful word artist who might wish to tell a thoroughly 
unbelievable tale. What we might hope to find when examining Longus’ fellow novelists, then, is 
a reflection of these preoccupations, and an analysis of their fictional narratives does not 
disappoint on that score. 
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Chapter 4: Lies and Fiction in the Greek Novels I – Chariton and 
Xenophon 
 
Chariton 
 
Chariton’s novel Callirhoe is most likely the oldest extant Greek romance, probably 
written in the middle of the first century CE.165 Regardless of whether it is typical of the genre at 
the time, it is “simple and linear” and contains an “uncomplicated narrative manner,”166 unlike 
the more “sophistic” novels of the second century and beyond, like those of Achilles Tatius, 
Longus, Apuleius, and Heliodorus. Simple though it may be, Chariton drives his linear fiction 
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 Chariton shows fewer, if any, attempts at Atticizing like the later sophistic authors (such as Longus), 
and is thus typically dated to before the second century. Papanikolaou (1973) has done the most 
thorough and oft-cited study of Chariton’s language, concluding from certain vulgarisms that he wrote in 
the latter half of the first century BCE, his lifetime overlapping with the advent of Atticizing reform: 
“Damit aber gewinnen wir ein Indiz, das auf eine Datierung Charitons in die Mitte oder die zweite Hälfte 
des 1. Jhs v. Chr. fuhrt, so daß sich seine Lebenszeit durchaus mit dem Beginn der attizistischen Reform 
überschnitten haben kann,” 163. However, Papanikolaou admits that a dearth of Hellenistic prose offers 
little for comparison to Chariton, and his own dating is the very earliest, based on a terminus post quem 
thanks to a reference to Chinese silk in 6.4.2 (χρύσεον δὲ ἀκινάκην ὑπεζωσμένος δύο ἄκοντας ἐκράτει, 
καὶ φαρέτρα καὶ τόξον αὐτῷ παρήρτητο, Σηρῶν ἔργον πολυτελέστατον). Giangrande (1974) was 
unconvinced by Papanikolaou, most especially on the grounds that a lack of Atticizing necessarily dates 
Chariton to before such a convention. Precisely because Chariton and the other novelists were “literate” 
(belesen, re: Papanikolau) “explodes Papanikolaou's argument: they were artists, who created their 
diction and style as an act of deliberate literary choice, so that the absence or presence of certain features 
in such self-conscious writers cannot, in so far as being the result of calculated artistic choice, be regarded 
as a criterion for dating in the manner followed by those who study non-literary texts” (197). Of course, it 
is possible that traces of Atticizing can, in fact, be found in Chariton. Ruiz-Montero (1991), studying the 
vocabulary rather than syntax of Chariton, found broad agreement with him and authors of the late first 
and early second century, concluding, contra Papanikolaou, that Chariton shows a “knowledge of Atticist 
precepts which the author follows when he wants. Thus, Atticisms are indeed present in Chariton, 
although in moderate quantity” (489). Based on these considerations and Chariton’s affinity for 
terminology found in Plutarch, Josephus, and Philo, Ruiz-Montero dates Chariton to the late first or very 
early second century CE, slightly later than Reardon, who advocates for a date in the middle of the first 
century CE (Reardon 2008, 17). Few anymore date him much later, thanks to papyrus finds in 1900 
(Papyrus Fayumensis 1 saec. 2: 4.2.3-4.3.2), 1910 (POxy 1019, 2.3.5-2.4.2), 1955 (Papyri Michaelidae 1, 
saec. 2:2.11.4-2.11.6), and 1972 (POxy 2948, saec. 3: 2.4.5-2.5.1), all of which date to the mid to late 
second century or early third. This terminus ante quem coincides with the brief, unflattering mention of a 
Chariton in Philostratus Epistle 1.66, where the author’s posterity is questioned and attacked: “Chariton, 
you suppose that the Greeks will remember your words when you die: but who will those be when they 
are no longer here, who are of no account when they are here?”/Χαρίτωνι. μεμνήσεσθαι τῶν σῶν λόγων 
οἴει τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃς: οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ὄντες, ὁπότε εἰσίν, τίνες ἂν εἶεν, ὁπότε οὐκ εἰσίν; 
Notes Reardon (1991, 47): “It seems probable [that our Chariton is the addressee] … we know of no other 
Chariton who wrote ‘stories’ (logoi), and Philostratus was a Bloomsbury figure, the biographer of the 
Second Sophistic.” 
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forward at almost every turn using narrative deceit within his story. The plot of virtually every 
episode (each of which is typically contained within one of his novel’s eight books), is set up by a 
deception weaved by one character to dupe others – a deception which is believed, acted upon, 
and which then moves the story into another narrative theater. In his use of narrative, plausible 
deception, then, Chariton is acting within the same milieu as Longus; but his use of said 
deceptions in such a linear fashion can perhaps shed light on the innovations which Longus and 
others attempt to bring to their own narratives. The indispensability of deception in Chariton’s 
work, at such an early stage of the novel’s development, suggests, as it does in the other 
novelists, that lying and fiction were inextricably linked in the minds of early imperial novelists 
and elites, and that this linkage expressed itself in self-conscious ways in the earliest forms of 
prose fiction we have today. 
Though many have attributed the myriad twists and turns of Chariton’s various episodes 
to fortune, or tyche,167 that is not a very helpful distillation. For while chance maneuvers, like a 
sudden swelling of the Nile that quenches a burning pyre, can rescue a hero in Xenophon,168 in 
Chariton virtually every turn of fortune is caused – within natural, not supernatural, means – by 
some deceptive scheme on the part of one of his characters: a scheme that is just plausible 
enough to be believed and thus fool the schemers’ fellow actors in the story. Chariton owes 
much of this debt to the plots of New Comedy,169 and indeed, Chariton will use the language of 
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 Thus Reardon summarily notes that “dramatic turns of event, thrown into the story by Tyche, the 
goddess Chance, land hero or heroine in one pathetic plight after another” (1991, 24). 
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 Ephesiaca 4.2 
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 Cf. 48 above, where Quintilian lists comedic plots as one of the forms of narrative: “the rational 
narrative, which is false but is similar to the truth, as comedies fashion” (argumentum, quod falsum sed 
uero simile comoediae fingunt, 2.4.2). Reardon referred to the novel as “cousin-german to New Comedy; 
and this is because it reflects a similar world. Cousin-german, but not blood brother; there are important 
differences between the two. The major differences are two, and they reflect the passage of some 
centuries between New Comedy and novel: … the elements of travel and divine intervention.” (1969, 292) 
Perry (1967, 140) mostly agreed, arguing that the novel was “fundamentally drama in substance and 
historiography in its outward form … The novel is the necessary successor to stage-drama on the popular 
level for a reading public; and since its subject matter is theoretically historical, and its form that of prose 
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the stage over and again to describe the sorts of deceptive schemes being plotted and carried 
out by his characters. The most famous is perhaps the action which sets up the typical romantic 
arc (the separation of the two lovers) of the entire novel: Chaereas’ belief that Callirhoe has 
been unfaithful to him, the assault Chaereas makes on her, and the mistaken belief that she is 
dead. 
Callirhoe Book 1: Much Ado About Nothing170 
Callirhoe and Chaereas are wed in the first chapter of the first book, and immediately in 
the second chapter, the rejected suitors of Callirhoe begin to scheme to end their union. Most of 
them prefer open force, but the tyrant of Acragas urges them otherwise. Because of the power 
of his father-in-law, an open fight against Chaereas is impossible, but they deem it better to use 
craft (ἀδύνατος ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ μάχη, κρείττων δὲ ἡ μετὰ τέχνης, Chariton 
1.2.4). Their first scheme, which proves unsuccessful, involved going to Callirhoe’s house 
“secretly and unseen” (κρύφα δὲ καὶ ἀδήλως) and leaving “evidence” of a party (σημεῖα 
κώμου). Chaereas arrived at the house and burst in on Callirhoe, “able neither to disbelieve the 
things which he had seen nor to believe the things which he did not want to” (οὔτε ἀπιστεῖν οἷς 
εἶδεν οὔτε πιστεύειν οἷς οὐκ ἤθελε δυνάμενος, 1.3.4). Nevertheless, the two lovers are 
reconciled, and the tyrant must embark on a more effective plot (ἥπτετο λοιπὸν ἐνεργεστέρας 
κατασκευῆς τι τοιοῦτον, 1. 4.1). He enlists one of his parasites who is talkative (στωμύλος) and 
full of every social grace (πάσης χάριτος ὁμιλητικῆς ἔμπλεως). He orders this man to play-act at 
being a lover (τοῦτον ἐκέλευσεν ὑποκριτὴν ἔρωτος γενέσθαι), and then bids him to seduce 
Callirhoe’s maid. Then, “the craftsman of this drama” (ὁ δημιουργὸς τοῦ δράματος) found 
                                                                                                                                                                             
narrative, it naturally follows the conventions of historiography, some of which in turn were 
fundamentally dramatic.” As this chapter and the next will demonstrate, the novelists are keenly aware of 
their dramatic debts, and self-consciously and repeatedly refer to their narratives in dramatic fashion.  
170
 The deception that initiates the action of the novel, Chaereas’ belief that Callirhoe is having an affair 
based on his witnessing Callirhoe’s maid with a seducer, was in fact source material for the 
Shakespearean comedy by this name (Höttemann 2011, 122-123). 
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“another actor, not altogether as charming, but cunning and plausible in his speech” (ὑποκριτὴν 
ἕτερον ἐξεῦρεν, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εὔχαριν, ἀλλὰ πανοῦργον καὶ ἀξιόπιστον λαλῆσαι, 1.4.2). Having 
told him what should be said and done, he sent him off to Chaereas (τοῦτον προδιδάξας ἃ χρὴ 
πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, 1.4.3). This actor knows precisely how to reel Chaereas in: when he is 
bidden to speak, he holds back, suggesting it is not the right time (δεομένου λέγειν ὤκνει καὶ 
προυφασίζετο μὴ εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτήδειον τὸν παρόντα), and fills Chaereas with hope, fear, 
and curiosity (ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης, 1.4.4). When he does finally tell 
Chaereas (“acting as one in mourning, even crying a little bit”/ ὅμοιος γενόμενος λυπουμένῳ, 
μικρὸν δέ τι καὶ δακρύσας), he informs Chaereas that his wife is having an affair. Chaereas 
insists on seeing it with his own eyes, and so this “malicious slanderer set the scene” (ὁ δὲ 
κακοήθης ἐκεῖνος καὶ διάβολος συνέταττε τὴν σκηνήν, 1.4.8). The man who had seduced 
Callirhoe’s maid then arrives at the house: 
ὑποκρινόμενος μὲν τὸν λαθραίοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν 
προαιρούμενον, πάντα δὲ μηχανώμενος ἵνα μὴ λάθοι: κόμην 
εἶχε λιπαρὰν καὶ βοστρύχους μύρων ἀποπνέοντας, ὀφθαλμοὺς 
ὑπογεγραμμένους, ἱμάτιον μαλακόν, ὑπόδημα λεπτόν: 
δακτύλιοι βαρεῖς ὑπέστιλβον. Εἶτα πολὺ περιβλεψάμενος τῇ 
θύρᾳ προσῆλθε, κρούσας δὲ ἐλαφρῶς τὸ εἰωθὸς ἔδωκε 
σημεῖον. Ἡ δὲ θεράπαινα καὶ αὐτὴ περίφοβος ἠρέμα 
παρανοίξασα καὶ λαβομένη τῆς χειρὸς εἰσήγαγε (1.4.9-10). 
 
 While pretending to attempt his purpose with secret 
deeds, he was in fact scheming openly so that he might not be 
overlooked: he had his hair shimmering and his locks smelling of 
perfume, his eyes had eyeliner, and he wore a soft cloak and 
dainty shoes, and his heavy rings gleamed. Then, after looking 
around him a lot, he went to the door. And the maiden, herself 
quiet and fearful, having opened the door a bit and taken him 
by the hand, led him within. 
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The actor’s attire and performance are evocative of the exaggerated movements and 
appearance of comic stock characters,171 but the naïve hero is taken in by them. He rushes in 
and kicks Callirhoe, who faints as though dead, is buried as such, and ends up kidnapped by 
piratical tomb raiders and taken out to sea. 
Over and again, the stage is ever present in the tyrant’s successful scheme. The parasite 
is asked to become an “actor” (ὑποκριτὴς), and the scheme is referred to as a “drama” (δράμα). 
The slanderer then sets the “scene” (σκηνή) and the so-called adulterer is a perfect stock 
portrait. But the difference between what Chariton is doing and the work of the comedic poets 
is obvious: here, the comic action is within the narrative, the betrayal of its staging known only 
to the omniscient narrator and reader, while to the characters deceived it is all too real. Yet the 
entirety of the novel is of course a giant stage, with Chariton play-acting for his audience, and it 
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 See Porter’s two treatments (1997, 2003). In the first of these two essays, Porter posits that Lysias 
“exploits the motifs of the stereotypical adultery tale” and draws on what he calls the “comic adultery 
scenario” (422). In the second, he responds to an attempt by Kapparis (2000) to specifically put Chariton 
in Lysias’ debt, arguing that most of the scene here contains “generic elements.” However, these “generic 
elements” can shed light on the scene and Chaereas’ actions within it. Studies of “the adultery mime” 
indicate that it was a popular comic scenario, and possibly contained similarities to the scene constructed 
here by Chariton’s schemers: according to Ovid (Tristia 2.497-500), the mime featured a “polished” or 
“elegant” adulterer (cultus adulter) and a “cunning wife” (callida nupta) who deceives her “foolish 
husband” (stulto viro), “who was no doubt played by the mimic fool, the stupidus” (Kehoe 1984, 90). 
Reynolds (1946) reconstructed the mime, wherein the wife admits her lover while the husband is away 
and then hides him in a chest when he unexpectedly arrives home (see discussion of the similar scene in 
Apuleius on 193 below). Reynolds, citing Capitolinus, argues that the mime perhaps started with the 
husband interrogating a slave as to his wife’s lover and then setting about to expose her adultery, not 
entirely different than the action that sets up Chaereas’ intervention. If the adultery mime was as popular 
as scholars contend, it is at least conceivable that even while mimicking its actions, Chariton has Chaereas 
influenced by its reputation. Reynolds concluded that “the weight of the ridicule was directed at the 
simple gullibility of the husband, and not at the lover ungracefully concealed in the chest” (82), so the 
humiliation of becoming the stupidus is perhaps behind his anger as much as the infidelity. Indeed, when 
the lover eventually is revealed in an adultery mime (perhaps when he runs out of air in the chest), 
Reynolds sees the farce coming to an end in perhaps two different ways: either the “guilty pair” is “ready 
with some fictitious story” or the “fat and awkward husband” barges in, consumed in “a clownish rage” 
(83). It is the latter that Chaereas does, but perhaps he is guarding against the former. One troubling 
aspect of Chaereas’ impulsively violent act is his refusal to allow Callirhoe to defend herself (as she has 
before, 1.4), but the reputation of the callida nupta may have made him reluctant to allow her to use, in 
Reynolds’ words, “all her feminine ingenuity” to fool the husband again while he, the “clumsy buffoon,” 
rushed in the room, “stabbing the empty air, tripping over his own feet, perhaps even falling into the 
chest, which lies conveniently open” (83). Thus in refusing to play the fool, Chaereas becomes just that, 
duped by a suitor’s machinations.  
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is an open question how many of his readers would have been aware that what they were 
reading was pure fiction.172 Chariton himself lends credence to the upcoming narrative in his 
opening, referring to himself as a clerk (ὑπογραφεύς) to a presumably real rhetor, Athenagoras, 
and writes simply (yet ambiguously) that he is going to narrate (διηγήσομαι) an erotic event 
(πάθος ἐρωτικὸν) that happened (γενόμενον). This is no once-upon-a-time opening: Chariton 
has told his readers this actually happened (whether or not it did), and lends the narrative more 
credence by situating it within a real historical context. Callirhoe is the daughter of Hermocrates, 
the general of Syracuse who defeated the Athenian invasion in 413 CE, a historical event alluded 
to often in the novel (i.a., 1.1.13, 1.11.2). Chariton even may have been lending Callirhoe some 
historical credence: Diodorus writes that Hermocrates had an unnamed daughter who also 
married a Dionysius, as Callirhoe will in Book 3 – Dionysius I, the tyrant of Syracuse,173 who 
incidentally started his life as a clerk like Chariton. 174 This daughter herself has an ill-fated 
history: before Dionysius’ tyranny was fully secured, rebelling Syracusans ransacked his house 
and outraged his wife (τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα συλλαβόντες οὕτω διέθεσαν κακῶς) so that the tyrant’s 
anger might remain deep (ὥστε καὶ τὸν τύραννον βαρέως ἐνέχειν τὴν ὀργήν, Diod. 13.112.4). 
Plutarch also writes that Dionysius married Hermocrates’ daughter and also reports the outrage 
by the rebels, but adds that afterward she took her own life (εὐθὺς ἔγημε τὴν Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ 
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 This is perhaps the biggest issue currently in scholarship on the ancient novel. For general treatments, 
see two chapters in Gill and Wiseman 1993: Laird’s “Fiction, Bewitchment and Story Worlds: The 
Implications of Claims to Truth in Apuleius”; and Morgan’s “Make-Believe and Make Believe: The 
Fictionality of the Greek Novels.” On Callirhoe specifically, Hagg (1987, 197): “Admitting the general 
probability of the historical background for the love story, different readers will have judged differently 
where the line is drawn between fact and fiction, exactly as is the case with modern historical novels and 
modern readers. No doubt some believed the whole story to be authentic.” See also Hunter 1994 and 
Reardon 1967, 66-72, and 167-68: “the authors [of early romances] professed to be writing history (of a 
kind), and were classified as historians by ancient scholars who had no more exact term for romance as a 
literary form.” 
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 “And so Dionysius right away married the daughter of Hermocrates, the conqueror of the Athenians” ὁ 
δ᾽ οὖν Διονύσιος εὐθέως ἔγημε τὴν Ἑρμοκράτους θυγατέρα τοῦ καταπολεμήσαντος Ἀθηναίους, 13.96.3). 
The epithet is similar to that first given to describe Hermocrates in Chariton (νικήσας Ἀθηναίους, 1.1). 
174
 “And so Dionysus, from a clerk … became the tyrant of the greatest city of the Greeks (Διονύσιος μὲν 
οὖν ἐκ γραμματέως … τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως τῶν Ἑλληνίδων ἐγενήθη τύραννος, Diodorus 13.96.2). 
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Συρακουσίου θυγατέρα, ταύτην, οὔπω τῆς τυραννίδος ἱδρυμένης βεβαίως, ἀποστάντες οἱ 
Συρακούσιοι δεινὰς καὶ παρανόμους ὕβρεις εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθύβρισαν, ἐφ᾽ αἷς προήκατο τὸν 
βίον ἑκουσίως, Plutarch, Dionysius 3.1). Hunter has identified quasi-historical models for several 
other minor characters in the work as well.175 And so while Chariton is drawing on the schemes 
and plots of New Comedy, he situates them within vaguely recognizable, historical contexts, 
nonfactual though they may be. And it should be remembered that Quintilian refers to comic 
plots as “like the truth” (uero simile),176 for they mimic situations that could occur, however 
unlikely.  
And so, Chariton, like Longus, is then engaging in the same narrative plausibility that his 
characters employ throughout the work, and it is, of course, Chariton who is pulling their puppet 
strings all along, anyway. At the opening of almost each book, a scheme sets the stage for the 
narrative action contained within it, and at the close of each book, another scheme sets the 
stage for the next. Thus the action of Book 1, which consists mainly of Callirhoe’s kidnapping and 
the pirates’ debates about what to do with her, is propelled forward thanks to the concocted 
schemes of the suitor from Acragas. Similarly, the action of Book 2, her initial time with the 
aristocrat Dionysophanes, will result from the lies and schemes of the pirate Theron, who first 
suggests he will give Callirhoe back to her parents (θέλω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς γονεῦσιν, 
1.9.7), but then reveals he aims to sell her into slavery (Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποδώσομαι τὴν γυναῖκα μᾶλλον 
ἢ ἀπολῶ, 1.10.8). Upon making this decision, both captor and captive engage in some mutual 
deceit, as Theron “mollified Callirhoe, trying to deceive her with manifold designs” (Καλλιρρόην 
δὲ παρεμυθεῖτο Θήρων, ποικίλαις ἐπινοίαις πειρώμενος ἀπατᾶν, 1.11.1), but she understood 
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 Hunter (1994, 1056-57) connects Bias, the general of Priene in 4.5.7 and 5.6.8 to Bias of Priene, one of 
the Seven Wise Men of archaic Greece; Rhodogoune, the Persian woman whose beauty is bested by 
Callirhoe, to a woman of the same name mentioned in Plutarch Artax. 27.7; and the Persians Zopyros and 
Megabyzos to men so named in Thucydides 1.109.  
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 Cf. 48 above. As Reardon (1991, 28) rightly notes, “Such a story is not simply a fantasy of the individual 
author. It has a basis in social reality, in the world as Chariton saw it.” 
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how matters stood with her and that she was saved in vain (Ἐκείνη δὲ ᾐσθάνετο τὰ καθ ἑαυτὴν 
καὶ ὅτι ἄλλως ἐσώθη) yet “pretended that she did not know” (προσεποιεῖτο δὲ μὴ νοεῖν, 
1.11.2).177 In order to effect the sale, Theron lies about where he got Callirhoe, telling a steward 
of the aristocrat Dionysius that she was a slave from Sybaris (1.12) sold out of the jealously of 
her mistress (another stock motif that Chariton’s characters make capital of). When the sale was 
all but agreed upon, Theron “began to flatter Callirhoe” (Καλλιρρόην κολακεύειν ἤρξατο), 
spinning a fairly complicated yarn about a sea trip that he did not want her to endure and 
ensuring that she would be sent back to Chaereas “without insult” (ἀνύβριστος, 1.13.8) but that 
for now she would be staying with some “trusted friends” of his in Ionia (παραθήσομαί σε 
φίλοις πιστοῖς, 1.13.9). Again, Callirhoe only pretends to be fooled, laughing to herself despite 
her grief (πρὸς αὑτὴν ἐγέλασε Καλλιρρόη, καίτοι σφόδρα λυπουμένη) and considering him a 
complete fool (ὅτι παντελῶς αὐτὴν ἀνόητον ὑπελάμβανεν), for she already knew she had been 
sold, but, wishing to get away from the pirates, she considered that a better fate than even the 
well-born status she had enjoyed before (ἤδη γὰρ πωλουμένη ἠπίστατο, τῆς δὲ πάλαι εὐγενείας 
τὴν πρᾶσιν εὐτυχεστέραν ὑπελάμβανεν, ἀπαλλαγῆναι θέλουσα λῃστῶν, 1.13.10). She thus 
thanks Theron for his “kindness” (φιλανθρωπίας) and then cleverly and ambiguously wishes that 
the gods bestow all the repayments he deserves (ἀποδοῖεν δὲ … πᾶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ θεοὶ τὰς ἀξίας 
ἀμοιβάς, 1.13.10). In finally closing the sale, Theron puts on one last show, affecting 
indifference (ἀκκισάμενος) when Dionysius’ steward offers him the money immediately before 
a legal contract has been secured – then taking the money anyway (1.14.5). This leaves Callirhoe 
to herself to utter a lengthy lament that serves to summarize the events of Book 1: events that 
began with a deceit leading to her kidnapping, and ended in another deceit which lands her in 
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 Chariton often has his characters “pretend” (προσποιέω, a word that will recurs at least seven times), 
as we shall see. 
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Dionysius’ home, the stage for the next round of conflicts that serve her continuing separation 
from Chaereas, and thus the forward movement of the novel. 
Callirhoe Book 2 
At the opening of Book 2, Callirhoe is a freeborn, married woman who has been sold as 
a slave to the aristocrat Dionysius. Greek social convention thus already poses a problem, for 
Callirhoe, if she is truly noble, must not look like a slave.178 Dionysius himself voices this 
prejudice aloud. As an aristocratic man (ἀνὴρ γὰρ βασιλικός), Dionysius was loathe to take a 
slave as a concubine (ἀπηξίου κοίτην θεραπαινίδος) and tells his servant that “it is impossible 
that someone not born free is beautiful” (ἀδύνατον … καλὸν εἶναι σῶμα μὴ πεφυκὸς 
ἐλεύθερον, 2.1.5). Yet if Dionysius is to be at all sympathetic, he must realize that she is not a 
slave, and indeed this preoccupation dominates the first half of Book 2. Dionysius rejects the 
prospect of satisfying his desire for Callirhoe as her master: “I could not do that, until I learn who 
the woman is and where she comes from. And so let us learn the truth about her in the 
morning” (‘Οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιμι … πρὶν μαθεῖν τίς ἡ γυνὴ καὶ πόθεν. Ἕωθεν οὖν πυθώμεθα παῤ 
αὐτῆς τὴν ἀλήθειαν’ 2.4.10). The emphasis on the “truth” concerning Callirhoe provides a nice 
counterpart to the lies told about her in the first book, but truth-telling will be short lived here, 
as well. Nevertheless, Dionysius’ servant urges Callirhoe to “tell the truth to him, who you are” 
(πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τίς οὖσα τυγχάνεις, 2.4.3). And just as telling lies is typically 
fraught with skill and complexity, here Callirhoe is urged in contrast to “hide nothing of the 
truth,” but to “merely explain it to him simply” (μόνον ἁπλῶς αὐτῷ διαλέγου, καὶ μηδὲν 
ἀποκρύψῃς τῶν ἀληθῶν, 2.5.3). Dionysius himself, upon their meeting, reiterates this truth-
telling theme: “It is right that you tell to us the truth about yourself” (δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ σὲ περὶ 
σεαυτῆς εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 2.5.5). Callirhoe at first demurs, calling her real life, prior to 
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 Cf. Longus 4.20 (and 37 above), when Dionysophanes finds it “incredible” (ἄπιστον) that someone who 
looks like Daphnis could come from his rustic parents.  
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her kidnapping and Theron’s sham sale, a “dream” and a “fable” (ὄνειρος ἦν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ 
μῦθος). One reason she gives for her demurral is her fear that once told, her story will be 
believed by no one: “I do not wish to seem like a charlatan nor to tell narratives that will not 
seem credible to those who are not familiar with them” (οὐ θέλω δοκεῖν ἀλαζὼν οὐδὲ λέγειν 
διηγήματα ἄπιστα τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσιν, 2.5.9). This allows Chariton himself to gain authority with his 
readers: even the title character herself understands that what has happened to her strains 
credibility, yet it is the truth. And so Callirhoe eventually does confess and tell the truth – most 
of it. But she leaves out the most crucial aspect of the story: her marriage to Chaereas, and the 
assault that led to her unconsciousness. Rather, she says that this condition was the result of a 
“sudden fall” (ἐξ αἰφνιδίου πτώματος, 2.5.10). Immediately upon the (better part of the) truth 
coming out, deceit again becomes a primary device, as Book 2 adopts typical comic motifs that 
see Dionysius enlisting his slave Plangon (Callirhoe’s confidant and personal attendant) to take 
care of Callirhoe in every way, and as a woman “skillful by nature” (φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἐντρεχής), 
Plangon fully understood the order (συνῆκεν ἡ Πλαγγὼν τῆς ἐντολῆς, 2.6.5). Plangon then 
becomes a double agent of deceit in Book 2, at first scheming on behalf of Dionysius and then 
later on behalf of Callirhoe. To get Callirhoe to approach Dionysius, Plangon makes up a story 
about the master’s displeasure with her husband, and urges Callirhoe to plead on his behalf to 
Dionysius. As Callirhoe does so, Dionysius realizes Plangon’s scheme (στρατήγημα) and plays 
along, telling Callirhoe she alone has spared the servant his wrath (2.7.6). Spurred on by his 
passion, Dionysius promises Plangon her freedom if she wins Callirhoe for him (another stock 
comic device) and Plangon brings forth all her craft and skill (ἡ Πλαγγὼν πᾶσαν πεῖραν καὶ 
τέχνην προσέφερεν, 2.7.2). Yet for all her attempts, Callirhoe is unmoved, and remains faithful 
to Chaereas (ἀλλ ἡ Καλλιρρόη πανταχόθεν ἀήττητος ἦν καὶ ἔμενε Χαιρέᾳ μόνῳ πιστή, 2.8.2). 
Faithful, that is, until a turn of fortune turns Callirhoe into the schemer, with Plangon again as 
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the chief agent. Callirhoe discovers she is pregnant with Chaereas’ child, and Plangon (who first 
notices the pregnancy) sees it as a chance to advance her designs on Dionysius’ part. 
Meanwhile, Callirhoe, after some arguing with herself and a dream featuring Chaereas, 
determines to keep the child. Plangon then follows the same strategy as the actor in Book 1 who 
feigned reluctance to tell Chaereas about Callirhoe’s supposed adultery: she at first tells 
Callirhoe that it would be impossible for her to bear the child in Dionysius’ house and that he 
would consider it an insult. When Callirhoe begs for her to help find “some scheme” (τινὰ 
τέχνην) by which she could raise her child, Plangon “declined everything” and delayed her 
answer for two or three days (πολλὰ τοίνυν ἀρνησαμένη, δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ὑπερθεμένη τὴν 
ἀπόκρισιν) until she seemed more trustworthy (ἀξιοπιστοτέρα), then made Callirhoe swear to 
tell their scheme to no one (μηδενὶ κατειπεῖν τὴν τέχνην) before suggesting the obvious: that 
Callirhoe lie with Dionysius so that he might think the child is his (2.10.2-4). Callirhoe at first 
recoils and suggests it would be better that the child die, something to which the clever Plangon 
“pretended to agree” (κατειρωνεύσατο, 2.10.6) readily, urging her to perform an abortion. 
Callirhoe, a “well-born young girl inexperienced with servile cunning,” suspected nothing of 
Plangon advising this (Ταῦτα τῆς Πλαγγόνος παραινούσης οὐδὲν ὑπώπτευε Καλλιρρόη, μείραξ 
εὐγενὴς καὶ πανουργίας ἄπειρος δουλικῆς, 2.10.7). Finally, after another night of debate with 
herself, Callirhoe is “persuaded to live,” not for herself, but for her child (οὐ δἰ αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ 
τὸ βρέφος ἐπείθετο ζῆν, 2.11.4). Reporting her decision to Plangon, the stage is set for the 
action of Book 3: Callirhoe’s marriage to Dionysius, based on the doubly deceptive machinations 
of the slave Plangon.  
Callirhoe Book 3 
Once again, the deception that closed the last book and drove the action forward opens 
the next book. After a bit of Chariton’s trademark melodrama, Dionysius is told that Callirhoe 
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wishes to marry him and he quizzes Plangon about the turn of events: “What spirit is deceiving 
me?” (‘τίς με δαιμόνων … ἀπατᾷ;) Plangon chides him for his hysterics, and insists that she is 
not deceiving him (οὐ γὰρ ἐξαπατῶ μου τὸν δεσπότην, 3.1.5) before doing precisely that, in 
spite of Dionysius’ request that she tell him the very words of Callirhoe, to not leave anything 
out or add anything, and to recount them accurately (καὶ λέγε αὐτὰ τὰ ἐκείνης ῥήματα. Μηδὲν 
ἀφέλῃς μηδὲ προσθῇς, ἀλλ ἀκριβῶς μνημόνευσον, 3.1.5-6). She then omits almost everything 
and adds Book 3’s chief lie: that Callirhoe wished to marry him rather than be his concubine, but 
only if he agreed to raise any children from their union as his true heirs. In his lustful passion, 
Dionysius assents eagerly: “Oh Zeus and Helios, let there be a child from Callirhoe!” (ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ 
Ἥλιε, τέκνον ἐκ Καλλιρρόης). Upon confronting Callirhoe, he swears by the sea and Aphrodite 
and Eros that he intends to marry her. But left to himself, Dionysius prepares to defend his 
union. He envisions Rumor rushing to Sicily to announce that Callirhoe is alive, and her father’s 
warships demanding his daughter’s return (καταπλεύσουσιν ἤδη τριήρεις Συρακουσίων καὶ 
Ἑρμοκράτης στρατηγὸς ἀπαιτῶν τὴν θυγατέρα). In an interior monologue reminiscent of 
Daphnis’ (albeit far more innocent) monologue in the winter of Longus 3.6, Dionysius must then 
determine the most credible path to avoid inevitable conflict:  
Τί μέλλω λέγειν; ῾Θήρων μοι πέπρακε.᾿ Θήρων 
δὲ ποῦ; Κἂν πιστευθῶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὑποδοχεύς εἰμι 
λῃστοῦ. Μελέτα, Διονύσιε, τὴν δίκην. Τάχα δὲ ἐρεῖς 
αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως. Ἄριστον οὖν τότε 
λέγειν ῾ἐγὼ γυναῖκα ἐλευθέραν ἐπιδημήσασαν οὐκ οἶδ 
ὅπως ἤκουσα: ἐκδομένην ἑαυτὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανερῶς 
κατὰ νόμους ἔγημα.᾿ Πείσω δὲ ταύτῃ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸν 
πενθερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἀνάξιός εἰμι τῶν γάμων.  
 
What am I going to say? “Theron has sold her to 
me.” But where is Theron? Even if I should be believed 
with respect to the truth, I am the customer of a pirate. 
Practice your case, Dionysius. Soon enough you will be 
speaking it before the great king. Therefore it would be 
best then to say, “I heard in some way that a free 
woman was living in town: I married her, having given 
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herself in marriage, in the city openly.’ With this I will 
persuade even my father-in-law that I am not unworthy 
of the marriage. (3.2.8-9) 
 
Here, Dionysius’ rehearsed lie is proleptic, for he will indeed argue his case for Callirhoe before 
the Persian king in Book 5. For now, Callirhoe prays to Aphrodite in her shrine that the goddess, 
for the sake of her child, “keep hidden my scheme” (ποίησόν μου λαθεῖν τὴν τέχνην, 3.2.13) and 
allow her child to pass for Dionysius’ own. Lies and deceit become ever more complicated in 
Book 3, as illustrative as ever how much narrative deceit mirrors the forward action of the plot. 
First, the Syracusans figure out that tomb raiders have taken Callirhoe, and launch triremes to 
search for them. Theron and his pirates have been blown off course and starved, with only the 
chief pirate surviving thanks to his cunning (πανοῦργος, 3.3.12). His cunning also comes to bear 
when Chaereas boards his ship, demanding to know where Theron’s crew obtained the funeral 
treasures from Callirhoe’s tomb. Theron claims to be a Cretan stowaway (3.3.18),179 but finally 
confesses the whole affair in front of the assembly, yet fails to mention the name of the man to 
whom he sold Callirhoe (3.4). He is then crucified, presumably before anyone thinks to get this 
crucial information from him. As in the previous two books, deception opens the narrative, and 
drives it forward. Chaereas now discovers that Callirhoe is married to Dionysius, and arrives in 
Ionia. As Plangon was the architect of Book 2’s deceit, here Dionysius’ steward Phocas takes that 
role, and upon discovering why Chaereas’ trireme is there, and recognizing the threat to his 
master’s happiness, he rides to a Persian base, announcing “that an enemy trireme was 
anchored and hidden either for spying or piracy” (τριήρης πολεμία λανθάνει τάχα μὲν ἐπὶ 
κατασκοπὴν τάχα δὲ καὶ διὰ λῃστείαν ὑφορμοῦσα, 3.7.2). His ruse persuades the Persians 
(Ἔπεισε τοὺς βαρβάρους, 3.7.3), and they destroy the warship during a night raid, leaving most 
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 An obvious allusion to Odysseus’ lie to Athena in Odyssey 13.256-86, where he claims to be a 
shipwrecked Cretan, and Epimenides’ proverb that Cretans always lie (recorded, i.a., in Callimachus’ 
Hymn 1.8: Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται).  
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of those aboard dead. Chaereas, however, is captured and taken into slavery. Though Dionysius 
and Phocas are unsure if Chaereas is among the dead, Dionysius instructs his servant to report 
everything about the attack “but to remain silent about these two things: his own strategies 
(i.e., Phocas’ machinations prompting the Persians to attack Chaereas’ warship) and that some 
from the trireme were still alive” (δύο δὲ ταῦτα σιγᾶν, τὸ ἴδιον στρατήγημα καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς 
τριήρους τινὲς ἔτι ζῶσι, 3.10.1). Thus Dionysius leads Callirhoe to believe that Chaereas is dead, 
and another lament (and deception) brings yet another book to a close. 
Callirhoe Book 4 
Book 4 is unique among Chariton’s books in that the truth is finally told here repeatedly, 
yet for deceitful ends. When Chaereas’ friend Polycharmus calls out Callirhoe’s name as they 
head to crucifixion (4.3), the two men are brought before the Persian satrap because Callirhoe is 
suspected of being an accomplice. The satrap Mithridates, who of course himself has developed 
an interest in Callirhoe, then gets Polycharmus to tell the complete story, which he does, 
truthfully. Mithridates then tells the two men the truth about Callirhoe, that she has wed 
Dionysius. However, Chariton notes that he does this even while “holding some hope of desire, 
because he was now able to talk about and do something regarding Callirhoe, while he seemed 
to be helping a friend” (ἐλπίδα τινὰ λαμβάνων ἐρωτικήν, ὡς δυνάμενος ἤδη καὶ λέγειν καὶ 
πράττειν τι περὶ Καλλιρρόης, ἵνα δοκῇ φίλῳ βοηθεῖν, 4.3.11-12). Mithridates then becomes the 
schemer of Book 4, even while utilizing the truth. When Chaereas announces he is going back to 
Miletus to get Callirhoe back from Dionysius, the satrap feigns indifference much as his 
scheming predecessors in the novel, then urges him to instead write to her a letter that he will 
ensure is delivered to her (4.4). Mithridates then gives the letter to his trusted servant, 
“revealing to him his own passion” regarding Callirhoe (παραγυμνώσας αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν ἴδιον 
ἔρωτα), and then writes to Callirhoe himself and sends her expensive gifts, which the servants 
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were told were for Dionysius so as to “avoid suspicion” (εἴρητο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκέτας, ὅτι 
πέμπει ταῦτα Διονυσίῳ, πρὸς τὸ ἀνύποπτον, 4.5.2). Thus the truth is made to serve Mithridates’ 
own passions, and when the letters and gifts are then confiscated and diverted to Dionysius, the 
latter refuses to believe they are legitimate, and chiefly refuses to believe that Chaereas is alive. 
Rather, he sees them for what they are (despite being true): “an adulterous pretext by 
Mithridates, wishing to seduce Callirhoe with the hope of Chaereas” (σκῆψιν δὲ μοιχικὴν 
ὑπελάμβανε Μιθριδάτου διαφθεῖραι θέλοντος Καλλιρρόην ἐλπίδι Χαιρέου, 4.5.10). And so this 
is how the entirety of the next book will progress, with the two antagonists, Dionysius and 
Mithridates, both using the truth in their disputes against each other even while concealing 
information that vindicates the other’s case: Mithridates conceals his own passion for Callirhoe, 
while Dionysius hides the fact that he does not know for certain that Chaereas is dead, leaving 
the reader to continually sift through layers of truth, falsehood, and pretense in a plot ever 
more complicated than the comic beguilement of the earlier books.  
Dionysius eventually enlists Mitrhidates’ rival satrap to accuse him of adulterous plots to 
the Persian king, who summons them all to trial at his court. With that, Dionysius, Callirhoe, 
Chaereas, and Mithridates all travel to the king’s court, each driven there by true events that 
have nonetheless been manipulated to serve deceitful ends. 
Callirhoe Book 5 
The action of Book 5 is yet again established by a deceit at the end of the preceding 
book. This time, it is Dionysius’ lie to Callirhoe about why they are going to the king’s court. 
Rather than reveal anything concerning the letters (which asserted Chaereas was alive), 
Dionysius instead “did not admit to his wife the reason, but his pretext was that the king sent for 
him wishing to discuss affairs in Ionia” (καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ὡμολόγει πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα, ἀλλ ἡ 
πρόφασις ἦν ὅτι βασιλεὺς αὐτὸν μεταπέμπεται, βουλεύσασθαι θέλων περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ 
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πραγμάτων, 4.7.10). Thus Dionysius himself will become the chief schemer of Book 5, followed 
by the Persian king himself.  
Book 5 continues the rivalry between Chaereas and Dionysius, ultimately leading to a 
courtroom showdown between the two. But Chaereas’ entrance into the court is itself made as 
dramatic as possible, since he is believed dead by so many of the players. Indeed, Mithridates 
himself contributes to the heightened expectation. Though Dionysius was confident he would 
win out, convinced that Mithridates had forged the letter to Callirhoe in Chaereas’ hand, he 
never expected that Chaereas lived (Διονύσιος μὲν θαρρῶν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς αἷς ἔγραψε 
Μιθριδάτης πρὸς Καλλιρρόην ὀνόματι Χαιρέου ῾ζῆν γὰρ οὐδέποτε Χαιρέαν προσεδόκἀ, 5.3.3). 
Mithridates, meanwhile, was himself convinced he could not be convicted, since he could 
produce Chaereas (Μιθριδάτης δὲ Χαιρέαν ἔχων δεῖξαι ἐπέπειστο ἁλῶναι μὴ δύνασθαι). 
Nevertheless, the satrap “pretended to be afraid” and consulted his own advocates, “so that 
through surprise he might make his defense all the more brilliant” (προσεποιεῖτο δὲ δεδιέναι 
καὶ συνηγόρους παρεκάλει, ἵνα διὰ τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον λαμπροτέραν τὴν ἀπολογίαν ποιήσηται, 
5.4.3). Here we continue the much more complex deceits than those found in the early books of 
the novel. There, simple, comic schemes on the part of servants and slavers shape the narrative, 
while here we have more sophisticated characters engaging in more ambiguous deceit. While 
Dionysius knows that some men from Chaereas’ trireme had lived, and while he has concealed 
both that and the ultimate reason for the trip to the king from Callirhoe, he has no reason to 
conclusively believe that Chaereas is alive, and he appears to genuinely suspect Mithridates of ill 
motive with respect to the letters he receives. His suspicions, in fact, are not wrong: Chariton 
tells us Mithridates indeed nursed “his own passion” (τὸν ἴδιον ἔρωτα, 4.5.2), and tells us that 
he assists Chaereas in sending the letter specifically so that he could “do something with respect 
to Callirhoe” while appearing to “help a friend” (πράττειν τι περὶ Καλλιρρόης, ἵνα δοκῇ φίλῳ 
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βοηθεῖν, 4.3.12). So it turns out Dionysius’ skepticism regarding the (actually genuine) letters is 
not entirely misplaced. Meanwhile, Mithridates, while guided by his own insincere motivations, 
is in fact planning a revelation typical in the resolution of comic plots.180 As such, he is in many 
ways the (in-narrative) comic architect of the plot as were previous schemers. Just as the other 
schemers play-acted to keep the truth secret from other characters, Mithridates “pretends to be 
afraid” (προσεποιεῖτο δὲ δεδιέναι) to make his eventual revelation as dramatic as possible, and 
appears in court not brilliant and beaming (οὐ πάνυ τι λαμπρὸς οὐδὲ φαιδρός), despite 
contriving to make himself seem all the more brilliant (λαμπροτέραν) with his great reveal, but 
wretched, as one who would be liable for damages (ἀλλ , ὡς ὑπεύθυνος, ἐλεεινός, 5.3.7). Yet 
for all his acting and scheming, Mithridates does plan to eventually make the truth known – a 
truth that promises the reader the reunification of the two lovers. And yet, that reunification is 
further complicated by Callirhoe’s status as wife to Dionysius and (ostensibly) mother of his 
child, and it will, ultimately, fail. Thus, while Mithridates comes closest to bringing to comic 
resolution (the reunification of the two lovers) the comic action of the novel (the separation of 
the two lovers), Chariton, as the author of the characters’ ever-changeable τύχη, steps in to 
thwart its ending. In much the same way, the author will obliquely but self-referentially muse 
about the further twists and turns he might have given the two lovers when he finally does 
decide to bring the novel to resolution toward its end, in a way ironically far less dramatic than 
the one orchestrated by Mithridates. 
Nevertheless, the reader is expecting a reunion, and the characters of Book 5 do all in 
their deceptive power to bring that about. Mithridates’ part has already been explored, but the 
king’s should not be forgotten, either. When he decided to summon Mithridates and Dionysius 
                                                          
180
 Mithridates’ planned reveal seems to be a form of deus ex machina, with the shade of Chaereas 
coming forth thanks to his entreaties to the gods to set aright the situation. When Chariton finally decides 
to resolve his narrative, he will do so much more plausibly but far less dramatically (see discussion on 
121ff below). 
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to his court (knowing only that a beautiful woman was in dispute, but not knowing her name 
from his correspondence), the king, Chariton tell us, acted partly out of duty and partly out of a 
desire to avoid the contempt (καταφρόνησις) of Mithridates. But the king, too, is guided by 
lustful passion. 
ἄλλο δὲ πάθος παρῄνει μεταπέμπεσθαι καὶ τὴν 
γυναῖκα τὴν καλήν. Σύμβουλοι μὲν οὖν νὺξ καὶ σκότος ἐν 
ἐρημίᾳ γενόμενοι καὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ἐπιστολῆς 
ἀνεμίμνησκον βασιλέα, προσηρέθιζε δὲ καὶ φήμη, Καλλιρρόην 
τινὰ καλλίστην ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας εἶναι: καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐμέμφετο 
βασιλεὺς Φαρνάκην, ὅτι οὐ προσέγραψεν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ 
τοὔνομα τῆς γυναικός, 4.6.7. 
 
“But another desire exhorted him to send for the 
beautiful woman. For darkness and night were co-counselors in 
his desolation, and they reminded the king of that part of the 
letter. And the rumor that some Callirhoe was the most 
beautiful woman in Ionia was arousing him: this blame alone 
the king had for Pharnaces: that he did not write in his letter the 
name of the woman.” 
 
The king follows through with this passion in Book 5, finding a pretense to get Callirhoe into the 
courtroom. Mithridates first questions why she is not present, central as she is to the dispute, 
and Dionysius objects to “placing another man’s wife before the crowd with her husband 
unwilling” (εἰς ὄχλον ἀλλοτρίαν γυναῖκα οὐ θέλοντος ἀνδρός, 5.4.10). Dionysius accompanies 
this plea with a legal case Chariton says was “justly made” (ταῦτα δικανικῶς, 5.4.11), but loses 
out to a crowd “eager to see Callirhoe” (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ πάντες Καλλιρρόην ἰδεῖν, 5.4.12). 
Chariton notes that the king is “ashamed” (αἰδουμένου) to call her, but his friends devise a 
pretense (πρόφασιν ἔσχον οἱ φίλοι) from his original letter summoning them all to court, calling 
her presence necessary (ἀναγκαία, 5.4.12). At this point, Dionysius must ask for a 
postponement, for he has still not told Callirhoe of the real reason they were there. And so 
Dionysius, a man “sensible and educated” (φρόνιμος ἀνὴρ καὶ πεπαιδευμένος) spoke “the most 
plausible words” to his wife about these affairs (λόγους τῇ γυναικὶ προσήνεγκεν ὡς ἐν τοιούτοις 
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πιθανωτάτους, 5.1.1). When the trial comes, the crowd packs the courtroom, supposedly to 
hear the proceedings but really to see Callirhoe (τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν ἀκροαταὶ τῆς δίκης, τὸ δὲ 
ἀληθὲς Καλλιρρόης θεαταί, 5.5.8). Again we are reminded of Mithridates’ motivation in all of 
this: Chariton notes that had he been required to speak first, he would have been unable to 
make a sound, for the sight of her had dealt him a more serious blow than even his initial 
passion (καὶ εἴγε Μιθριδάτην ἔδει πρῶτον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἔσχε φωνήν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπί τι τραῦμα 
παλαιὸν τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν σφοδροτέραν αὖθις ἐλάμβανε πληγήν, 5.5.9). 
 Dionysius’ case is peppered with half-truths. His central argument is based on a lie of 
omission: he asserts that “either Chaereas is alive or Mithridates is an adulterer” (ἢ Χαιρέαν ζῆν, 
ἢ Μιθριδάτην ἠλέγχθαι μοιχόν), and claims that Mithridates cannot claim he did not know 
Chaereas is dead because he was there in Miletus when his tomb was erected (τεθνηκέναι 
Χαιρέαν ἠγνόει: τούτου γὰρ ἐν Μιλήτῳ παρόντος ἐχώσαμεν ἐκείνῳ τὸν τάφον, 5.6.10). Of 
course, Dionysius omits that the tomb was empty and that he persuaded his wife to erect it and 
“bury” Chaereas because “it would profit his own desire if she despaired once and for all her 
former husband” (λυσιτελεῖν δὲ ὑπελάμβανε εἰς τὸν ἴδιον ἔρωτα, τὸν πρότερον ἄνδρα βεβαίως 
αὐτὴν ἀπογνῶναι, 4.1.2). In his crowing accusation, Dionysius beseeches the king to “consider 
how shameful an adulterer he is, when he lies even about the dead” (λόγισαι δέ, βασιλεῦ, πῶς 
ἀναίσχυντός ἐστι μοιχός, ὅπου καὶ νεκροῦ καταψεύδεται, 5.6.10). Mithridates, knowing the 
truth, urges the king in response not to allow “a Greek person, having cunningly crafted 
slanderous lies about me, to be more persuasive to you than the truth” (μηδὲ ἄνθρωπος Ἕλλην, 
πανούργως συνθεὶς κατ ἐμοῦ ψευδεῖς διαβολάς, πιθανώτερος γένηται παρὰ σοὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, 
5.7.1). After some sound arguments about Callirhoe’s legal status (that as a slave sold to him by 
Theron, she was not marriageable), Mithridates urges Dionysius to withdraw his complaint, 
warning him that he will lose Callirhoe if not. Dionysius responds that “you will not deceive me 
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with sophisticated and plausible threats, nor will Dionysius ever be discovered filing false suits” 
(οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξαπατήσεις με σοφίσμασι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοπίστοις ἀπειλαῖς, οὐδ εὑρεθήσεταί ποτε 
Διονύσιος συκοφαντῶν, 5.7.9). At that point Mithridates offers his surprise witness in a 
dramatic flourish which he and Chaereas had “arranged” (διατεταγμένον) beforehand: 
Mithiridates ominously prays to the gods to produce Chaereas, “even if only in the trial” (κἂν εἰς 
τὴν δίκην), and as if truly summoning a man from the dead (which can only be deliberate farce, 
since his case rests on Chaereas being alive), he beckons him to “appear, good spirit” (Φάνηθι, 
δαῖμον ἀγαθέ). Chaereas then dramatically enters, and Chariton embarks on some self-
congratulation: 
Τίς ἂν φράσειε κατ ἀξίαν ἐκεῖνο τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ 
δικαστηρίου; ποῖος ποιητὴς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς παράδοξον 
μῦθον οὕτως εἰσήγαγεν; ἔδοξας ἂν ἐν θεάτρῳ παρεῖναι 
μυρίων παθῶν πλήρει: πάντα ἦν ὁμοῦ, δάκρυα, χαρά, 
θάμβος, ἔλεος, ἀπιστία, εὐχαί, 5.8.2-3. 
 
“Who could worthily describe that scene in the 
courtroom? What poet brought upon the stage such an 
unbelievable story? You would have thought you were 
in a theater, filled with myriad emotions, all of them at 
once: tears, joy, amazement, pity, disbelief, prayers.” 
 
“What poet brought such an unbelievable story?” Chariton, of course, and the emotions felt by 
the audience are precisely the sorts Chariton is hoping for readers to experience with his novel. 
The courtroom, like the readers, is a gallery of spectators, and upon the verbal volleying of 
Chaereas and Dionysius that follows, we are told they heard it “not without pleasure” (οἱ δ 
ἄλλοι πάντες ἤκουον οὐκ ἀηδῶς, 5.8.6). The king has his servants look over Callirhoe while it is 
decided whose husband she is, and each of the lovers despairs: Callirhoe is unable to believe she 
has really seen Chaereas, wondering instead (perhaps taken in by Mitrhidates’ performance) if 
he was a spirit conjured by a Persian magician (ἐκεῖνος ἦν Χαιρέας οὑμός, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο 
πεπλάνημαι; τάχα γὰρ Μιθριδάτης διὰ τὴν δίκην εἴδωλον ἔπεμψε: λέγουσι γὰρ ἐν Πέρσαις 
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εἶναι μάγους, 5.9.4), while Chaereas laments that Callirhoe had married another. He even 
beseeches her in her absence, during a failed suicide attempt, to visit his grave, “even if your 
husband and child are watching” (κἂν ἀνήρ, κἂν βρέφος ὁρᾷ, 5.10.8), and lie to him, saying, 
“‘you are truly gone, Chaereas, now you are dead. I was going to pick you in the court of the 
king.’ I will hear you, wife. Perhaps I will even believe you.” (῾οἴχῃ, Χαιρέα, νῦν ἀληθῶς: νῦν 
ἀπέθανες: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμελλον ἐπὶ βασιλέως αἱρεῖσθαι σέ.᾿ Ἀκούσομαί σου, γύναι: τάχα καὶ 
πιστεύσω, 5.10.8-9). The book then ends, with the lovers almost reunited yet still separated. 
Book 5, then, like Book 1, is an intricate set of deceptions that will propel the motion forward 
(the two will of course remain separated), and as in Book 1, the stage is ever-present. Not only 
do the two principal actors, Dionysius and Mithridates, concoct elaborate defenses based 
alternatively on truths, lies, and omissions, they are given an active audience in their 
performance, an audience ever present in the book – from the arrival of Callirhoe in Persia (5.3) 
to the final showdown between Dionysius and Chaereas (5.8), to the second trial between the 
two rivals, over which “all of Babylon was in suspense” (μετέωρος ἦν πᾶσα Βαβυλών, 6.1). And 
this is where Book 6 begins: a new narrative theater whose stage was set this time by a truthful 
revelation rather than a deceitful scheme, but built on several characters’ deceptive motivations 
and ambiguous truths nonetheless. 
Callirhoe Book 6 
 Book 6 opens with Babylon debating the merits of Chaereas’ and Dionysius’ claims to 
Callirhoe, in much the fashion one might expect Chariton’s readers to do. In this way, and 
others, Book 6 is a mirror to Book 2, much as Book 5 was to Book 1. The arguments for 
Dionysius’s and Chaereas’s stakes for Callirhoe take us to the first twists and turns of the novel: 
Διέσχιστο δὲ ἡ πόλις, καὶ οἱ μὲν Χαιρέᾳ σπεύδοντες ἔλεγον 
‘πρῶτος ἦν ἀνήρ, παρθένον ἔγημεν, ἐρῶσαν ἐρῶν: πατὴρ 
ἐξέδωκεν αὐτῷ, πατρὶς ἔθαψε: τοὺς γάμους οὐκ ἀπέλιπεν, 
ἀπελείφθη: Διονύσιος δὲ ἠγόρασεν, οὐκ ἔγημεν: λῃσταὶ 
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ἐπώλησαν: οὐκ ἐξὸν δὲ τὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀγοράσαι.’ Οἱ δὲ 
Διονυσίῳ σπεύδοντες ἀντέλεγον πάλιν ‘ἐξήγαγε πειρατῶν παῤ 
οὐδὲν μέλλουσαν φονεύεσθαι: τάλαντον ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς 
σωτηρίας αὐτῆς: πρῶτον ἔσωσεν, εἶτα ἔγημε: Χαιρέας δὲ γήμας 
ἀπέκτεινε: μνημονεύειν ὀφείλει Καλλιρρόη τοῦ γάμου: χρηστὸν 
δὲ Διονυσίῳ πρόσεστιν εἰς τὸ νικᾶν ὅτι καὶ τέκνον ἔχουσι 
κοινόν.’ 6.1.2-4 
 
The city was split, and those favoring Chaereas said, “He 
was her husband first, he married her a virgin, he loving her, she 
loving him: her father gave her to him, her home country buried 
her: he did not abandon his nuptials, he was abandoned: but 
Dionysius bought her, he did not marry her, pirates sold her: 
they were not able to exchange a free-born woman.” But those 
favoring Dionysius responded back: “He took her from many 
pirates when she was going to be murdered. He gave a talent 
for her salvation. He saved her first, then married her. But when 
Chaereas married her, he killed her. Callirhoe ought to be 
mindful of her marriage: but what is serviceable for victory for 
Dionysius is that they have a common child.” 
 
These are no doubt the arguments readers might pose to themselves when encountering the 
dilemmas present in Chariton’s novel, and it is perhaps safe to guess they are presented here to 
illustrate just that. Yet the people of Babylon are not, of course, privy to all the information of 
the omniscient reader, and so readers are also invited to fill in the gaps in the characters’ 
presented narratives just as they did during the trial ,181 which serves to undermine many of 
their arguments: Dionysius did not “save” Callirhoe from pirates per se, his slave merely bought 
her from one of them; and Chaereas did not simply “kill” Callirhoe: missing, of course, is the 
entire motivation for his assault, however justified (or more properly, not justified) a reader 
might consider it. And, of course, the most significant piece of information remains hidden to all 
except Callirhoe herself and the servant Plangon: that the child she has is not in fact Dionysius’, 
but Chaereas’.  
                                                          
181
 Schema theory in narratology has illuminated this concept in recent decades, though there the gap-
filling is typically done by readers drawing on common knowledge to assume material that is not explicitly 
stated in the text. Here, the readers are doing somewhat the opposite, standing over the audience within 
the text, an audience lacking such explicit knowledge, and supplementing their arguments with fuller 
versions of the truth. See Mandler 1984, Cook 1994 and Herman 2002. 
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 Yet one aspect of Book 2 will reappear with slight modification in Book 6. While the 
Babylonian women appeal to Callirhoe to choose Chaereas because he is a fellow citizen (τὸν 
πολίτην) and it would mean she could see her father as well (ἵνα καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἴδῃς) rather 
than living as an exile in a foreign land (εἰ δὲ μή, ζήσεις ἐπὶ ξένης ὡς φυγάς, 6.1.4-5), her status 
again comes under debate, though differently from before. While in Book 2 Dionysius and his 
servants beg Callirhoe to reveal the truth about her identity, not believing she is merely a slave, 
in Babylon Callirhoe, far from being suspected of noble rather than servile status, is rather 
questioned by the king and his eunuch as to whether she is even human, providing again some 
incredible self-referentiality for Chariton. The king admits to his eunuch that he is in love, 
something he had heard about before in “fables and poems” (μύθοις τε καὶ ποιήμασιν, 6.3.2), 
and that “this is equally true, as you say, that this woman is a goddess: for her beauty is not 
human” (‘τοῦτ ἴσως ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι θεῶν τίς ἐστιν ἥδε ἡ γυνή: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινον 
τὸ κάλλος, 6.3.5). 
πλὴν οὐχ ὁμόλογα. Προσποιεῖται δὲ Ἑλληνὶς εἶναι Συρακουσία. 
Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἀπάτης ἐστὶ σημεῖον. Ἐλεγχθῆναι γὰρ οὐ βούλεται 
πόλιν εἰποῦσα μίαν τῶν ὑφ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἰόνιον καὶ τὴν 
πολλὴν θάλασσαν τὸν περὶ αὑτῆς μῦθον ἐκπέμπει. Προφάσει δὲ 
δίκης ἦλθεν ἐπ ἐμὲ καὶ ὅλον τὸ δρᾶμα τοῦτο ἐκείνη κατεσκεύασε, 
6.3.5-6. 
 
“But she claims that she is not. She pretends to be a Syracusan 
Greek. And this is proof of her deceit. For she does not wish to be 
put to the proof, naming a single city of those under me, but rather 
she sets forth the story about herself upon Ionia and across the 
whole sea. But she has set upon me with the pretext of a trial while 
she has fabricated this entire play.” 
 
Here, Callirhoe (who might well be the lone title character182), is said to “set her story” (τὸν περὶ 
αὑτῆς μῦθον ἐκπέμπει) and is accused of having “fabricated” (κατεσκεύασε)183 the whole 
                                                          
182
 Several matters argue for Callirhoe’s name alone in the title, despite the manuscript’s title (τὰ περὶ 
Χαιρέαν καὶ Καλλιρρόην ἐροτικά διηγήματα) and a similar postscript at the end (τῶν περὶ Χαιρέαν καὶ 
Καλλιρρόην ἡ λόγων τέλος): Chariton’s last line of the work, discussed below, is in the first person and 
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“drama” (ὅλον τὸ δρᾶμα). Mingled with the story are the words of the courtroom: the case 
(δίκης) before the king is merely a pretense (προφάσει), while Callirhoe’s claims about herself 
are the evidence (σημεῖον) of her deception (τῆς ἀπάτης), and Callirhoe herself wishes to avoid 
being “put to the proof” (ἐλεγχθῆναι). The language is just the sort we should expect from the 
clerk of a rhetor (ῥήτορος ὑπογραφεύς) writing an erotic tale (πάθος ἐρωτικὸν, 1.1.1), and 
counts as one of the most self-referential moments of the novel. 
The pretense of legal reasoning as an engine to move the plot forward continues in 
Book 6 as its chief schemer – the king’s eunuch Artaxates – finally convinces the king, with a bit 
of legal sophistry, that he can indulge his passion for Callirhoe: 
Καλλιρρόη γὰρ ἄνδρα οὐκ ἔχει, μένει δὲ τὴν κρίσιν, τίνι 
ὀφείλει γαμηθῆναι. Μέμνησο οὖν ὅτι χήρας ἐρᾷς: καὶ μήτε 
τοὺς νόμους αἰδοῦ, κεῖνται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς γάμοις, μήτε μοιχείαν, 
δεῖ γὰρ πρῶτον εἶναι ἄνδρα τὸν ἀδικούμενον, εἶτα τὸν 
ἀδικοῦντα μοιχόν,’ 6.4.7-8. 
 
“For Callirhoe has no husband, but awaits your judgment 
as to whom she ought to be married. And so, remember that 
you love a widow, and do not be ashamed before the laws or 
adultery, for they rely upon marriages, and it is necessary for 
there to be a husband first who has been wronged before there 
can be an adulterer doing the wronging.”  
 
Chariton notes that this argument “pleased the king” (ἤρεσεν ὁ λόγος βασιλεῖ), since it was in 
accordance with his pleasure (πρὸς ἡδονὴν γὰρ ἦν, 6.4.8). So here again, legal wrangling, of 
higher sophistication than the servile deceits of the earlier books, drives the narrative forward. 
Yet of the eunuch’s confidence in carrying out his king’s orders to bring Callirhoe to him (with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
names Callirhoe only (τοσάδε περὶ Καλλιρρόης συνέγραψα); the colophon to Papyri Michaelidae 1 (cf. n.1 
above) gives the title τὰ περὶ Καλλιρρόην διηγήματα; and (perhaps least convincing) a reference in Persius 
1.134 (his mane edictum, post prandia Callirhoen do) may or may not refer to this work, again naming 
only the heroine. Whether Chaereas was or was not in Chariton’s original title, the attention afforded 
Callirhoe by the other characters in the work, including meta-discussions regarding her “story” and her 
status, are lopsided in comparison with her male counterpart. 
183
 Liddell and Scott: “of fraudulent transactions, fabricate, trump up,” especially with πρόφασιν. Cf. 
Xenophon, Cyropaideia 2.4.17: ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, καὶ πρόφασιν κατασκευάσαι καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ 
ἄπιστον, καὶ ἤν τις ἐκεῖσε ἐξαγγείλῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ βουλοίμην μεγάλην θήραν ποιῆσαι: καὶ ἱππέας, ἔφη, αἰτοίην 
ἄν σε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ. 
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much the same conditions Dionysius gave to his slaves in Book 2 – that she come willingly), 
Chariton notes that Artaxates was thinking “like a eunuch, like a barbarian, like a slave,” (ὡς 
εὐνοῦχος, ὡς δοῦλος, ὡς βάρβαρος, 6.4.10), allowing us to categorize his scheming in much the 
same comic fashion as earlier deceits, despite its higher sophistication. This categorization is 
made all the more pregnant by its immediate contrast to well-born Greek character (φρόνημα 
Ἑλληνικὸν εὐγενὲς), namely, “that of chaste Callirhoe” (τὸ Καλλιρρόης τῆς σώφρονος). And yet, 
as we have seen, Callirhoe herself has been most adept at deceit, most especially at convincing 
almost everyone that her child is the product of her union with Dionysius. She proves still adept 
in Book 6: adroitly comprehending the meaning behind the eunuch’s message that the king 
“looks on you pleasantly” (ἡδέως σε εἶδε, 6.5.5), she “pretended not to understand” 
(προσεποιεῖτο δὲ μὴ συνιέναι). When the eunuch tries for more clarity, she engages in even 
more sophistry, ironically (κατειρωνεύσατο) responding: 
‘Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω’ φησὶ ‘μαινοίμην, ἵνα ἐμαυτὴν ἀξίαν εἶναι 
πεισθῶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως. Εἰμὶ δὲ θεραπαινίσιν ὁμοία 
Περσίδων γυναικῶν. Μὴ σύ, δέομαί σου, μνημονεύσῃς ἔτι περὶ 
ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα μηδὲν 
ὀργισθῇ, μετὰ ταῦτά σοι χαλεπανεῖ, λογισάμενος ὅτι τὸν γῆς 
ἁπάσης κύριον ὑπέρριψας Διονυσίου δούλῃ. Θαυμάζω δὲ πῶς 
συνετώτατος ὑπάρχων ἀγνοεῖς τὴν βασιλέως φιλανθρωπίαν, 
ὅτι οὐκ ἐρᾷ δυστυχοῦς γυναικὸς ἀλλὰ ἐλεεῖ. Παυσώμεθα 
τοίνυν λαλοῦντες, μὴ καὶ τῇ βασιλίδι τις ἡμᾶς διαβάλῃ,’ 6.5.9-
10. 
  
“May I not be so deluded,” she said, “that I am convinced I 
am worthy of a great king. I am like the servants of Persian 
women. Do not, I beg you, make mention of me anymore to 
your master. For should he not be angered presently, after 
these things he will be severe with you, thinking that you have 
thrown down the lord of the whole world to the slave girl of 
Dionysius. I am amazed how the wisest of the king’s 
subordinates could be ignorant of the king’s philanthropy: for 
he is not desirous of an unfortunate woman, but rather pities 
her. Let us stop chatting like this, lest someone slander us to the 
queen.” 
 
119 
 
Here, Callirhoe bests one of the most cunning schemers of the entire novel, not only escaping 
from the solicitation without outright rejecting the king, but also pointing out its shamefulness 
ironically in the process, noting that an eavesdropper who understood the (real) subject of their 
conversation could use it as an accusation to the queen – an accusation that would be a slander 
(διαβολή) if it were not, in fact, true. Chariton notes that Callirhoe’s skill leaves the eunuch 
“speechless” (ἀχάνη, 6.5.10) as she runs off. 
 Ultimately, Callirhoe’s conflict with the king’s passion moves to another stage: a 
rebellion develops in Egypt, requiring the king’s attention and changing all erotic matters 
(πᾶσαν ἐρωτικὴν ὁμιλίαν). Meanwhile, the king “contrived” (ἐπενόησε, 6.9.5) a plan to have 
Callirhoe come along to war. Summoning the man in charge of the king’s caravan, he first gave 
all other instructions, then “made mention of Callirhoe with a rightly plausible expression, as 
though it were not a concern to him” (ἐμνημόνευσε Καλλιρρόης ἀξιοπίστῳ τῷ προσώπῳ, ὡς 
οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον, 6.9.7). Calling her “that little foreign woman, about whom I was judging a 
case” (κἀκεῖνο ... τὸ γύναιον τὸ ξένον, περὶ οὗ τὴν κρίσιν ἀνεδεξάμην, 6.9.7), the king orders her 
to be brought with the other women. Thus Book 6, like so many others, sets the stage for a new 
narrative theater through the machinations of one of its characters – this time no less than the 
king of Persia. 
Book 7 
Book 7’s narrative theater, the war with the Egyptians, already has Callirhoe cast within 
it at the opening of the book. Chaereas soon joins her: when he goes looking for Callirhoe upon 
the outbreak of war and fails to find her, he instead goes to Dionysius’s house and finds a 
messenger who lies to him, saying that the king had awarded Callirhoe to Dionysius to ensure 
his loyal service in the war. Chaereas at once believes it – “for it is easy to deceive an 
unfortunate man” (εὐεξαπάτητον γὰρ ἄνθρωπος δυστυχῶν, 7.1.4). When Chaereas (again) 
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decides to commit suicide, his friend Polycharmus instead persuades him to go out fighting by 
joining the rebels and getting some revenge against the king in the process. The two men set 
out with the king’s army, “pretending they wished to campaign with him” (προσποιούμενοι 
ἐθέλειν ἐκείνῳ συστρατεύεσθαι, 7.2.1), then desert to the Egyptians after they get to Syria. The 
two men are received into the Egyptian forces and have considerable success there, thanks in no 
small part to Chaereas’ clever wiles. To take Tyre, Chaereas appears before the walls and tells 
the Tyrians he and his band are Greek mercenaries who wish to join the Tyrians because the 
Egyptians want them dead. Chaereas and his men then slaughter the Tyrians when they are let 
inside.184 Meanwhile, Dionysius happens upon a bit of luck when the Egyptian king kills himself 
after a Persian raid, and he takes the Egyptian king’s head to the Persian king, who awards him 
Callirhoe (for real) after all. Callirhoe herself, however, is with the Persian king’s retinue on the 
island Aradus, which Chaereas successfully captures in a sea battle. A lacuna in the text makes it 
difficult to know precisely how the reunion of the two lovers is set up, but it appears that, after 
noticing the queen is among the Persian prisoners on the island, and hearing of a beautiful 
woman among them, Chaereas sends for the woman (not aware she is Callirhoe). Callirhoe, 
when told the admiral (who is, unbeknownst to her, Chaereas) plans to marry her, embarks on 
her trademark melodrama, refusing the marriage. Chaereas (like Dionysius and the Persian king 
                                                          
184
 There appear to be traces here of historical references to Alexander’s siege of Tyre in 332 BCE, albeit 
faint ones. It is possible that the Tyrians are here taken by a rather simplistic deception where they 
proved to be far more cautious with Alexander, who (genuinely?) requested access to the city’s temple to 
Melkart and was denied, leading to his eventual siege (Arrian, Anabasis 2.15.7-2.18.1). Melkart was 
associated with Heracles by Alexander and the Greeks (Arrian embarks on a long digression as to this 
relationship), and Chariton makes mention of their devotion to this deity in 7.2.7, making his familiariy 
with Arrian’s account at least plausible: “The Tyrians are by nature a most warlike race and wish to attain 
renown for her bravery, lest they seem to bring shame upon Heracles, the god most illustrious among 
them and to whom nearly alone they have dedicated their city” (Τύριοι δὲ φύσει γένος εἰσὶ μαχιμώτατον 
καὶ κλέος ἐπ ἀνδρείᾳ θέλουσι κεκτῆσθαι, μὴ δόξωσι καταισχύνειν τὸν Ἡρακλέα, φανερώτατον θεὸν παῤ 
αὐτοῖς καὶ ᾧ μόνῳ σχεδὸν ἀνατεθείκασι τὴν πόλιν). But Plepelits (1976, 18) rather saw him drawing on an 
early version of the Alexander romance: Es scheint also, als ob Chariton von einer Vorstufe des 
Alexanderromans abhinge. 
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before him) orders that she not be forced with violence, and Book 7 ends on the cusp of the two 
lovers’ reunification, though both remain ignorant of the other’s identity. 
Book 8 
The beginning of Book 8 is self-consciously extraordinary, for here Chariton (under his 
usual authorial guise of τύχη), literally spells out the ways in which he could have prolonged the 
novel with further episodes, but then decides (under yet another guise, this time of Aphrodite) 
otherwise: 
Ἔμελλε δὲ ἔργον ἡ τύχη πράττειν οὐ μόνον παράδοξον, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ σκυθρωπόν, ἵνα ἔχων Καλλιρρόην Χαιρέας ἀγνοήσῃ 
καὶ τὰς ἀλλοτρίας γυναῖκας ἀναλαβὼν ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἀπαγάγῃ, 
μόνην δὲ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐκεῖ καταλίπῃ οὐχ ὡς Ἀριάδνην 
καθεύδουσαν, οὐδὲ Διονύσῳ νυμφίῳ, λάφυρον δὲ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ 
πολεμίοις. Ἀλλ ἔδοξε τοῦτο δεινὸν Ἀφροδίτῃ… Νομίζω δὲ καὶ τὸ 
τελευταῖον τοῦτο σύγγραμμα τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἥδιστον 
γενήσεσθαι: καθάρσιον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις 
σκυθρωπῶν. Οὐκέτι λῃστεία καὶ δουλεία καὶ δίκη καὶ μάχη καὶ 
ἀποκαρτέρησις καὶ πόλεμος καὶ ἅλωσις, ἀλλ ἔρωτες δίκαιοι ἐν 
τούτῳ καὶ νόμιμοι γάμοι. Πῶς οὖν ἡ θεὸς ἐφώτισε τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοουμένους ἔδειξεν ἀλλήλοις λέξω, 8.1.2-
5 
 
But Fortune was going to do something not only 
unbelievable, but also sad, so that Chaereas, though having 
Callirhoe, was not going to recognize her, and boarding others’ 
wives on his triremes, he was going to take them away, but 
leave his own there, not sleeping as Ariadne, not for the 
bridegroom Dionysus, but as spoils for his own enemies. But 
this seemed cruel to Aphrodite … I think that this last book will 
be most pleasurable for the readers. For it is a cleansing from 
the sorrows of the first ones. No longer will there be piracy and 
slavery and court and battle and suicide and war and capture, 
but rightful desires and lawful nuptials. And so, how the 
goddess brought to light the truth and offered them recognized 
to each other, I will tell. 
 
Chariton here engages in some thinly veiled subterfuge. The entirety of Callirhoe was, of course, 
his own invention, despite reporting at the onset of the tale that it was an event (πάθος) that 
happened (γενόμενον) within a vaguely recognizable, historical context. Yet this is a game, much 
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as his characters’ schemes have been, schemes which have driven forth the narrative. How 
would the narrator know what Fortune had intended, if in fact it never happened? And how did 
Aphrodite intervene? No deus ex machina is presented here, in contrast to the (far more 
dramatic) revelation Mithridates planned in Book 5 – no divine intervention, staged or real, is 
presented as happening, just as supernatural forces hardly if ever make an appearance 
elsewhere in the novel. Indeed, hardly elsewhere does the author reveal himself, either, as he 
does here in the first-person verbs “I think” (νομίζω) and “I will tell” (λέξω), except, of course, at 
the very beginning (“I will narrate an erotic event that happened on Syracuse”/ πάθος ἐρωτικὸν 
ἐν Συρακούσαις γενόμενον διηγήσομαι) and at the very end (“I have written these things about 
Callirhoe”/ τοσάδε περὶ Καλλιρρόης συνέγραψα).  
Aside, then, from Chariton labeling this book his last (τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦτο σύγγραμμα), 
we are assured the story will end, for by pledging to end the “sorrows,” he promises to put an 
end to what constituted the entire novel. What one might not expect is for Chariton to prove a 
man of his word. The recognition happens at once and without complication. Chaereas enters 
the room where Callirhoe is, she recognizes his voice, she uncovers her face and they both cry 
out each other’s name – all before the first chapter of Book 8 closes. Rather than new narrative 
episodes, Chariton instead has the characters recap all that has happened to them – several 
times. Callirhoe first tells her tale, allowing Chariton to briefly recap everything and also provide 
us with Chaereas’ reaction to various events (he at one point “recalled his inborn jealousy” / τῆς 
ἐμφύτου ζηλοτυπίας ἀνεμνήσθη, 8.1.15). Likewise, we are given the reaction of the Syracusan 
audience to the entirety of the tale, as it is told by Chaereas (including not a few inconsistencies 
with Chariton’s version).185 Routinely, Chaereas breaks the narrative wall and addresses them 
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 In 8.8, Chaereas suggests Phrygian bandits destroyed his warship in Miletus (though they were 
“barbarians” in 3.7), and claims Polycharmus called out Chaereas’ name when they were being led to be 
crucified (it was actually Callirhoe’s, 4.2). Reardon (2008, 122) was of the opinion that “it seems pointless 
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directly (“don’t be afraid – she did not become a slave”/ μὴ φοβηθῆτε: οὐκ ἐδούλωσεν, 8.7.10; 
“There is a fellow citizen being raised for you, Syracusan men”/ Τρέφεται γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἄνδρες 
Συρακούσιοι, πολίτης, 8.7.12), in much the ways Chariton has just himself addressed the 
readers at the opening of Book 8. 
Yet just as his characters have created elaborate stage-plays to beguile other players in 
the novel with narrative deceit, so too Chariton especially tips his hand at the end as to his 
program from the beginning. And just as the Persian audience of the trial in Book 5 listened to 
the proceedings “not without pleasure” (οὐκ ἀηδῶς, 5.8.6), so too now Chariton predicts his last 
book will be the “most pleasurable” (ἥδιστον). And chiefly, Chariton writes that Aphrodite will 
allow the “truth to come to light” (ἐφώτισε τὴν ἀλήθειαν), a truth whose obfuscation has, at 
every turn, allowed the novel to move forward into new episodes of “piracy and slavery and 
court and battle and suicide and war and capture” (λῃστεία καὶ δουλεία καὶ δίκη καὶ μάχη καὶ 
ἀποκαρτέρησις καὶ πόλεμος καὶ ἅλωσις), the very things Chariton now collectively dismisses as 
“sorrows” (σκυθρωπῶν) in need of cleansing (καθάρσιον). The “cleansing” he offers has often 
been compared to that catharsis which Aristotle wrote about with respect to tragedy,186 yet 
with both this and his promise of the goddess “bringing to light the truth,” we are offered more 
contrasts to tragedy than similarities. When the goddess Artemis reveals the truth at the end of 
Euripides’ Hippolytus, for example – that the title character’s father Theseus “was deceived by 
the contrivances of a god” (ἐξηπατήθη δαίμονος βουλεύμασιν, 1406) – she is present on stage 
and interacting with the other characters, her presence the key to revealing the deception 
behind the enmity between father and son so as to allow for their deathbed reconciliation (a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for Chariton consciously to make him get them wrong; more probably Chariton himself is in some haste to 
finish his story.” Yet if this analysis has shown anything, one would hope it would be just how conscious 
Chariton is about narrative events. At least with respect to the second error, it would make sense (and be 
highly amusing) should the male protagonist of The Callirhoe alter this episode to feature himself more 
prominently.  
186
 Poetics 1449b.21-28 
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classic deus ex machina, the sort of revelation teased in Book 5 by Mithridates and promised 
here by Chariton).187 Here, however, no deity arrives; Chariton merely stops writing the story, 
and tells the readers that is precisely what he is doing! Yet if Chariton is indeed referencing the 
Poetics with the καθάρσιον he has planned, he may in fact be taking Aristotle’s advice as to how 
to end his novel – advice that contained a criticism of Euripides’ ex machina resolutions: 
χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν 
πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, 
ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ 
εἰκὸς καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός. 
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ 
μύθου συμβαίνειν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς … 
(1454a.33-1454b.1). 
 
“It is necessary in characters, just as also in the 
composition of events, to always seek out what is either 
necessary or probable, so that a type of person says or does the 
same sorts of things and that it is necessary or probable that 
this happen after that. Thus it is clear also that the resolutions 
of stories ought to come about from the story itself, and not as 
in Medea from a device …” 
 
Thus it is perhaps excusable that Chariton reconciles his story with a rather mundane 
reunification of the two lovers. But the repeated characterization of the novel’s episodes as 
“sorrows” (σκυθρωποί) cannot be but ironic, since it is the author himself who is the architect of 
said sorrows, sorrows which the reader is intended to fully enjoy. This becomes apparent in the 
subsequent references to said sorrows: twice more they will be so disingenuously coined, and 
on each occasion, Chariton will allude to the reader’s desire to hear them. When Chaereas tells 
the Syracusans the couple’s tale, for example, “he began from the end, not wishing to grieve the 
crowd with the sorrows in the first parts” (ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων ἤρξατο, λυπεῖν οὐ θέλων ἐν τοῖς 
πρώτοις καὶ σκυθρωποῖς τὸν λαόν, 8.7.3). Here the crowd (as would no doubt the reader) 
insists, “Start from the top, tell everything to us, and leave nothing out” (ἄνωθεν ἄρξαι, πάντα 
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 Cf. discussion on 113 above. 
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ἡμῖν λέγε, μηδὲν παραλίπῃς, 8.7.3-4). Later, he tries again to pass over events surrounding his 
capture and kidnapping (ἐπιτρέψατε ἐμοὶ τὰ ἑξῆς σιωπᾶν), calling them, again, “more sorrowful 
than the events in the beginning” (σκυθρωπότερα γάρ ἐστι τῶν πρώτων), but again the crowd 
orders him to “tell everything” (λέγε πάντα, 8.8.2). These “sorrows,” then, are in fact the very 
entertainment Chariton has pursued from the beginning, and so the narrative’s closing is made 
manifestly less a divine intervention than an authorial intervention, a self-referential signpost as 
to the fictional program he has pursued from the beginning. The author will even reconcile 
himself with the title character at the end, for just as Chariton connects Aphrodite’s “bringing to 
light the truth” with his completion of the novel at the beginning of Book 8, at the end he again 
connects the two when Callirhoe addresses the goddess in her shrine:  
‘Ἀφροδίτη: πάλιν γάρ μοι Χαιρέαν ἐν Συρακούσαις 
ἔδειξας, ὅπου καὶ παρθένος εἶδον αὐτὸν σοῦ θελούσης. Οὐ 
μέμφομαί σοι, δέσποινα, περὶ ὧν πέπονθα: ταῦτα εἵμαρτό μοι. 
Δέομαί σου, μηκέτι με Χαιρέου διαζεύξῃς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βίον 
μακάριον καὶ θάνατον κοινὸν κατάνευσον ἡμῖν.’ 8.8.15-16 
 
“Aphrodite, you have delivered Chaereas to me again in 
Syracuse, where I first saw him by your will. I do not blame you, 
mistress, for the things which I have suffered: these things were 
my lot. I beg you, never part me from Chaereas, but assent to us 
a happy life and a common death.” 
 
Of course, the trials which Callirhoe suffered (ὧν πέπονθα) are those that Chariton invented for 
her for the purposes of his novel. Thus the end is neatly framed with the beginning by the πάθος 
common to both: the πάθος that is the “suffering” (πέπονθα) of Callirhoe’s fate (εἵμαρτό μοι) 
reminds us of the preface of Chariton’s work, when he tells us he will narrate for us a πάθος (an 
event) which is shaped throughout by fate (τύχη). The author’s connection to these 
events/sufferings is then immediately solidified by his salutation: “These are the things I have 
written about Callirhoe” (τοσάδε περὶ Καλλιρρόης συνέγραψα).  
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 Chariton’s narrative, then, from beginning to end, is self-consciously composed, skirting 
the boundaries between what is, what is not, and what could be, and the narrative deceits that 
drive the novel forward at every venture offer us an insight into the process of this self-
conscious composition: a story neither history nor myth, but drawn together (συνέγραψα) 
wholly by the author himself. For Chariton, the stage is ever-present, even (especially) in the 
courtroom scenes, where the author displays a familiarity with the law befitting his introduction 
(τοῦ ῥήτορος ὑπογραφεύς) to us in the beginning. Characters are said to engage in a drama 
(δράμα) and are routinely actors (ὑποκριταί) or dramatists setting the scene (σκηνή). Just as 
Chariton’s characters engage in deceitful stagecraft that render their narratives 
indistinguishable from actual events, we are invited as readers, while shaking our heads at the 
characters taken in by the clever machinations of the connivers of the novel, to reflect on how 
much we ourselves are taken in by Chariton’s tale, and to consider him, like the other novelists, 
perhaps the most skillful schemer of them all. That he should move his narrative in such a way 
may seem obvious given the older material he is working with from New Comedy, but it is not 
inevitable. A short comparison of Chariton to his near-contemporary, Xenophon of Ephesus, can 
bear this out. 
Xenophon 
Regardless of whether Xenophon’s novel is an epitome or not,188 it has been called the 
most standard of the Greek novels – thought to present what the genre most likely looked like 
                                                          
188
 If O’Sullivan is correct that “the theory that the Ephesiaca as an epitome has become orthodoxy, 
doubted by very few” (1995, 100), the supposedly heterodox position has to its credit an increasing 
number of scholars. Rohde first posited the idea of an epitome, in complete seriousness (“Ich meine dies 
ganz ernstlich,” humorous but noteable in that it was certainly not the “orthodox” assumption of the 
time) that the novel might actually be a “skeleton” or “excerpt” (Skelett … Auszug) from an originally 
longer novel (Stellenweise liest sich diese Erzählung fast wie eine blosse Inhaltsangabe einer Erzählung; 
fast könnte man auf den Gedanken kommen, gar nicht einen voll entwickelten Roman, sondern nur das 
Skelett eines Romans, einen Auszug aus einem ursprünglich viel umfangreicheren Buche vor sich zu haben, 
1876, 401). In 1894, Bürger developed Rohde’s Gedanken and argued at length that the novel is an 
epitome (“Nachdem wir so das Verfahren des Bearbeiters im Einzelnen kennen gelernt haben, wie er 
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prior to its transformation under authors beginning with Chariton.189 And while the similarities 
between Chariton and Xenophon cannot be ignored,190 and while there is most certainly deceit 
and scheming in Xenophon, just as there is in any of the other novels, it does not typically drive 
the story forward into new narrative theaters. Where Chariton’s characters might scheme or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
einige Abschnitte ziemlich unverändert herübergenommen, andere aufs äusserste zusammengestrichen 
und noch andere ganz weggelassen hat,” 59). Perry (1967, 346 n. 2) judged that Burger had 
“demonstrated convinginly, in a close-up study of the internal evidence, that such indeed is the case.” But 
a year earlier a serious challenge had been mounted by Hagg, who noted Xenophon’s tendency to 
recapitulate his narratives, doing so some one hundred and twenty times but only four times 
recapitulating something that cannot with precision be identified in the text, a feat that seems too tall for 
an epitomizer to have pulled off (“Doch wäre es sonderbar, wenn das enge Netz der Rekapitulationen den 
Epitomator nicht einmal verstrickt hätte; irgendwie hätte er sich doch dadurch verraten, dass ein Rückblick 
zu viel oder etwas anderes als die erstmalige Erzählung sage!” 1966, 126). Schmeling (1980) also found 
the evidence for epitome “circumstantial and frequently weak” (21), and Ruiz-Montero (1982), in a study 
of Xenophon’s “καί style” (estilo KAI) concluded that the author’s style is consistent throughout all five 
books, and it is thus, he argues, the work of a single author. O’Sullivan likewise has dismantled the case 
for epitome (1995, 100-139). However, as recently as Swain, scholars can summarily embrace Burger’s 
claim and conclude Xenophon is “surely the victim of an epitomizer” (1996, 104). All of this debate stems, 
as O’Sullivan rightly points out, from the fact that the Suda, not known to be perfect, reports Xenophon’s 
books to be ten while our text has only five (“It must be extremely doubtful that the epitome-theory 
would have won such acceptance, or even ever have been proposed, but for the statement from the Suda 
that Xenophon’s novel contained ten books,” 1995, 134). I tend to find Hagg’s and Ruiz-Montero’s work 
persuasive, and do not consider the passages Burger deemed “original” to be noticeably different enough 
in style to warrant notions of a later editor. However, whether any part of the novel has been epitomized 
or not does not affect my overall conclusions with respect to his departure from Chariton regarding 
scheming and deceit. It is possible, I suppose, that an epitomizer removed longer sections regarding 
schemes, but even Burger and others holding to the position of epitome do not allege the epitomizer 
changed significantly the content of episodes; rather they say he merely summarized them.  
189
 Anderson (in Reardon 2008) considers Xenophon “a specimen of penny dreadful literature in antiquity; 
it exhibits in vintage form the characteristics of the melodrama and the popular novel … The narrative 
exemplifies the basic pattern of late Greek romance” (125). Konstan (Morgan 1994, 49) considers such a 
(largely) negative view of Xenophon to be “a mistake. The novel is not ony good fun, it is also very cleverly 
constructed, and subtly examines the erotic conventions that underpin the genre as a whole.” Both, 
however, agree that such conventions are at play in Xenophon, though no one dates him prior to Chariton 
anymore. He is typically dated to the second century (O’Sullivan 1995, 3; Reardon 1967, 170, 358 n. 17). 
190
 Schmeling (1980, 22) notes that while Xenophon uses language identical to Chariton (in describing 
Habrocomes as opposed to Chariton’s Callirhoe), and while “the beginning of Xenophon’s novel is 
intended to resemble Chariton’s novel … the contrasts to Chariton’s opening lines are marked” in that 
“Xenophon … cuts his story free from historical bonds, and describes a world which exists … in his 
imagination only.” 
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deceive to get their desired ends, Xenophon’s more often will simply resort to direct action or 
violence.191 
Hence when Manto, the daughter of the master who at first owns the protagonists 
Habrocomes and Anthia, inevitably falls in love with Habrocomes, no lies or schemes initially 
follow her attempts to pursue him. She at first confides in another slave, then when she cannot 
endure the delay any further, she writes Habrocomes a letter herself, professing her love 
immediately and entirely. Her letter does not scheme or deceive but does directly threaten:  
ἉΒΡΟΚΟΜΗι ΤΩι ΚΑΛΩι ΔΕΣΠΟΙΝΑΗ ΣΗ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ. 
Μαντὼ ἐρῶ σου, μηκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη:192 ἀπρεπὲς 
μὲν ἴσως παρθένῳ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ φιλούσῃ: δέομαι, μή 
με περιίδῃς μηδὲ ὑβρίσῃς τὴν τὰ σὰ ᾑρημένην. Ἐὰν γὰρ 
πεισθῇς, πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν Ἄψυρτον ἐγὼ πείσω σοί με 
συνοικίσαι, καὶ τὴν νῦν σοι γυναῖκα ἀποσκευασόμεθα, 
πλουτήσεις δὲ καὶ μακάριος ἔσῃ: ἐὰν δὲ ἀντείπῃς, 
ἐννόει μὲν οἷα πείσῃ τῆς ὑβρισμένης ἑαυτὴν 
ἐκδικούσης, οἷα δὲ οἱ μετὰ σοῦ, κοινωνοὶ τῆς σῆς 
ὑπερηφανίας καὶ σύμβουλοι γενόμενοι. (2.5.1-2) 
 
To the handsome Habrocomes, greetings from your 
mistress: I Manto am desirous of you, and I am no 
longer able to bear it: perhaps inappropriate for a 
maiden, but necessary for one who loves, I beg you, do 
not look away from nor insult the one who holds in her 
power your affairs. For should you be persuaded, I will 
convince my father Apsyrtos to wed you to me, and we 
will dispatch with your current wife, and you will be rich 
and blessed. But should you refuse, consider the sort of 
things which you will suffer when the one you have 
insulted exacts recompense for herself, and the sort of 
things those with you will suffer, since they were 
partners and conspirators in your contempt.  
 
Here Manto clearly does not seek to beguile Habrocomes as the desirers of illicit love do in 
Chariton; rather, she confronts him immediately with her desire, tells him they will get rid of his 
                                                          
191
 A study in its own right by Scippacercola (2010, 408): “La violenza è integrata nella trama del romanzo 
ed è spesso motore dell’azione.” Notes Haynes (2003, 108), Xenophon often utilizes “the stereotype of 
violent barbarity eschewed by Chariton.” 
192
 O’Sullivan (1995) notes that this formulaic language recurs when Moiris desires Anthia (ὁ καλὸς Μοῖρις 
ἐρῶ σου, μηκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη, 2.12.1, discussed below).  
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wife Anthia, and then threatens both him and his friends for coercion. Only after Habrocomes’ 
expected refusal (also stated bluntly) does Manto resort to a scheme, telling her father that 
Habrocomes attempted to take her virginity (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων Ἁβροκόμης ἐπείρασε μὲν 
παρθενίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἀφανίσαι, 2.5.7). But the scheme only lasts a few chapters, and by 2.10, 
Manto’s father has found her original letter to Habrocomes and released him. A similar scheme 
using the same Potiphar’s wife motif193 occurs in 3.12, when he is again sold as a slave. This time 
the master’s wife desires Habrocomes, and after pressuring him to consummate her lust, he 
eventually gives in.  
Καὶ νυκτὸς γενομένης194 ἡ μὲν ὡς ἄνδρα ἕξουσα τὸν 
Ἁβροκόμην τὸν Ἄραξον ἀποκτιννύει καὶ λέγει τὸ 
πραχθὲν τῷ Ἁβροκόμῃ, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐνεγκὼν τὴν τῆς 
γυναικὸς ἀσέλγειαν ἀπηλλάγη τῆς οἰκίας, καταλιπὼν 
αὐτήν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε μιαιφόνῳ συγκατακλιθῆναι φήσας. 
 
And when it was night, she killed Araxos [her 
husband] as though she had Habrocomes as her 
husband, and told Habrocomes about what had been 
done. But he, having not endured the woman’s 
wantonness, delivered himself from the house, leaving 
her behind, saying that he would not ever lie with a 
murderess. (3.12.5-6) 
 
Again, only after she has been thwarted, the woman resorts to scheming, this time accusing 
Habrocomes of the death of her husband. Here the deceit does, in fact, move Habrocomes to a 
new theater (and new book, Book 4), but overall this is the exception in Xenophon, and this is a 
largely a repeat of the same stock scheme195 we were treated to in Book 2.  
Anthia, too, is treated to direct assault more often than schemes for her affection, 
distinguishing her from her counterpart Callirhoe. Manto, embittered toward Anthia because of 
                                                          
193
 Trenker 1958, 65 n. 1; Ruiz-Montero 2003, 45. 
194
 Burger (1892, 54) saw this as evidence of epitomization, arguing that it must skip over a detailed part 
of the episode that occurred in the intervening time (54), but O’Sullivan (1995, 106) convingincly 
dismisses such suspicion: “νυκτὸς γενομένης means here no more than νύκτωρ, “at night,” the proper 
time for murder.”  
195
 On parallelism in Xenophon, see Hagg 1971 and O’Sullivan 1995. 
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Habrocomes’ spurning, “decided to join her to a slave, one of the most worthless, some rustic 
goatherd” (τὴν δὲ Ἄνθειαν οἰκέτῃ συνουσιάζειν ἐνενόει καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων, αἰπόλῳ τινὶ 
ἀγροίκῳ, 2.9.2). Manto bids the goatherd to make her his wife (κελεύει γυναῖκα ἔχειν), and 
should she demur, she commanded him to use force (καὶ ἐὰν ἀπειθῇ προσέταξε βιάζεσθαι, 
2.9.3). Again, no scheming is present to seduce Anthia; the goatherd is instead told to use force 
(βιάζεσθαι). However, Anthia tells the goatherd her story and begs for mercy, leading the 
goatherd to swear to guard her chastity (ὄμνυσιν ἦ μὴν φυλάξειν ἀμόλυντον, 2.9.4).196 
Things then go from bad to worse for Anthia when Manto’s new husband Moiris falls for 
her, yet similarly few schemes result. Any attempts at hiding Moiris’ passion are quickly 
dispatched by the character and author. Moiris immediately tells the goatherd, who 
immediately then tells Manto:  
Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐπειρᾶτο λανθάνειν, τελευταῖον δὲ 
λέγει τῷ αἰπόλῳ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ πολλὰ ὑπισχνεῖτο 
συγκύψαντι.  Ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν Μοίριδι συντίθεται, δεδοικὼς 
δὲ τὴν Μαντὼ ἔρχεται πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ λέγει τὸν ἔρωτα 
τὸν Μοίριδος. (2.11.1-2) 
 
At first he tried to keep it hidden, but finally he told 
about his love to the goatherd and promised him many 
things for keeping it hidden. And the goatherd agreed 
to Moiris, but fearing Manto he went to her and told 
her about Moiris’ passion. 
 
This then leads Manto to order the goatherd to lead Anthia out into the woods and kill her. He 
does not wish to do this, but does not come up with some scheme to get out of it – instead, he 
merely takes her to the harbor, sells her to some Sicilian merchants, then takes the money and 
                                                          
196
 This same motif is present in Euripides’ Electra, when rather than kill Electra as Aigisthus insists, 
Clytemnestra marries her to a “powerless man” (ἀσθενεῖ, 39), who nonetheless keeps her a virgin (ἣν 
οὔποθ᾽ ἁνὴρ ὅδε — σύνοιδέ μοι Κύπρις — ᾔσχυνεν εὐνῇ: παρθένος δ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἐστὶ δή, 43-44). Trenkner (1958, 
45) notes the similarities but finds it most plausible that they both drew from an oral source: “It is not 
impossible that the author of the romance copied Euripides. But as no single detail in this episode … is 
unique in the romance, it appears rather than Xenophon took this story from its common popular 
sources. Euripides borrowed it from the same source, namely popular story-telling.”  
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returns back to the countryside (ᾤχετο ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα: εὑρὼν δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐμπόρους ἄνδρας Κίλικας 
ἀπέδοτο τὴν κόρην, καὶ λαβὼν τὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τιμὴν ἧκεν εἰς τὸν ἀγρόν, 2.11.9).197 Ironically, 
when asked what happened to Anthia, Manto unintentionally tells the truth: that she has been 
sold into slavery, though Manto assumes the goatherd did her bidding and killed her, as he 
presents no schemes or lies to cover up this fact. 
This avoidance of scheming and deceit runs throughout Xenophon. In Chariton, the 
author goes to great pains to indicate that none of his characters wish to force themselves on 
Callirhoe; rather, we are treated to a host of schemes as outlined above. In contrast, characters 
in Xenophon are quite comfortable with using force and violence. The key example of this is in 
Book 4, when the bandit Anchialos burns with love for Anthia and he simply tries to rape her: 
Καὶ νύκτωρ ποτέ … ἐπανίστατο καὶ ὑβρίζειν 
ἐπειρᾶτο: ἡ δὲ ἐν ἀμηχάνῳ κακῷ γενομένη, σπασαμένη 
τὸ παρακείμενον ξίφος παίει τὸν Ἀγχίαλον, καὶ ἡ πληγὴ 
γίνεται καιρία: ὁ μὲν γὰρ περιληψόμενος καὶ φιλήσων 
ὅλος ἐνενεύκει πρὸς αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ κατεγκοῦσα τὸ ξίφος 
κατὰ τῶν στέρνων ἔπληξε.198 Καὶ Ἀγχίαλος μὲν δίκην 
ἱκανὴν ἐδεδώκει τῆς πονηρᾶς ἐπιθυμίας. (4.5.5-6) 
 
And once at night … he got up and tried to rape her: 
but she, being in a resourceless bad spot, drawing a 
sword that was lying nearby, smote Anchialos, and the 
blow was just right: for he was going to embrace her 
and kiss her, lying down entirely on her, and pushing 
the sword down against his chest she struck him. And so 
Anchialos paid the appropriate penalty for his wicked 
zeal. 
 
                                                          
197
 O’Sullivan (1995, 40 n. 11) notes that Lampon’s “otherwise spotless character is blotted right at the 
end of his dealings with Anthia when he becomes a moral victim of compositional necessity: the plot says 
that he must sell the girl to slavers, not a very nice thing to do, and not really what we have come to 
expect of him.”  
198
 O’Sullivan (1995, 51-52), citing numerous textual parallels, connects this episode with the death of 
Aristomachus, who makes off with Hippothous’ lover Hyperanthes in 3.2 and is stabbed to death by the 
former. 
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Here, in contrast to Callirhoe, who can talk her way out of a situation, Anthia also resorts to 
violence and kills her assailant.199  Similarly, in Book 5, the Egyptian commander Polyidos falls in 
love with Anthia and also resorts to violence: 
Ἐν τούτῳ ἐρᾷ καὶ ὁ Πολύιδος Ἀνθείας ἔρωτα 
σφοδρόν ῾ἦν δὲ αὐτῷ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ γυνἤ: ἐρασθεὶς 
δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐπειρᾶτο πείθειν μεγάλα 
ὑπισχνούμενος: τελευταῖον δὲ ὡς κατῄεσαν εἰς 
Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἐγένοντο δὲ ἐν Μέμφει, ἐπεχείρησεν ὁ 
Πολύιδος βιάζεσθαι τὴν Ἄνθειαν: ἡ δὲ ἐκφυγεῖν 
δυνηθεῖσα, ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Ἴσιδος ἱερὸν ἔρχεται καὶ ἱκέτις 
γενομένη (5.4.5-6) 
 
At that time Polyidos also developed an excessive 
passion for Anthia, though his wife was in Alexandria. 
Afflicted with this passion, he at first tried to persuade 
her, promising her great things: but at last they went 
into Alexandria, and when they were in Memphis, 
Polyidos attempted to force Anthia. And she, able to 
escape, went to the temple of Isis and became a 
suppliant.  
 
Here again, force is attempted, and here again, rather than scheme or talk her way out, Anthia 
simply manages to escape.200 And likewise, rather than scheming himself at this point, Polyidos 
instead goes to the temple and swears never to use force on her again. She relents, and the 
episode moves on. When Polyidos’ wife finds out about his passion for Anthia, she, too, resorts 
to direct violence: 
ἀπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ Ῥηναία ῾τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο ἡ τοῦ 
Πολυΐδου γυνἢ μεταπέμπεται τὴν Ἄνθειαν ῾ἦν δὲ ἐπὶ 
τῆς οἰκίας᾿ καὶ περιρρήγνυσι τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ αἰκίζεται 
τὸ σῶμα ‘ὦ πονηρὰ’ λέγουσα ‘καὶ τῶν γάμων τῶν ἐμῶν 
                                                          
199
 Schmeling (1980, 66) points out this is not in keeping with the conventions of the romance: 
“Regardless of the social implications of her actions and the role of a suppressed woman fighting off a 
would-be rapist, the mere fact that the heroine kills anybody is news in a Greek novel… Xenophon does 
not intend to have his readers marvel at Anthia’s action; he intends to shock them.” Hopwood notes that 
her punishment by the gang for this killing, to be buried alive with two dogs, is similar to that of Roman 
parracides: “Anthia had offended against the form of patriarchy represented by the topsy-turvy world of 
the bandits: the ‘protection’ of the predatory male” (in Foxhall 2013, 201). 
200
 Bürger saw the brevity of this (and the Psammis episode above) as further proof of epitome, but 
O’Sullivan (1995, 107) dismisses such a claim: “Psammis and Polyidus … have quite simple functions to 
fulfill and the parts of the text dealing with them are correspondingly short.”  
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ἐπίβουλε, ματαίως ἔδοξας Πολυΐδῳ καλή, οὐ γάρ σε 
ὀνήσει τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο. Ἴσως μὲν γὰρ πείθειν λῃστὰς 
ἐδύνασο καὶ συγκαθεύδειν νεανίσκοις μεθύουσι 
πολλοῖς: τὴν δὲ Ῥηναίας εὐνὴν οὔποτε ὑβριεῖς 
χαίρουσα.’ Ταῦτα εἰποῦσα ἀπέκειρε τὴν κόμην αὐτῆς 
καὶ δεσμὰ περιτίθησι καὶ παραδοῦσα οἰκέτῃ τινὶ πιστῷ, 
Κλυτῷ τοὔνομα, κελεύει ἐμβιβάσαντα εἰς ναῦν, 
ἀπαγαγόντα εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀποδόσθαι πορνοβοσκῷ τὴν 
Ἄνθειαν. (5.5.2-4) 
 
While he was away, Renaia (for this is what the wife 
of Polyidos was called) sent after Anthia, who was in the 
house, and ripped her clothes and abused her body, 
saying, “You worthless woman, plotting against my 
marriage, you seem foolishly pretty to Polyidos, but this 
beauty won’t avail you. Maybe you were able to lure 
pirates and to bed many drunken young men, but you’ll 
never brag that you’ve insulted the bed of Renaia!” 
Saying these things, she cut off her hair and bound her 
in chains, and handing her over to some trusted slave 
named Clytos, she ordered that he load Anthia onto a 
ship, lead her away to Italy, and sell her to a brothel-
keeper. 
 
Hence yet again, Anthia’s situation is changed not by guile or deceit, but rather by direct action 
and violence. Granted, when Clytos returns home, he tells Polyidos that Anthia has run away, 
but the lie here – like many of those already explored in Xenophon – is an afterthought, not the 
schematic by which the narrative is moved.201 
 One of the few schemes that does occur in Xenophon happens when Anthia finally goes 
on sale at the brothel. Here, while on display for sale in front of the brothel, a situation 
seemingly solutionless (ἀμηχάνῳ), she “discovered a scheme of escape” (εὑρίσκει τέχνην 
ἀποφυγῆς), falling on the ground and imitating an epileptic seizure. This prompts pity on the 
part of the men considering her and gets her out of the purchase, but she still must explain to 
                                                          
201
 As Reardon (1991, 36) rather critically puts it, in comparing the two, “Xenophon can think of no very 
effective means of conducting the parallel actions, and ends up moving his characters more and more 
widely around the Mediterranean, like demented chessmen.”  
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her master, the πορνοβοσκός,202 what happened. When asked to do so, she launches into a 
fantastic, supernatural tale about how she became afflicted with the disease: 
Ἡ δὲ Ἄνθεια ‘καὶ πρότερον’ ἔφη, ‘δέσποτα, εἰπεῖν πρὸς σὲ 
ἐβουλόμην τὴν συμφορὰν τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ διηγήσασθαι τὰ 
συμβάντα, ἀλλὰ ἀπέκρυπτον αἰδουμένη: νυνὶ δὲ οὐδὲν 
χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν πρὸς σέ, πάντα ἤδη μεμαθηκότα τὰ κατ ἐμέ. 
Παῖς ἔτι οὖσα ἐν ἑορτῇ καὶ παννυχίδι ἀποπλανηθεῖσα τῶν 
ἐμαυτῆς ἧκον πρός τινα τάφον ἀνδρὸς νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος: 
κἀνταῦθα ἐφάνη μοί τις ἀναθορῶν ἐκ τοῦ τάφου καὶ κατέχειν 
ἐπειρᾶτο: ἐγὼ δ ἀπέφευγον καὶ ἐβόων: ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἦν μὲν 
ὀφθῆναι φοβερός, φωνὴν δὲ πολλῷ εἶχε χαλεπωτέραν: καὶ 
τέλος ἡμέρα μὲν ἤδη ἐγίνετο, ἀφεὶς δέ με ἔπληξέ τε κατὰ τοῦ 
στήθους καὶ νόσον ταύτην ἔλεγεν ἐμβεβληκέναι. Ἐκεῖθεν 
ἀρξαμένη ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς κατέχομαι. Ἀλλὰ 
δέομαί σου, δέσποτα, μηδέν μοι χαλεπήνῃς: οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ 
τούτων αἰτία.’ (5.7.7-9) 
 
And Anthia said, “Master, I wished to tell to you before about 
my misfortune and to explain its particulars, but being ashamed, 
I concealed it. But now it is not difficult to tell you, since the 
things that have happened to me have already been found out. 
When I was still a child, having wandered away from my family 
at an all-night festival, I came to some tomb of a man having 
recently died: and then some man appeared to me from the 
tomb and tried to take hold of me, but I fled and creid out. The 
man was fearful to behold but he had a voice even more 
savage: and finally it was then day, and he let me be, having  
struck me about the chest, and said that he had cast this 
sickness upon me. Thenceforth, I began to be seized by the 
disease sometimes. But I beg you, master, do not be harsh to 
me: for I am not at fault for these things.”203 
 
                                                          
202
 A “well-known stock character in comedy,” unnamed because “his occupation is directly responsible 
for his function in the romance” (Hagg 1971b, 32-33). 
203
 Though a bit hostile to his subject (“a survey of Xenophon’s novel reveals Anthia as a rather shallow 
personality prone to melodramatic outbursts and lamentation which may be justified only in part by her 
admittedly uncomfortable plights, an utterer of generally trite and repetitious comments, painfully in 
need of reassurance about her beauty, which is hard to reconcile with the fact that her fellow-citizens 
worship her on account of that beauty”), Garson nevertheless praises her “unexpected resources of 
initiative, inventiveness and even physical strength … Aithia (sic) has an eye for just the weakness in those 
around her which will extricate her from her predicament.” (1981, 50) Nevertheless, Anthia’s 
resourcefulness appears more happenstance when compared with the survivalist Callirhoe. Schmeling 
(1980, 70) dryly notes: “Her story convinces her pimp, but certainly amazes the readers (among whom are 
married males thanking the gods that their wives are not as good at telling impromptu stories).”  
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Her master believed her and forgave her, Xenophon notes, since “she suffered these things 
unwillingingly” (ὡς οὐχ ἑκούσῃ ταῦτα πασχούσῃ). This is the sort of scheme that features 
prominently in the other novelists, but here it seems to be a bit of comic relief: Anthia must 
make up a deceptive narrative to go along with her impromptu ruse, and rather than spin a 
plausible one (as her counterparts might have in the other novels), she instead offers up an 
unbelievable tale that the gullible pimp believes wholesale, a tale worthy of Apuleius (see 
Chapter 6).204 More impressive is Anthia’s cunning when confronted with the Indian ruler 
Psammis, who buys her in Alexandria to be his handmaiden after falling in love at the sight of 
her: 
Ὠνησάμενος δὲ ἄνθρωπος βάρβαρος εὐθὺς ἐπιχειρεῖ 
βιάζεσθαι καὶ χρῆσθαι πρὸς συνουσίαν: οὐ θέλουσα δὲ 
τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἀντέλεγε, τελευταῖον δὲ σκήπτεται πρὸς 
τὸν Ψάμμιν ῾δεισιδαίμονες δὲ φύσει βάρβαροἰ ὅτι 
αὐτὴν ὁ πατὴρ γεννωμένην ἀναθείῃ τῇ Ἴσιδι μέχρι 
ὥρας γάμων καὶ ἔλεγεν ἔτι τὸν χρόνον ἐνιαυτῷ 
τίθεσθαι. ‘Ἢν οὖν’ φησὶν ‘ἐξυβρίσῃς εἰς τὴν ἱερὰν τῆς 
θεοῦ, μηνίσει μὲν ἐκείνη, χαλεπὴ δὲ ἡ τιμωρία.’ 
Πείθεται Ψάμμις καὶ τὴν θεὸν προσεκύνει καὶ Ἀνθείας 
ἀπέχεται. (3.11.4-5) 
 
And having bought her, the barbarian man at once set 
his hands to force and assault her for intercourse: 
unwilling, she refused his first advances, but ultimately 
she pretended to Psammis, knowing that barbarians are 
god-fearing by nature, that her father had dedicated her 
when she was born to Isis until it was time for her 
nuptials, and she said that that time was set at a year 
away. “So,” she said, “should you insult one under 
divine protection, she will be angry, and the 
                                                          
204
 Schmeling (1980, 71) also sees a distinct contrast between Xenophon and Achilles Tatius in how alert 
the readers are made to the (limited) scheming of Anthia versus her counterpart Leucippe: “The reader 
knows that Anthia does not have epilepsy. Just before the sudden onslaught of her seizure, she had 
informed the reader that she intended to devise some means to preserve her chastity. The epileptic fit 
then comes as no surprise – unfortunately for the reader, who, in this predictable novel, needs a few 
surprises. Leucippe, in Achilles Tatius’ novel (4.9), also goes mad, but there the reader is caught by 
surprise because Clitophon, the narrator, did not tip his hand to the reader. … The audience is left in the 
dark and the object of Achilles Tatius’ irony. Xenophon never excludes his reader from any secret.” I will 
be examining in detail just this narrative strategy of Achilles Tatius below in Chapter 5. 
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recompence harsh.” Psammis believed her and prayed 
to the goddess and stayed away from Anthia.  
 
Here we have a more Callirhoean scheme, one that utilizes nuance and intuition instead of 
direct action or a veritable Milesian tale. Anthia knows the religious weakness of her opponent, 
and “pretends” or “puts on a pretense” (σκήπτεται) about her divine protection. The pretense is 
still less sophisticated than Callirhoe can be, and yet again relies upon (an invented) 
supernatural intervention, but it successfully dupes yet another would-be assailant.205 
At one point Anthia uses the truth to make her escape. When she is sold yet again and 
winds up in front of Habrocomes’ best friend Hippothoos, Xenophon again puts her in an 
impossible situation, with her captor/master desiring her. Here, rather than direct action of 
violence to ward off the threat of rape, Anthia instead spills the entire truth of her marriage to 
Habrocomes and their separation (5.9.12). Hippothoos reveals he is Habrocomes’ friend and the 
encounter leads ultimately to the reunion of the two lovers a few chapters later and thus the 
end of the novel. 
 Xenophon thus stands as a telling contrast to the sorts of narrative deceptions found 
throughout Chariton’s novel, and illustrates that such lies and deceit are not (originally) endemic 
to the genre as a whole. However, as shall see, most of the novels that came down to us did 
consider deception and narrative to be inextricably entwined, and as the genre develops in later 
authors, narrative deceit becomes a recurring theme and variation in the telling of fictional 
tales.  
  
  
                                                          
205
 Muses Schmeling (1980, 62): “I would hazard a guess that Xenophon sees her as a kind of witch, a 
priestess, someone with special powers to make men go wild or to control them. It is clear that her words 
carry a magical force over men who could be controlled by nothing else.” 
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Chapter 5: Lies and Fiction in the Greek Novels II – Achilles Tatius 
and Heliodorus 
 
Leucippe and Clitophon: Death and Deception 
 
Not long after Chariton’s novel Callirhoe, one appeared even more popular, judging by a 
papyrological witness almost double that of the earlier author.206 Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and 
Clithophon was likely written in the mid to late second century,207 and shares many similarities 
with Callirhoe, while introducing its own novelties. Yet again the ideal romance is present, with 
two lovers separated by the vicissitudes of fate, which takes them through numerous episodes, 
also contained within eight books. And yet again, those vicissitudes are often shaped and moved 
forward by deceptive plots within the novel. The key difference for Achilles Tatius is this: while 
Chariton announces early on that “I will narrate an erotic event that happened in Syracuse” 
(πάθος ἐρωτικὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις γενόμενον διηγήσομαι, 1.1.1)208 and maintains that third-
person, omniscient narration throughout, allowing the audience to know when central 
characters are being deceived in ways that will shape the episodes to come, Achilles Tatius 
abandons such a narration from the beginning, allowing the male protagonist, Clitophon, to 
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 Plepeltis 1976, 391 
207
 Achilles Tatius’ date may in fact not be much later than Chariton’s if we date the latter as late as the 
end of the first century CE (see 94, n.165 above). A reference to eight men who “shaved the hair from 
their cheeks” (τῶν γενείων ἐψίλωντο τὰς τρίχας, 2.18.3) has been seen as evidence that the text must 
postdate the emperor Hadrian (117-138 CE), who reintroduced the beard for the next two centuries, until 
Constantine reversed course (Plepeltis 1976, 391). Yet another Roman imperial reference has been seen 
in the description of the soldiers’ shields (“reaching to their feet”/ποδήρεις) at 3.13.2, which Hilton (2009, 
103) says “seems to clinch the identification of these men as Romans, since the Roman legions bore a full-
length scutum, whereas Persian soldiers carried a round shield.” Hilton goes on to compare Achilles 
Tatius’ depiction of Andromeda to Roman wall paintings (2009, 107-108). But Achilles Tatius cannot be 
any later than the second century, thanks to two papyrological witnesses from that time (Vogliano 1938 
and Willis 1990). Thus a date of the late second century is fairly commonly agreed upon for Leucippe and 
Clitophon. 
208
 “The very first words in Chariton’s romance show the distance from which the author is to tell the 
story.” (Hagg 1971a, 114) 
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narrate the tale for him.209 The author/narrator of the first two chapters, who meets Clitophon 
in front of a painting of the rape of Europa,210 then disappears, never to return, even though “it 
can hardly be doubted that the author’s placement of this pictorial description at the very head 
of his work would give rise to certain expectations in the ancient reader about its role in the 
following narrative.”211 But the frame is never again referenced, even at key points of the story 
where we are reminded of the beginning, such as when, after describing Egyptian bulls, the 
narrator remarks that “if the myth of Europa is true, Zeus surely mimicked an Egyptian bull” (Εἰ 
δὲ ὁ μῦθος Εὐρώπης ἀληθής, Αἰγύπτιον βοῦν ὁ Ζεὺς ἐμιμήσατο, 2.15.4).212 Nor does the 
author/narrator return at the end, a matter of recurring scholarly puzzlement.213 Instead, we are 
                                                          
209
 “… the author’s purpose in removing an omniscient viewpoint from the narrative is to make possible 
and complement the play on the readers’ expectations that constitutes his strategy on a larger scale.” 
(Bartsch 1989, 129) 
210
 Much has been made of the choice of this painting to open the narrative. See first Harlan (1965, 94), as 
well as Bartsch (1989, 49), who says it “serves to set the tone of the novel” as an erotic one. 
211
 Bartsch 1989, 40 
212
 Bartsch sees this reference as obliquely pointing back to the novel’s opening ecphrasis. It occurs right 
before the maiden Calligone is mistaken for Leucippe and kidnapped by brigands, which Bartsch says is 
surrounded by references to the earlier Europa painting. In addition to this line, immediately prior 
(2.15.4), the sacrificial event at which the kidnapping takes place is said to be adorned with flowers -- τὰ 
ἄνθη νάρκισσος καὶ ῥόδα καὶ μυρρίναι – “the very same three flowers … found in Europa’s meadow, even 
listed in the same order” (1989, 64). Nevertheless, the narrator Clitophon, presumably still speaking to the 
author/narrator of the beginning, does not offer an apostrophe to his listener nor does the initial narrator 
interrupt the story with a (somewhat expected) comment regarding the painting that gave rise to the 
story to begin with. 
213
 Indeed, Morales (2004) calls the ending “the ultimate frustration” in a work that [she claims] solicits 
and then frustrates the desires of the reader. Morales (2004, 144), Nikatani (2003, 74), and Most (1989, 
115) all note that the work ends with the word Byzantium (Βυζάντιον) and begins with the word Sidon 
(Σιδὼν), punctuating a geographic inconsistency that leaves us wondering how Clitophon got there and 
why Leucippe is not with him (Morales 2004, 143). But Winkler sees the ending and its failure to resolve 
the frame as dependent upon (as many other allusions throughout) Plato’s Symposium (see discussion 
below), and as such a “deliberate act” (Reardon 2008, 284, n. 72). Morales concurs, noting, “It is hard to 
believe, given, for example, the care with which the author has taken to provide narrative justifications 
for Clitophon’s knowledge of certain events, that not completing the circle of narrative can be put down 
to improvisation rather than design” (2004, 146). But as deliberate as it might have been, it remains odd 
that Clitophon begins his tale with words of woe and lament more so than the joy the happy ending 
should prescribe. Most surmised that first-person narration within the novels (in embedded tales) were 
almost always tales of woe, leading to a tension between the expected ending of Achilles Tatius (a happy 
one) and the narration (woeful) by a character himself, “between the content of a narrative which can 
only turn out well (an erotic romance) and the mode of a narration which seems to presuppose that 
events have turned out badly (a first-person story in an erotic romance)” (1989, 119). Morales and 
Nakatani both depart from this, focusing instead on the ending as an example of closure-less narratives 
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completely subsumed into the point of view of Clitophon, who, like Chaereas, is duped a great 
many times throughout the story. But by focalizing the story through the character’s eyes, we 
too become fooled by the action of the story, and must await its resolution and the explanation 
behind its machinations just as the character does.214 Yet Clitophon is clearly narrating his 
experiences well after the events of the end of the novel, so the author can pick and choose 
whether to present the reader with events as they happen and as his character/narrator first 
experiences them (as he does most often), or to instead let the reader in on information that 
Clitophon was not privy to at that point in the narration.215 As such, the character himself 
becomes a consummate story-teller, and self-referentiality is everywhere in Achilles Tatius, just 
as it was in Chariton. Indeed, Clitophon’s role as an archetypal storyteller is clear from the very 
beginning. The early narrator (whether Achilles Tatius or someone else: he does not identify 
himself within the narrative as Chariton does) spies a painting of Europa’s rape while in the city 
of Sidon, and after a lengthy ecphrasis216 exclaims about the power of Eros. At this point a young 
man (νεανίσκος) overhears him and interjects, “Indeed, I could show you these things, having 
suffered such outrages from Eros” (‘ἐγὼ ταῦτ ἂν ἐδείκνυν’ ἔφη ‘τοσαύτας ὕβρεις ἐξ ἔρωτος 
παθών’, 1.2.1-2). Here again, at the outset, is πάθος, at once suffering, desire, and a series of 
events that happened: most suitable for a love story, which is what the young man, Clitophon, is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
throughout the novel (Morales builds off of Bartsch’s observation about ecphrases that end abruptly, 
2004, 147-148), or on the embedded narrations of the other novels, of which Clitophon’s extended story 
is merely an (overwhelming) example (Nakatani 2003 78-79). Hagg (1971a, 126), meanwhile, suggests “it 
is questionable whether the ordinary reader ever misses its resumption after 175 pages of first-person 
narration.” 
214
 For general treatments of this, see Whitmarsh and Bartsch in Whitmarsh 2008, 237-257; Reardon, in 
Morgan 1994, 80-96; Fusillo 1989, 166-78; and Hagg 1971a. 
215
 As Reardon (2004, 381) notes, “It is to transpire, as the story unfolds, that this technique of misleading 
the reader is one of the main pillars of Achilles’ whole narrative technique … The deceptions that are 
practiced upon the reader are made possible by the fact that the story is being told by an internal 
narrator, namely Clitophon himself, who in the fiction relieves the author of authorial responsibility.” This 
will be the conclusion of my analysis as well, though Hagg notes that the narrative fiction is broken during 
the Callisthenes episode (2.13), when Clitophon omnisciently tells of things happening far away of which 
the character will only be made aware at the end of the novel (1971a, 131). 
216
 See discussion on 151ff below. 
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about to tell. The author/narrator is intrigued, and asks him what he has suffered (τί πέπονθας), 
but Clitophon at first demurs, warning him: “you are rousing a beehive of narrations, for the 
things that happened to me are like fables” (σμῆνος ἀνεγείρεις’ εἶπε ‘λόγων: τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις 
ἔοικε,217 1.2.2). This only encourages our author/narrator, who urges him that if they are like 
fables, he is all the more eager to hear them (ταύτῃ μᾶλλον ἥσειν, εἰ καὶ μύθοις ἔοικε, 1.2.2-3). 
He then leads Clitophon to a grove: a “pleasant place suitable for erotic tales” (ὁ τόπος ἡδὺς καὶ 
μύθων ἄξιος ἐρωτικῶν), one marked by plane trees (πλάτανοι) and a “water flowing cold and 
clear” (παρέρρει δὲ ὕδωρ ψυχρόν τε καὶ διαυγές, 1.2.3). The presence of the grove is itself a 
signpost to the narration that is about to happen, modeled as it so clearly is on the beginning of 
Plato’s Phaedrus. There, Socrates and Phaedrus meet up on the road, and Socrates entreats him 
to tell of the “erotic trope” (τρόπον ἐρωτικός, 227c) he had just heard from his host Lysias. 
Looking for a suitable spot, Phaedrus spots a plane tree (ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην 
πλάτανον; 229a) near a clean and clear stream (καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, 
229b) and then begins his tale.218 Likewise, Clitophon begins his tale in a suitable grove, and the 
author/narrator then speaks his last before handing the story over exclusively to Clitophon: 
“And he began to speak thus” (Ὁ δ ἄρχεται τοῦ λέγειν ὧδε, 1.3.1). 
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 Cf. ὁμοία μύθοις, 36-37, 57, and 87 n.153 
218
 Socrates then gives another description of the grove, part of which matches that of Achilles Tatius’ 
grove and part of which matches that of Longus: νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή. ἥ τε γὰρ πλάτανος 
αὕτη μάλ᾽ ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει 
τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον: ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ῥεῖ μάλα 
ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελῴου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε 
καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ᾽ αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ: 
θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἠρέμα 
προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε 
Φαῖδρε/ By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall 
and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, 
the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. 
And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. 
Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! And it 
resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the 
grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you 
have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus. (230b-c, trans. Fowler) 
141 
 
  Though the structure of Achilles Tatius’ novel is linear much like Chariton’s, it relies on 
narrative deceptions less so to drive the story forward into new episodes and theaters of action 
than it does to simply enrich the story’s telling (or more to the point, the reader’s reading of it). 
And as in Chariton, the stage is ever present in Achilles Tatius, even as the character Clitophon 
begins telling of the complications that set up his tale (“Fortune made a start to her drama”/ 
ἤρχετο τοῦ δράματος ἡ τύχη). The most obvious example comes in the novel’s first Scheintod, as 
Clitophon (along with the reader) is tricked into thinking that his lover Leucippe has been 
disemboweled during a human sacrifice:  
Ἄγουσι δή τινες δύο τὴν κόρην ὀπίσω τὼ χεῖρε δεδεμένην. 
Καὶ αὐτοὺς μὲν οἵτινες ἦσαν οὐκ εἶδον, ἦσαν γὰρ ὡπλισμένοι, 
τὴν δὲ κόρην Λευκίππην οὖσαν ἐγνώρισα. … Εἶτα ἀπὸ 
συνθήματος πάντες ἀναχωροῦσι τοῦ βωμοῦ μακράν, τῶν δὲ 
νεανίσκων ὁ ἕτερος ἀνακλίνας αὐτὴν ὑπτίαν ἔδησεν ἐκ 
παττάλων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρηρεισμένων, οἷον ποιοῦσιν οἱ 
κοροπλάθοι τὸν Μαρσύαν ἐκ τοῦ φυτοῦ δεδεμένον: εἶτα 
λαβὼν ξίφος βάπτει κατὰ τῆς καρδίας καὶ διελκύσας τὸ ξίφος 
εἰς τὴν κάτω γαστέρα ῥήγνυσι: τὰ σπλάγχνα δὲ εὐθὺς 
ἐξεπήδησεν, ἃ ταῖς χερσὶν ἐξελκύσαντες ἐπιτιθέασι τῷ βωμῷ. … 
ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ παραλόγου καθήμενος ἐθεώρουν. Τὸ δὲ ἦν ἔκπληξις: 
μέτρον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχον τὸ κακὸν ἐνεβρόντησέ με. Καὶ τάχα ὁ τῆς 
Νιόβης μῦθος οὐκ ἦν ψευδής, ἀλλὰ κἀκείνη τι τοιοῦτον 
παθοῦσα ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παίδων ἀπωλείᾳ δόξαν παρέσχεν ἐκ τῆς 
ἀκινησίας ὡσεὶ λίθος γενομένη. 3.15.2, 4-6 
 
Two men were leading a maiden bound with both her 
hands behind her back. And I did not see who they were, for 
they were in armor, but I did recognize that the maiden was 
Leucippe. … Then, at a signal they all moved far away from the 
altar, and the other of the youths laid her down on her back and 
bound her from pegs planted in the ground, just as figurine 
makers make Marsyas bound from a tree: then, taking a sword, 
he plunged it into her heart and tearing the sword through her 
stomach, rent it asunder: immediately her guts sprang out, 
which they placed on the altar, after pulling them out with their 
hands. … Sitting there, I watched beyond all reason. It was 
shocking. The wickedness, senseless, struck me like lightening. 
Indeed, perhaps the myth of Niobe was no lie, but she, suffering 
such a thing upon the loss of her children, betrayed the 
appearance of becoming like stone from her stagnancy.  
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The scene is made as vivid as possible, leaving almost anyone (including both Clitophon and the 
reader) little doubt as to what has happened: she is not just stabbed, but torn “through her 
stomach” (εἰς τὴν κάτω γαστέρα); her innards do not just leap out: attendants remove them to 
an altar. We, and Clitophon, are not left with much hope that Leucippe is still alive.219 This is no 
Charitonian stagecraft, where the hero simply witnesses a gussied-up seducer enter his house 
from afar, while the reader remains knowledgeable that what he does not see (his lover) would 
otherwise betray the truth of the situation.220 Nor is it an interrupted episode, “narrated in a 
few lines, without rhetorical color,” as is its sacrificial counterpart in Xenophon’s Ephesiaka.221 
Here all is seen, and described, in detail. Yet stagecraft it remains, and self-consciously so. When 
Clitophon later almost kills himself upon Leucippe’s coffin, his two friends (who had infiltrated 
the bandit camp that had ordered the sacrifice) arrive to stop him and inform him that Leucippe 
is in fact alive. What seemed vivid and certain is then explained: the two men had come upon 
the chest of a Homeric theater actor (τις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν τὰ Ὁμήρου τῷ στόματι δεικνύντων ἐν 
τοῖς θεάτροις, 3.20.2) that washed up on shore and that included a trick sword whose blade 
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 As notes Fusillo (1989, 166): “C'è un rigore estremo in questa focalizzazione sull'io attore e sulle sue 
percezioni limitate: la distanza da cui è vista la scena è valorizzata … sottolineando il fatto di non sentire i 
suoni …” Bartsch’s comments also bear repeating: “Achilles Tatius … is interested in surprise and trickery, 
in shaking the readers up; it is precisely these goals to which his deployment of the restricted viewpoint 
contributes. Leucippe’s first false death … is an elaborate piece of trickery by which the first-time readers 
cannot but be deceived; when they consequently discover that Leucippe is quite alive, they are (like 
Clitophon) considerably surprised, and driven again to an awareness of the continual play of deception 
and discovery” (1989, 129). 
220
 Hagg (1971a, 116) provides a useful examination and comparison of points of view between Chariton 
and Achilles Tatius. “Instead of choosing such a point of view – besides Chaereas, it would also be possible 
to select some passive eye-witness – the author [Chariton] is content with retaining his own point of view 
which was apparent at the very beginning of the romance, thus letting the reader look at each of the 
characters in turn, directly and objectively.” While in Achilles Tatius, “from the start … we are consistently 
made to follow the particulars of the actions in the same sequence as they are experienced by Clitophon. 
[…] On this level, things that happen when Clitophon is absent can be transmitted to the reader only when 
the hero himself is informed” (129-130). 
221
 Xenophon Ephesiaca 3.3. As elaborated upon by Konstan (1994, 61): “The differences between the 
ordeals of Anthia [in Xenophon] and Leucippe are striking. For Xenophon, the ritual has been only one 
more ordeal for Anthia … In Achilles Tatius’ account, however, the sacrifice of Leucippe is described for its 
effect on Clitophon.” Hence the ego-narrator helps not only to delay our knowledge that the sacrifice was 
a farce, but also to enhance our pathos on Clitophon’s behalf. 
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retracted into the hilt, “used in the theater for fraudulent slaughters” (ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἐχρῆτο 
πρὸς τὰς κιβδήλους σφαγάς, 3.20.7). The men add the device (τῆς μηχανῆς, 3.21.5) to an animal 
skin filled with animal entrails to form a “fabricated stomach” (τὴν πλαστὴν ταύτην γαστέρα, 
3.21.2). The proscription for the sacrifice is useful for deception (εἰς τὸ λαθεῖν χρήσιμος, 3.21.3) 
because the maiden is required to wear a long robe. Those watching will seem to see the blade 
plunged all the way into the stomach (οἱ μὲν ὁρῶντες δοκοῦσι βαπτίζεσθαι τὸν σίδηρον κατὰ 
τοῦ σώματος), but in reality it will only penetrate the sack, allowing the animal entrails to come 
forth and “deceive those watching” (τοὺς ὁρῶντας ἀπατᾷ, 3.21.4). Since the two friends were 
required to carry out the sacrifice (and burial) themselves as part of their initiation into the 
gang, they were sure that with such a plan, “the bandits would not perceive the contrivance” 
(οὐκ ἂν εἰδεῖεν οἱ λῃσταὶ τὴν τέχνην, 3.21.5). Thus the first instance of Scheintod in the novel is 
inextricably linked to the stage, as stagecraft was quite literally used to pull off the deception 
and persuade everyone (including possibly the reader) of Leucippe’s convincing death.222 And 
ever-present as always is the overlapping, lexical nexus between deceit and literary skill: “the 
contrivance” of the sword is a τέχνη; the stomach “fictional” (πλαστή), designed to deceive 
(κιβδήλους, λαθεῖν, δοκοῦσι, ἀπατᾷ) the spectators (ὁρῶντες). And it can hardly go unnoticed 
that the very contrivance designed to deceive the robbers, which also for a time deceived 
Clitophon, also of course deceives the reader, all thanks to Achilles Tatius’ strategy of employing 
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 The shocking nature of the death and eventual explanation makes this a veritable precursor for the 
medieval gothic explique or surnaturel explique, the tendency in gothic literature to “explain” at the end 
of the story the mechanisms behind what appeared to be supernatural. It might be argued that there is 
no claimed supernatural here, though Clitophon’s friend Menelaos, the architect of the scheme, farcically 
“calls Hecate to the deed” (καλῶ γὰρ τὴν Ἑκάτην ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, 3.18.2) before removing the fake stomach 
and allowing that “Leucippe live again now for you” (Λευκίππη δέ σοι νῦν ἀναβιώσεται, 3.17.4). For 
gothic explique and the fantastic, see Todorov 1975, 41.  
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the ego-narrator in a genre wherein deception of the hero (cf. Chariton’s Chaereas) appears to 
be a recurring trope.223 
 But an even more convincing Scheintod will occur in Book 5 – more convincing in so far 
as it is not immediately resolved and explained, as is the first example, but lasts eleven chapters 
before we see Leucippe again, while six months pass within the narrative chronology of the 
novel. Even after we see her again, we do not learn the truth about her apparent death until the 
very end of the novel some three books later (8.16). Like before, this Scheintod is full of so much 
detail that it seems solidly true. Leucippe has been kidnapped by pirates, and Clitophon is on a 
ship with the town general in pursuit: 
Ὡς δὲ εἶδον οἱ λῃσταὶ προσιοῦσαν ἤδη τὴν ναῦν εἰς 
ναυμαχίαν, ἱστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὀπίσω τὼ χεῖρε 
δεδεμένην τὴν κόρην, καί τις αὐτῶν μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ ‘ἰδοὺ τὸ 
ἆθλον ὑμῶν’ εἰπὼν ἀποτέμνει αὐτῆς τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν 
σῶμα ὠθεῖ κατὰ τῆς θαλάσσης. 
 
But when the pirates saw our ship advancing now into a sea 
battle, they stood the maiden up on the deck, her hands bound 
behind her back, and one of them, saying with a great shout 
“Here, your prize!” cut the head from her and pitched the rest 
of her body into the sea (5.7.4). 
 
As before, Clitohpon is an eyewitness (“when I saw this, I groaned a loud cry”/ Ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς εἶδον, 
ἀνέκραγον οἰμώξας, 5.7.5) and tries to immediately kill himself, but is stayed. Here the grisly 
nature of the death helps to advance the Scheintod, for Clitophon successfully advocates that 
they retrieve her for burial (ἐδεόμην ἐπισχεῖν τε τὴν ναῦν καί τινα ἁλέσθαι κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης, 
εἴ πως κἂν πρὸς ταφὴν λάβοιμι τῆς κόρης τὸ σῶμα), but they only discover her body (τὸ σῶμα 
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 Or in the very least, the expectation that the hero will be in the dark as to his beloved’s whereabouts 
or status, as virtually all the protagonists of the ancient novel are until the ultimate 
recognition/reconciliation scene at the story’s end.  
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ἀναφέρουσιν, 5.7.5). Clitophon’s lament over the headless corpse224 is intended to leave no 
(apparent) doubt that Leucippe is gone. Indeed, he says as much himself: 
‘Νῦν μοι Λευκίππη τέθνηκας ἀληθῶς θάνατον διπλοῦν, γῇ 
καὶ θαλάττῃ διαιρούμενον: τὸ μὲν γὰρ λείψανον ἔχω σου τοῦ 
σώματος, ἀπολώλεκα δὲ σέ. [9] Οὐκ ἴση τῆς θαλάττης πρὸς τὴν 
γῆν ἡ νομή: μικρόν μοί σου μέρος καταλέλειπται ἐν ὄψει τοῦ 
μείζονος: αὕτη δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ πᾶν σου κρατεῖ. Ἀλλ ἐπεί μὁ   τῶν 
ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ φιλημάτων ἐφθόνησεν ἡ Τύχη, φέρε σου 
καταφιλήσω τὴν σφαγήν.’ 
 
Now you have truly died for me a double death, Leucippe, 
cloven in twain on earth and sea: for I have the remnant of your 
body, but I have lost you. The distribution for the sea and the 
land is not equal: the smaller share of you has been left behind 
to me in the appearance of the greater: yet it [the sea] holds 
possession of the wholeness of you. But since Fortune has 
begrudged me of kisses upon your face, come, let me kiss upon 
your slaughtered neck” (5.7.8-9). 
 
Here we are referred back to the first Scheintod repeatedly yet obliquely. When Clitophon 
initially laments that Leucippe has died “a death truly twice over” (ἀληθῶς θάνατον διπλοῦν) 
we might initially presume he is referring to her first “death,” but his elaboration immediately 
thereafter speaks of her rending into two (διαιρούμενον) and the separate fates of her head 
and body, affording her two burials of sorts, one at sea and the other on land.225 There are also 
hints that we might, against all odds, be witnessing yet another Scheintod: for Clitophon is 
missing “the wholeness” (τὸ πᾶν) of Leucippe, and though he holds the leftovers (λείψανον) of 
her body, he has truly lost her (ἀπολώλεκα δὲ σέ). He kisses her slaughter, or wound: her 
σφαγή, which is also the word for the neck of a sacrificial victim (i.e., where it is struck) – the 
                                                          
224
 Harlan (1965, 132) sees the pathos evident in Clitophon’s telling of the Philomela myth (see discussion 
on 154ff) reflected in this lament. 
225
 Morales (2004, 43) sees this as one of several in the “motif of doubleness which recurs with striking 
frequency during the narrative.” Bartsch (1989, 126-127), building off of Harlan’s connection between the 
pathos of this scene with that of the Philomela myth, sees “hilariously gruesome paradoxes and 
antitheses Achilles Tatius has had fun with in both these passages: Tereus mourns his meal and recognizes 
he is father to his food; Clitophon (embracing Leucippe’s headless trunk) cries that although he has the 
greater part of her he really has the lesser, and the division between the land’s share and the sea’s is 
unfair.” 
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fate she met in the prior Scheintod. What is more, the contrivance that aided the last Scheintod, 
the trick sword, was said to stage “fraudulent slaughters” (κιβδήλους σφαγάς), and so we are 
left with some hope here, too, that some such narrative deceit has been pulled with respect to 
this σφαγή. Yet the fruits of such a hope are not short in coming: Clitophon immediately “buried 
the body” (θάψας τὸ σῶμα) and then returned to Alexandria, where he “endured living” but 
lived nonetheless. The narrator even suggests that he makes it through the stages of grief as the 
story lapses forward six months: 
Καὶ ἤδη μοι γεγόνεσαν μῆνες ἕξ, καὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ πένθους 
ἤρχετο μαραίνεσθαι χρόνος γὰρ λύπης φάρμακον καὶ πεπαίνει 
τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἕλκη: μεστὸς γὰρ ἥλιος ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ λυπῆσαν 
πρὸς ὀλίγον, κἂν ᾖ καθ ὑπερβολήν, ἀναζεῖ μὲν ἐφ ὅσον ἡ ψυχὴ 
κάεται, τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ψυχαγωγίᾳ νικώμενον καταψύχεται 
(5.8.2). 
 
And already six months had passed for me, and the 
enormity of the sadness began to be quenched; for time is the 
drug of mourning and it softens the wounds of the soul: for the 
sun is full of pleasure, and the grieving only lasts a little while, 
even if it should be excessive, while the soul burns and boils as 
much, but it cools, conquered by the persuasion of the day. 
 
Here the hero’s reaction to the death lends credence to the Scheintod, and threatens to 
overturn the structure of the romance entirely. The male protagonist is not supposed to “get 
over” his lover, and yet Achilles Tatius (or the narrator) here makes it appear that is precisely 
what is happening, invading the ideal romance with the realism of overcoming grief, a realism 
none too few of his readers must necessarily be acquainted with. Six months are said to pass, 
and Clitophon even agrees to indulge the advances of the beautiful widow Milete upon chidings 
from his friends that he is “thinking to himself that Leucippe will be restored to life” (νομίζων 
αὐτῷ Λευκίππην ἀναβιώσεσθαι, 5.11.6). Yet again we are reminded of the previous Scheintod, 
when Leucippe was, in fact “restored to life” (Λευκίππη δέ σοι νῦν ἀναβιώσεται, 3.17.4). But the 
hero/narrator abandons such a hope, and agrees to meet at last with Milete, who will become a 
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major player in the last half of the novel. It is not for several more chapters, when Clitophon 
arrives on Milete’s estate, their union eminent, that we see Leucippe again, and her appearance 
is gradual and unrecognizable at first. A slave throws herself at Milete’s feet and says her name 
is Lakaina,226 and Clitophon reports that he was confounded (συνεχύθην) for she seemed to 
have some resemblance to Leucippe (γάρ τι ἐδόκει Λευκίππης ἔχειν, 5.17.7). He is then handed 
a letter written by Leucippe (and revealing that she is, in fact, the slave Lakaina) and rebuking 
him for taking another wife. Then, just as Chariton had used the audience of a court drama to 
replicate the feelings he envisioned of his readers, here too the narrator experiences a series of 
emotions, chief among them wonder and disbelief: “I turned pale, I marveled, I doubted, I 
rejoiced, I was vexed” (ὠχρίων, ἐθαύμαζον, ἠπίστουν, ἔχαιρον, ἠχθόμην, 5.19.1-2). He 
immediately demands of his friend: “Have you come carrying this letter back from Hades? Or 
what do these things mean?” (πότερον ἐξ Ἅδου ἥκεις φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολήν, ἢ τί ταῦτα θέλει;). 
And then, of course, the question we have been expecting: “Does Leucippe live again?” 
(Λευκίππη πάλιν ἀνεβίω; 5.19.2). As before, the resolution of the Scheintod is made effective for 
the reader precisely because we have remained focalized through Clitophon’s experiences as 
they occurred, rather than retrospectively, a point of view into and out of which the narrator 
will move at his own pleasure. Several chapters later, Milete employs her slave Lakaina 
(Leucippe) to help her win Clitophon’s passion, and betrays to Leucippe Clitophon’s denial of her 
sexual advances. This conversation of course takes place out of Clitophon’s earshot and yet after 
narrating them, he notes: “But I was in despair, knowing nothing of these things” (Ἐγὼ δὲ 
τούτων ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἠθύμουν, 5.23.1), thus alerting the reader to the narrative game he 
                                                          
226
 Mignogna (1995, 27) connects this scene directly with the “doubling” technique mentioned by Morales 
on 145 n.225 above: Die Vorliebe, die Achillleus für einige Bilder hat, verrät seinen Wunsch, im Text den 
trügerischen Charakter der Dinge widerzuspiegeln; das Thema des Doppelten, das sehr wichtig vom 
erzählerischen Standpunkt aus ist (ich erinnere ganz kurz daran, daß Leukippe gezwungen ist, ihre 
Identität zu verstecken und als Sklavin unter dem Namen Lakena zu leben) …   
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has been playing.227 He could have spared the reader the suspense of the two Scheintode, and 
indeed will do so at his next opportunity: in 7.1, a rival for Leucippe’s affection plots 
(ἐβουλεύετο) to make Clitophon, who has since been imprisoned, despair again over Leucippe’s 
death. This time we, unlike the protagonist at the time, are privy to the plot, while Clitophon 
(who remains unaware) explicitly references his reactions to previous news and then goes even 
further with his melodrama:  
Ὡς δ  ἤκουσά μου τὸν μῦθον τῶν κακῶν, οὔτε ἀνῴμωξα 
οὔτε ἔκλαυσα: οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν εἶχον οὔτε [p. 176] δάκρυα: 
ἀλλὰ τρόμος μὲν εὐθὺς περιεχύθη μου τῷ σώματι καὶ ἡ καρδία 
μου ἐλέλυτο, ὀλίγον δέ τί μοι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπολέλειπτο (7.4.1). 
 
When I heard this story of my ills, I neither groaned nor 
cried out: for I had neither voice nor tears: but a tremor 
immediately spread through my body and my heart slackened, 
and only some small part of my soul was left behind. 
 
When Clitophon yet again resolves to die, his friend Cleinias speaks what must be on every 
reader’s mind: “Who knows if she lives again? For has she not died many times? Has she not 
lived again many times?” (‘Τίς γὰρ οἶδεν εἰ ζῇ πάλιν; Μὴ γὰρ οὐ πολλάκις τέθνηκε; μὴ γὰρ οὐ 
πολλάκις ἀνεβίω; 7.6.1-2), to which the clueless Clitophon responds, “You’re foolish. How could 
you know it more surely than this?” (Ληρεῖς: τούτου γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερον πῶς ἂν μάθοις; 7.6.2). 
Of course, this is a tongue-in-cheek remark to put in the mouth of Clitophon, who has “known” 
Leucippe to die much more certainly (ἀσφαλέστερον) than this twice already, witnessing her 
apparent death with his own eyes (and even burying her supposed body) rather than merely 
                                                          
227
  “Rather than forgetting that he has adopted the fiction that the story is being recounted by Clitophon 
and lapsing instead into the easier option of omniscient narration, Achilles Tatius frequently inserts small 
details or turns of phrase into his text to remind us that it is Clitophon who is telling his story. … For it is a 
remarkable and not adequately appreciated aspect of Achilles Tatius' narrative technique that, near the 
very end of Leucippe and Clitophon, he takes great care to provide an explanation for the way in which his 
narrator had been able much earlier to report certain events which we know to have happened outside 
his direct cognizance. … His scrupulous care in explaining how Clitophon came by the knowledge of what 
he had reported as many as six books earlier is practically unparalleled in ancient fiction; it testifies to a 
degree of sophisticated reflection about the exigencies of first-person narrative we are more familiar with 
from modern novels” (Most 1989, 116). 
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hearing it secondhand from a stranger in a prison cell. And so while Clitophon comes off as 
somewhat foolish, the author is afforded the chance of reminding us just how much more 
convincing were the previous “deaths,” which we experienced alongside Clitophon. This quasi-
Scheintod is resolved a few chapters later when Leucippe escapes her captors and arrives at the 
temple of Artemis, where she is eventually reunited with Clitophon at the end of Book 7. Only at 
the end of the novel, as Leucippe is finally afforded the opportunity to “narrate her events with 
pleasure” (τὰ συμβάντα μεθ ἡδονῆς διηγεῖτο, 8.15.3), do we find out what happened three 
books earlier with Leucippe’s supposed beheading aboard the ship:  
‘Γυναῖκα’ ἔφη ‘κακοδαίμονα ἐξαπατήσαντες οἱ λῃσταὶ τῶν 
ἐπὶ μισθῷ πωλουσῶν τὰ Ἀφροδίτης, ὡς δὴ ναυκλήρῳ τινὶ 
συνεσομένην ἐπὶ τοῦ σκάφους, ταύτην εἶχον ἐπὶ τῆς νεώς, 
ἀγνοοῦσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐφ ὃ παρῆν, ὑποπίνουσαν δὲ ἡσυχῆ 
σύν τινι τῶν πειρατῶν: λόγῳ δ ἦν ἐραστὴς ὁ λῃστής. Ἐπεὶ δὲ 
ἁρπάσαντές με, ὡς εἶδες, ἐνέθεσαν τῷ σκάφει καὶ πτερώσαντες 
αὐτὸ ταῖς κώπαις ἔφυγον, ὁρῶντες τὴν διώκουσαν ναῦν 
φθάνουσαν, περιελόντες τόν τε κόσμον καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα τῆς 
ταλαιπώρου γυναικὸς ἐμοὶ περιτιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ ἐμοὺς 
χιτωνίσκους ἐκείνῃ: καὶ στήσαντες αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τῆς πρύμνης, ὅθεν 
διώκοντες ὄψοισθε, τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποτέμνουσιν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ 
μὲν σῶμα ἔρριψαν, ὡς εἶδες, κατὰ τῆς θαλάσσης, τὴν δὲ 
κεφαλήν, ὡς ἔπεσεν, εἶχον ἐπὶ τῆς νεὼς τότε. Μικρὸν γὰρ 
ὕστερον καὶ ταύτην ἀποσκευάσαντες ἔρριψαν ὁμοίως, ὅτε 
μηκέτι τοὺς διώκοντας εἶδον. Οὐκ οἶδα δὲ πότερον τούτου 
χάριν προπαρασκευάσαντες ἔτυχον τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ διεγνωκότες 
ἀνδραποδίσαντες πωλῆσαι, ὥσπερ ὕστερον πεπράκασι κἀμέ: 
τῷ δὲ διώκεσθαι πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν διωκόντων ἀντ ἐμοῦ 
σφάττουσι, νομίζοντες πλέον ἐμπολήσειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμῆς πράσεως 
ἢ τῆς ἐκείνης (8.16.1-3). 
 
The pirates, having deceived an ill-fated woman (one of 
those who sell for a price the matters of Aphrodite) that she 
was to be joined to some shipowner in the hull, took her, 
unaware of the truth of her purpose there, onto the ship, and 
she was drinking a little bit quietly with one of the pirates – the 
bandit who was to be her lover (in their account). When they 
took me, as you saw, and put me on the hull, they fled, 
spreading their oars. And seeing your pursuing ship overtaking 
them, stripping the adornment and clothing from the pitiful 
woman, they put them on me, and my short chiton on her: and 
standing her upon the stern, from where you all pursuing might 
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see, they cut the head from her, and they pitched the body, as 
you saw, down into the sea. But the head, as it fell, they 
grabbed and then held it upon the ship. A little bit afterward 
they pitched this in the same way, when they no longer spied 
their pursuers. I do not know whether they were preparing this 
woman beforehand for this purpose, or whether they were 
knowing slavers planning to sell her, just as afterwards they sold 
me: [perhaps] in the pursuit they slew her in place of me for the 
deception of their pursuers, thinking that they might gain more 
from my sale than from hers. 
  
And so this Scheintod contains even more deceit than the first: the deceit of the “unfortunate 
woman,”228 the deceit of the pursuers through the swapping of clothes, and of course the deceit 
necessary (as in Callirhoe) to sell a free-born woman into slavery, not to mention the grisly 
deceit in keeping the head (to avoid the woman’s identification) aboard the ship until the 
pursuers were gone. The passage is a difficult one to translate, for Leucippe is telling it with 
excitement, using over a dozen participles (ἐξαπατήσαντες, συνεσομένην, ἀγνοοῦσαν, 
ὑποπίνουσαν, ἁρπάσαντές, πτερώσαντες, ὁρῶντες, διώκουσαν, φθάνουσαν, περιελόντες, 
στήσαντες, διώκοντες, ἀποσκευάσαντες, διώκοντας, προπαρασκευάσαντες, διεγνωκότες, 
ἀνδραποδίσαντες, διωκόντων, νομίζοντες) alongside forms of διώκω some five times to 
emphasize the thrill of the chase: Leucippe herself knows how to tell a story. And yet, the 
information she does not have, “whether they were preparing this woman beforehand for this 
purpose, or whether they were knowing slavers planning to sell her” (πότερον τούτου χάριν 
προπαρασκευάσαντες ἔτυχον τὴν γυναῖκα ἢ διεγνωκότες ἀνδραποδίσαντες πωλῆσαι), only 
adds, as it often does in Clitophon’s own narration, an aura of authenticity to the tale. Similarly, 
the pirates are here explicitly said to engage in narrative deceit when tricking the poor woman, 
                                                          
228
 Morales (2004, 216) notes that Leucippe here does not refer to the woman as a “porne or speak 
dismissively of her” but rather refers to her as “unfortunate” (κακοδαίμονα); and while the woman is 
treated as “expendable … to the readers as well as the pirates,” in the plot, “the details about how the 
prostitute was conned into thinking she was to marry one of the pirates, and how he pretended to be 
interested in her provide just a glimpse, albeit short-lived, of poignancy and sympathy for this ‘poor 
woman.’” 
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who was drinking with the man who “was to be her lover” (ἦν ἐραστὴς ὁ λῃστής), at least, 
“according to their story” (λόγῳ). 
 And so, like Chariton and Longus, Achilles Tatius utilizes narrative deceit to color his 
novel, but innovates the ideal romance by focalizing the narrative through the eyes of his male 
protagonist, whose convincing eyewitness accounts of his beloved’s grim death(s) leave us 
wondering just how the story will resolve itself. In contrast, when Callirhoe first “dies,” Chariton 
writes that she “gave the appearance of a corpse” (νεκρᾶς εἰκόνα πᾶσι παρέχουσα, 1.5.1), and 
so when he later remarks that she experienced a “rebirth” (παλιγγενεσία, 1.8.1), the reader is 
not likely too surprised. Achilles Tatius, meanwhile, provides vivid and ghastly details about his 
heroine’s apparent deaths, leaving little room for sleight-of-hand, making their eventual 
revelation as just that all the more “pleasurable,” just as Leucippe experienced pleasure in her 
retelling of one of them (μεθ ἡδονῆς, 8.15.3). Again, deception of these sorts could merely be 
extrapolated as comic motifs imported into the novel, and they are that, of course. But they are 
also self-conscious insights into the fictional process. In order to demonstrate that, we should 
turn to the many ways in which Achilles Tatius’ tale is self-referential, even as it is told in the 
mouth of his protagonist. 
Achilles Tatius: Ecphrasis and Self-Referentiality 
 As in Chariton, the clearest examples of self-referentialism in Achilles Tatius occur with 
repeated references to the stage.229 As noted above, when the protagonist Clitophon first begins 
his story, he not only warns the author/narrator that his “narrations” (λόγων) are “like fables” 
(μύθοις ἔοικε, 1.2.2), he immediately refers to the impending story as a “drama” that Fortune 
began (ἤρχετο τοῦ δράματος ἡ τύχη). Similarly, when Leucippe is almost caught by her mother 
in her bedroom with Clitophon and he escapes without Leucippe’s mother seeing who he was, 
                                                          
229
 For a discussion of prose narrative taking over the form aims and aesthetics of drama, see Perry 1967, 
72-79. 
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she demands to know what is happening: “Will you not tell the plot of your drama?” (‘οὐκ ἐρεῖς’ 
ἔφη ‘τὴν συσκευὴν τοῦ δράματος;’ 2.28.1). Likewise, in 3.10, after Leucippe has been kidnapped 
by Egyptian bandits, Clitophon laments that she is in the hands of non-Greek speakers. If he 
spoke the same language as the bandits, he reasons, things might turn out differently: 
Λῃστὴν γὰρ Ἕλληνα καὶ φωνὴ κατέκλασε, καὶ δέησις 
ἐμάλαξεν: ὁ γὰρ λόγος πολλάκις τὸν ἔλεον προξενεῖ: τῷ γὰρ 
πονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ γλῶττα πρὸς ἱκετηρίαν διακονουμένη τῆς 
τῶν ἀκουόντων ψυχῆς ἡμεροῖ τὸ θυμούμενον. Νῦν δὲ ποίᾳ μὲν 
φωνῇ δεηθῶμεν; τίνας δὲ λόγους προτείνωμεν; Κἂν Σειρήνων 
τις γένηται πιθανώτερος, ὁ ἀνδροφόνος οὐκ ἀκούει. Μόνοις 
ἱκετεύειν με δεῖ τοῖς νεύμασι καὶ τὴν δέησιν δηλοῦν ταῖς 
χειρονομίαις. Ὢ τῶν ἀτυχημάτων: ἤδη τὸν θρῆνον ὀρχήσομαι. 
(3.10.2-3) 
 
For our voice could break down a Greek bandit, and our 
entreaty would soften him. Speech often patronizes mercy: as 
the tongue, ministering through supplication for the one 
careworn of soul, tames the angered part of the soul of those 
listening. But now, with what voice should we beg favor? What 
words might we stretch forth? Even if there were one of the 
more persuasive Sirens, the cutthroat would not listen. Only 
with signs is it possible for me to supplicate, to show my 
entreaty with hand gestures. Oh misfortunes, that I should now 
pantomime my adversity. 
 
Clitophon thus runs the gamut of dramatic performance, from verbal persuasion and 
supplication, intended to soften (ἡμεροῖ) his listener, to dramatic stage gestures (χειρονομίαις) 
and orchestral dance (ὀρχήσομαι).230 Likewise, in 6.10, when the widow Milete’s supposedly 
dead husband, Thersandros, returns from being lost at sea and demands to know what she is 
doing with another man, she spins an incredibly long yarn about Clitophon’s presence that she 
“acted out persuasively” (ὑποκριναμένη πιθανῶς, 6.10.2).  
                                                          
230
 “Clitophon is portrayed as the khoregos: the director, producer, casting manager, and general 
impresario of the show” (Morales 2004, 63). 
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But the most pregnant bit of acting in the novel is Leucippe’s “disguise” as the slave 
Lakaina on Milete’s estate, which she contemplates shedding in 6.16 after she has caught the 
eye of Thersandros: 
Νῦν οὖν ἂν Θέρσανδρος ἔλθῃ πυνθανόμενος, τί πρὸς αὐτὸν 
εἴπω; Ἆρα ἀποκαλύψασα τοῦ δράματος τὴν ὑπόκρισιν 
διηγήσομαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Μή με νομίσῃς ἀνδράποδον εἶναι, 
Θέρσανδρε. Στρατηγοῦ θυγάτηρ εἰμὶ Βυζαντίων, πρώτου 
Τυρίων γυνή: οὐκ εἰμὶ Θετταλή: οὐ καλοῦμαι Λάκαινα: ὕβρις 
αὕτη ἐστὶ πειρατική: λελῄστευμαι καὶ τοὔνομα. Ἀνήρ μοι 
Κλειτοφῶν, πατρὶς Βυζάντιον, Σώστρατος πατήρ, μήτηρ 
Πάνθεια. Ἀλλ οὐδὲ πιστεύσεις ἐμοὶ λεγούσῃ. Φοβοῦμαι δὲ καὶ 
ἐὰν πιστεύσῃς περὶ Κλειτοφῶντος, μὴ τὸ ἄκαιρόν μου τῆς 
ἐλευθερίας τὸν φίλτατον ἀπολέσῃ. Φέρε πάλιν ἐνδύσωμαί μου 
τὸ δρᾶμα: φέρε πάλιν περίθωμαι τὴν Λάκαιναν’ (6.16.4.-6). 
 
And so now should Thersandros come investigating, what 
might I say to him? Should I, having revealed my casting in the 
drama, narrate the truth? Do not think that I am a captive slave, 
Thersandros. I am the daughter of the general of Byzantium, 
and wife of a first man of Tyre: I am not Thessalian, nor am I 
called Lakaina. This is piratical hubris: I have been plundered 
even of my name. My husband is Clitophon, my homeland 
Byzantium, my father Sostratos, my mother Panthia. But you 
will not trust me saying these things. And should you believe me 
regarding Clitophon, I fear that my ill-timed license would 
detroy my most beloved. Come then, let me again dress for my 
drama: come, let me again put on Lakaina. 
 
Here more than elsewhere, Achilles Tatius makes a direct link between the deceitful plots of his 
characters and the stagecraft inherent in putting on a play, the terminology of which abounds. 
Leucippe frets about revealing her “casting” or her “acting” (τὴν ὑπόκρισιν), and at the end of 
her internal debate, she resolves to put on the constume (ἐνδύσωμαί) of Lakaina. As always, the 
notion that she is a slave, in contrast to “the truth” (τὴν ἀλήθειαν) she would otherwise tell 
Thersandros, is referred to repeatedly as a “drama” (τὸ δρᾶμα).  
 Even more specific terminology for the stage comes in the novel’s court scenes, a 
requisite for its genre, wherein Thersandros faces off against Clitophon, whom he has accused 
of adultery with his wife. After Clitophon is defended by his friend Cleinias, Thersandros 
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dismisses his (in actuality, true) version of events by calling them “mythologies” (μυθολογῶν), 
and chides the audience for “listening to a sorocerer play-acting plausibly” (γόητος ἀκούοντες 
πιθανῶς μὲν ὑποκρινομένου, 7.11.1). When a follow-up trial over the various disputes occurs in 
Book 8, a priest takes the role of advocate for Clitophon, who notes that he “especially 
emulated Aristophanic comedy” (μάλιστα δὲ τὴν Ἀριστοφάνους ἐζηλωκὼς κωμῳδίαν, 8.9.1). 
Indeed, his speech against Thersandros is very much a stock one, at first starting with routine 
accusations suggesting Thersandros was a male prostitute in his youth.231 His later case is 
marked in contrast by declamation, at one point responding to Thersandros’ demands with 
rhetorical exaggeration: “Close the courts! Cast out the councils! Throw away the magistrates! … 
Withdraw to Thersandros, president. You are president scarcely by name alone. This one 
conducts all your affairs” (Κλεῖσον οὖν τὰ δικαστήρια, κάθελε τὰ βουλευτήρια, ἔκβαλε τοὺς 
στρατηγούς. … Ὑπανάστηθι Θερσάνδρῳ, πρόεδρε. Μέχρι μόνων ὀνομάτων πρόεδρος εἶ. Οὗτος 
τὰ σὰ ποιεῖ, 8.9.9-10). The stylistic change is not lost on Thersandros’ rhetor Sopatros, who 
(apparently agreeing with the narrator’s unspoken characterization of it) calls his earlier remarks 
“comedy” (‘τῆς μὲν τοῦ ἱερέως κωμῳδίας’ ἔφη ‘ἠκούσαμεν,’ 8.10.2), then remarks that “after 
the comedy he waxed tragic” (μετὰ τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐτραγῴδησεν, 8.10.4). 
 Throughout Leucippe and Clitophon, δράμα and μῦθος become virtually synonymous, 
perhaps no place more so than when the company comes upon a painting of the rape of 
Philomela, which prompts Clitophon to recount her myth to an anxious Leucippe (because 
women are naturally myth-lovers, φιλόμυθον, according to the narrator,  5.5.1). In the myth, a 
tongueless Philomela informs her sister about her rape through weaving its depiction on 
tapestry, and Clitophon at this point explains that she “wove her drama” (τὸ δρᾶμα πλέκει, 
5.5.5). The entirety of the episode is self-referential, in that Clitophon is prompted to act as an 
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exegete for the story painted, a common preoccupation of the Second Sophisitc232 and a 
recurring feature of Achilles Tatius’ novel. Leucippe asks him: “What does the myth of this 
painting mean? And who are these birds and who are the women and who is that shameless 
man?” (‘τί βούλεται τῆς εἰκόνος ὁ μῦθος καὶ τίνες αἱ ὄρνιθες αὗται καὶ τίνες αἱ γυναῖκες καὶ τίς 
ὁ ἀναιδὴς ἐκεῖνος ἀνήρ;’ 5.5.1). This affords Clitophon (and the author) the chance at a lengthy 
inset myth. The set-up will remind us of Longus, where the painting in the grove (also 
interpreted by an exegete) provides us with the story that follows, 233 but it is also a reference to 
the story we are being told now: for Clitophon’s tale is prompted by the painting of the myth of 
Europa, which both he and the author/narrator are viewing at the opening of the novel.234 While 
it is true that Clitophon’s story is not Europa’s story (and indeed, that even a mention of the 
myth of Europa failed to spark a reference to the beginning),235  the narrator or author alerts us 
to its relevance to the story proper just one chapter before. When Clitophon’s group initially 
discovers the Philomela painting, his friend Menelaos considers it reason to postpone their 
planned trip: 
‘ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὴν εἰς Φάρον ὁδὸν ἐπισχεῖν: ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐκ 
ἀγαθὰ δύο σύμβολα, τό τε τοῦ ὄρνιθος καθ ἡμῶν πτερὸν καὶ 
τῆς εἰκόνος τὴν ἀπειλήν. Λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τῶν συμβόλων ἐξηγηταὶ 
σκοπεῖν τοὺς μύθους τῶν εἰκόνων, ἂν ἐξιοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν 
συντύχωσι, καὶ ἐξομοιοῦν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας 
λόγῳ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅσων γέμει κακῶν ἡ γραφή: ἔρωτος 
παρανόμου, μοιχείας ἀναισχύντου, γυναικείων ἀτυχημάτων: 
ὅθεν ἐπισχεῖν κελεύω τὴν ἔξοδον,’ 5.4.1-2 
 
“It seems to me that we should withhold our trip into 
Pharos: for do you not see two serviceable omens, both the 
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wing of the bird set against us and the threat of this painting? 
The exegetes of signs say to watch out for the myths of 
paintings, should any meet with us going about our business, 
and to consider our outcome to be similar to the narration of its 
story. And you see what sort of ills this painting is full of: 
unlawful desire, shameless adultery, womanly misfortunes. 
Hence, I bid that we check our departure.” 
 
The passage is the most self-referential in Achilles Tatius, for it describes, from beginning to end, 
what the novel is.236 It begins with the ecphrasis of a painting of Europa (just as this passage is 
preceded by an ecphrasis of a painting of Philomela), and the painting is made the impetus for 
Clitophon’s supposedly analogous tale. The power of Eros evident in the painting – leading the 
king of the gods to don bovine form in order to satisfy his lust for a woman – is considered 
similar (ἐξομοιοῦν) to the story that Clitophon is about to tell, prompted by Clitophon’s 
sympathy with its subject matter, much as Clitophon warns the author/narrator that his stories 
are like the myths (τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε, 1.2.2) they are viewing in paint. Likewise, the 
portents that Menelaos sees in the Philomela painting – unlawful desire, shameless adultery, 
womanly misfortunes (ἔρωτος παρανόμου, μοιχείας ἀναισχύντου, γυναικείων ἀτυχημάτων) – 
serve as a nice summation of what the novel will indeed be about henceforth, irrespective of 
how exhaustive a summary they are.237 Little wonder: despite the warnings of the painting and 
Menelaos, Clitophon and Leucippe leave for Pharos the next day anyway. Menelaos stays 
behind.238 
 Indeed, Bartsch has suggested that Achilles Tatius includes such ecphrases in a 
deliberate attempt to bamboozle his learned readers, for it is they who will be most equipped 
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(and most inclined) to interpret the various paintings and scenes described as signposts for the 
action that is likely to follow: “Achilles Tatius uses the expectations of observant readers versed 
in conventions of interpretation against the readers themselves.”239 It is thus not only the casual 
reader who is fooled by the first-person narration into thinking that, for example, Leucippe has 
been disemboweled and truly killed: Bartch suggests the learned and alert reader, too, would be 
surprised to learn that Leucippe is in fact alive, for the paintings described beforehand, that of 
Andromeda the “bride of death” chained to a rock and Prometheus likewise bound and 
disemboweled by Zeus’ eagle, are “proleptic similes” for Leucippe’s sacrifice and 
disembowelment. “And precisely because this fate was foreshadowed, we accept it all the more 
unquestioningly. It is thus an even greater shock to learn that we, along with Clitophon, have 
been completely fooled.”240 
 As in Longus, the self-referentiality so clearly outlined in this passage helps illuminate 
those passages where the characters of the novel engage in narrative deceit. Myths, dramas, 
and lies are woven together throughout the work, making them indistinguishable from one 
another, and often indistinguishable from the truth, which – as the action of the novel becomes 
more and more like myths, just as Clitophon warned us in the beginning – itself becomes all but 
unbelievable.  
What these treatments of Achilles Tatius, in comparison to Chariton, seek to 
demonstrate, then, is that both authors, like Longus, consider the skill (τέχνη) they are 
employing in the writing of their works to be similar to the deceit (τέχνη) used by the characters 
of their works. Just as the characters of their dramas are duped unknowingly by stagecraft 
within the narrative, the authors know that it is their goal to dupe their readers, as best as 
possible, into believing the events of their novels. They realize, as their elementary training 
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taught them, that fables are lies, but that lies can be told ever more persuasively to make them 
seem like truth, even while remaining lies. Were the writers of these works writing in poetry, 
this would be an empty observation – as old as the stories Homer told through Odysseus, the 
“founder of this nonsense,” to use Lucian’s words, this was the case.241 But they were writing in 
prose, and prose lent their writings an air of authenticity they might not otherwise enjoy,242 one 
that Chariton especially exploits: situating his novel in a recognizable time period with 
recognizable, historical figures; but one that Achilles Tatius can innovate, casting his protagonist 
as the narrator and taking the comic-style Scheintod of an unconscious Callirhoe and turning it 
into a disemboweled or decapitated Leucippe, whose death we mourn alongside Clitophon and 
whose eventual safety we must wait to learn definitively. This waiting, this concealment of the 
truth – for now – to heighten the curiosity of the reader and propel the reader forward by 
means of that curiosity, will ultimately be taken to the greatest lengths by the last novelist of 
antiquity, Heliodorus. 
Heliodorus 
 Heliodorus’ Aethiopica is often considered the most sophisticated of the five “canonical” 
Greek novels we have extant from antiquity, and aside from its sophistication, it is perhaps best 
known for its outsized girth. At ten books long and more than three hundred pages in most 
modern editions, it is double the size of the next-longest novel (Achilles Tatius’). Added to its 
length and sophistication is its intense complexity: the novel begins in medias res and includes 
several embedded narrations. Almost three full books (2-4) are an inset tale by one of its 
                                                          
241
 Cf. 78 above. 
242
 See Hagg 1983, 100-101: “Even if there were no formal rules against using prose for fiction, there was 
undoubtedly the tradition. It is true that already in the classical period imaginative story-telling did occur 
also in prose, but then it was always within a historiographical, ethnographical, or some other ‘serious’ 
framework. … Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that for an educated person, as Chariton and 
the unknown author of the Ninus Romance certainly were, there would still in the fourth century BC have 
been a psychological barrier to cross before he could use prose for an extended narrative of his own 
invention, designed for entertainment. … many generations later things were obviously fundamentally 
different.” 
159 
 
characters, Calisiris, whose story also includes an inset narrative (that of Charicles, 2.29-34), and 
whose mendacity has been treated at length.243 With so much material so complicated by 
displaced chronology and dozens of characters who often tell their tales themselves, an 
exhaustive treatment of Heliodorus’ tome would be far outside the comparative scope of this 
one section of a single chapter. What Heliodorus does lend my investigation, however, is a look 
at how the narrative innovation of Achilles Tatius – the concealment of information known to 
the narrator (in his case the protagonist giving a retrospective first-person account) – can be 
innovated even further by an omniscient narrator who remains all but aloof throughout the 
prolonged pages of his novel, requiring his many characters to bear the brunt of the complex 
tale’s exposition and thereby keeping the readers in the dark (and in the process, in the novel) 
until the very end.244 For at no point does Helidorus take a break from the telling of his tale to 
inform his readers about its background, but rather utilizes long flashbacks (most notably 
Calisiris’) to meet that end. Indeed, it becomes apparent by the novel’s end, after several stories 
are truncated to be finished at a later time (1.14, 2.6, 4.11, 5.1, 5.21, 7.15, 10.22, 10.30) that the 
length of the novel itself, driven by the concealment of the truth for the time being and the 
postponement of pertinent information and storytelling, constitutes Heliodorus’ unique 
contribution to self-conscious artistry.245 
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Much of the discussion of late regarding Heliodorus and the interpretation of his work 
has been framed by Winkler’s seminal 1982 study comparing the flashback stories of Cnemon to 
those of Calisiris: in short, Winkler has suggested that Cnemon’s story represents a simple, 
linear, chronological narrative most like a romance, while Calisiris’ inset narratives and the novel 
itself at large are most definitely not, requiring instead that the reader remain in states of 
temporary puzzlement as the pieces of the story fall into place. This temporary concealment of 
the truth, a narrative strategy termed by Winkler “incomplete cognition,”246 indeed punctuates 
the entire work. “Heliodorus’ principal narrative excellence … is his disposition of material so as 
to arouse interest in the careful reader by the giving or withholding of information … [He] 
regularly manipulates points of view so as to contrast and highlight states of relative knowledge 
and ignorance.”247 The author accomplishes this in a narrative technique that takes Achilles 
Tatius’ first-person narration a step further, offering a third-person narration that nonetheless 
refuses to fill in omnisciently the gaps that readers will only fill by plodding through more of his 
pages. Notes Wolff, “[Heliodorus] will tell as little as possible; he declines the role of the 
omniscient novelist speaking of his men and women in the third person; they must do their own 
talking.”248 Though some, including especially Morgan, have departed from Winkler on some of 
his specifics, especially his characterization of Cnemon’s tale, his general assertion that “our 
reading strategy and the strategies of ‘reading’ which form part of the narrative itself are very 
closely related phenomena” has been “widely accepted.”249 It is important to point out, then, 
although it is never stated explicitly by Winkler, that the length of the novel itself serves as a 
tangible manifestation of this overall literary program, which is to conceal the truth about his 
various characters and only slowly release the information that readers crave so as to keep 
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them moving through the tale.250 Several self-conscious moments make reference to this 
strategy of delay, and it is in them that Heliodorus is most instructive in our present 
investigation. 
Indeed, a good tagline for the novel writ large could be Caricleia’s remark at 9:24, where 
while declining Theagenes’ urgings to tell the king of Ethiopia that he is her father, she observes 
that “God has cast down tangled beginnings of these things, and it is necessary to conclude their 
endings through longer time” (ὧν γὰρ πολυπλόκους τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δαίμων καταβέβληται, τούτων 
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ τέλη διὰ μακροτέρων συμπεραίνεσθαι). Such self-conscious advertisements of 
Heliodorus’ long narrative strategy recur throughout, as do predictions by the author of how his 
readers may well be interacting with said strategies. If as Winkler suggests, Calirisis’ twisting tale 
is meant to serve as a model of the author’s own work, the character Cnemon expresses the 
impatience that no doubt many of Heliodorus’ readers have felt about its subplots and 
digressions, to say nothing of Cnemon’s frustration at Calisiris’ attempt to cut to the end without 
telling the part of the story Cnemon wants to hear. In a flash of frustration, Cnemon likens 
Calisiris’ tale to the narrative equivalent of the shape-changing Proteus: 
Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Κνήμων "ἅλις" ἔφη "βουκόλων καὶ 
σατραπῶν καὶ βασιλέων αὐτῶν, ἔλαθες γάρ με μικροῦ 
καὶ εἰς πέρας τῷ λόγῳ διαβιβάζων, ἐπεισόδιον δὴ 
τοῦτο οὐδέν φασι πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον ἐπεισκυκλήσας 
ὥστε ἐπάναγε τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εὕρηκα 
γάρ σε κατὰ τὸν Πρωτέα τὸν Φάριον, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸν 
τρεπόμενον εἰς ψευδομένην καὶ ῥέουσαν ὄψιν ἀλλά με 
παραφέρειν πειρώμενον." 2.24.4 
 
Thus Cnemon, interrupting, said, “Enough of 
herdsmen and satraps and kings as such, for you almost 
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deceived me, wrenching me into the end of your story, 
unrolling this episode that, as they say, has nothing to 
do with Dionysus, so bear your tale to the part you 
promised. Indeed, I have discovered you to be on par 
with Pharion Proteus, not turning yourself into false and 
flowing appearances, but trying to steer me off course!” 
 
If this is Heliodorus’ acknowledgment of the sort of reaction he expects from readers, he also 
offers his portrait of an ideal reader: “Not only are you insatiate for stories, Cnemon, but you are 
also unconquered by sleep. Already now, with a large part of the night having passed, you have 
held out awake and are not worn out by my prolonged narration” (οὐ μόνον ἀκοθσμάτων 
ἀκόρεστος ἄρα ἦσθα, ὦ Κνήμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπνῳ δυσάλωτος. ἤδη γοῦν οὐκ ὀλίγης μοίρας τῆς 
νυκτός παρῳχηκυίας ἀντέχεις ἐγρηγορώς καὶ τὴν διήγησιν μηκυνομένην οὐκ ἀποκναίει). And 
like us, Cnemon is driven by his desire to know what the end (τέλος) of the story will be (“fulfill 
your promise and bring your narration to its end” πλήρου τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν καὶ εἰς τέλος ἄγε τὴν 
διήγησιν, 3.4.10). Heliodorus even allows his hero to wish for the story’s end: in a moment of 
despairing melodrama (one of many), Theagenes suggests that the two protagonists end their 
story early:  
Κερδήσωμεν ἄλην ἀνήνυτον καὶ πλάνητα βίον 
καὶ τὴν ἐπάλληλον τοῦ δαίμονος καθ΄ ἡμῶν πομπείαν. 
... τοιοῦτον παίζει καθ’ ἡμῶν πόλεμον, ὥσπερ σκηνὴν 
τὰ ἡμέτερα καὶ δρᾶμα πεποιημένος. τί οὖν οὐχ 
ὑποτέμνομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν τραγικὴν ταύτην ποίησιν, καὶ 
τοῖς βοθλομένοις ἀναιρεῖν ἐγχειρίζομεν, μὴ πῃ καὶ 
αὐτόχειρας ἡμᾶς ἑαυτῶν ἐκβιάσηται γενέσθαι. (5.6)  
 
“Let’s cash in our endless wandering and 
roaming lifestyle and the god’s repeated abuse of us. … 
Thus it plays a war against us, as though it has made our 
lives a scene and a drama. So why do we not truncate 
this tragic fabrication it has made and entrust ourselves 
to those plotting to kill us, lest it somehow pride itself in 
an excessive end to its drama, and force us to be our 
own murderers.” 
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Theagenes’ equation of his unrequited love for Charikleia and the progress of their story is 
echoed throughout as Heliodorus overlaps both “textual and sexual desire,” delaying both so as 
to deter the death of said desire by its fulfillment.251 
 But in a novel where we do not know the main characters’ full backstory until almost 
halfway through, it is little wonder that many self-referential moments can be seen in the 
various characters’ deliberate concealment and/or postponement of information. These various 
“teasings, deferrals, and digressions are one of the most characteristic features of the novel.”252 
We get our first taste of this early, when Charicleia tells an elaborate tale (1.22) to the bandit 
Thyamis. “Her account is not only a lie, it is nearly a parody of the Greek romance as a genre, 
conflating typical motifs from several novels, as a sort of least common denominator of what 
such a story could be expected to be.”253  Her lies not only deceive the robber; they also 
postpone our knowledge of who she truly is and what her and Theagenes’ story is. Notes 
Ormand, “we are charmed by Charicleia’s story, and therefore willing to suspend our desire to 
know her until the plot plays out.”254  
This postponement of ultimate knowledge of the heroine is no more gruelingly on 
display as when the story is finally moving toward its inevitable recognition scene and thus 
resolution, and the chief character needed for said recognition – the Ethiopian king and 
erstwhile father of Charikleia – keeps failing to grasp the hints dropped by other characters. 
Between his obtuse dismissals and other comic interruptions of the recognition, the reader must 
await the eventual, painful resolution, ten books into the narrative, for the truth to finally 
emerge that the two youths are already married. When Charikleia first attempts to tell her 
father Hydapses that she already has a husband, he responds with a somewhat comical 
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puzzlement, recounting all the many ways in which she has hitherto concealed the truth about 
Theagnes:  
"Ὦ θεοί" ἔφη, "ὡς κακὰ τοῖς καλοῖς ἐοίκατε μιγνύναι καὶ τὴν 
ἀπ' ἐλπίδος μοι δωρηθεῖσαν πρὸς ὑμῶν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ μέρος 
κωλύειν, θυγατέρα μὲν ἀπροσδόκητον ἀλλὰ παράφρονά πως 
ἀναδείξαντες. 
Πῶς γὰρ οὐ παραπλῆγος τὸ νόημα τῆς ἀλλόκοτα ῥήματα 
προιεμένης; Ἀδελφὸν ὠνόμαζε τὸν μὴ ὄντα· τὸν ὄντα ὅστις 
ἐστὶν ὁ ξένος ἐρωτωμένη ἀγνοεῖν ἔλεγεν. Αὖθις ἐζήτει 
περισῴζεσθαι ὡς φίλον τὸν ἀγνοούμενον· ἀδύνατον εἶναι 
μαθοῦσα τὴν αἴτησιν αὐτὴ καταθύειν ὡσανεὶ πολεμιώτατον 
ἱκέτευε. 
Καὶ τοῦτο ὡς οὐ θεμιτὸν λεγόντων, μιᾷ μόνῃ καὶ ταύτῃ 
ὑπάνδρῳ τῆς τοιᾶσδε θυσίας καθωσιωμένης, ἄνδρα ἔχειν 
ἐμφαίνει τὸ τίνα οὐ προστιθεῖσα· πῶς γὰρ τόν γε μηδὲ ὄντα 
μηδὲ γεγενῆσθαι αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς ἐσχάρας ἀποδειχθέντα; εἰ μὴ 
ἄρα παρὰ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ψεύδεται μὲν τὸ παρ' Αἰθίοψιν ἀψευδὲς 
τῶν καθαρευόντων πειρατήριον καὶ ἐπιβᾶσαν ἄφλεκτον 
ἀποπέμπεται καὶ παρθενεύειν νόθως χαρίζεται· μόνῃ δὲ ἔξεστι 
φίλους καὶ πολεμίους τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν ἀκαρεῖ καταλέγειν, 
ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἀναπλάττειν, 10.22.1-3. 
 
“O gods,” he said. “How you seem to mix the wicked with the 
good and to give to me happiness unhoped for but hinder me 
from part of it, showing me a daughter unexepected but insane.  
“For in uttering such strange things, how could she not be 
insane with respect to her mind? She named a brother, who 
does not exist. When asked who this stranger is who does exist, 
she said she doesn’t know. But then she sought to save this 
unknown man as though he were a friend. Having learned that 
was not possible, she supplicated the request to sacrifice him 
herself as though he were her greatest enemy.  
“And when we told her this was not lawful, this performance 
of these sacrifices being done by one woman alone and this one 
a married one, she indicates she has a husband while not 
putting forth who he is by name. And how could she since he 
does not exist and has been shown by her not to exist by the 
fire? Unless the purity trial that has never lied to the Ethiopians 
has lied for her alone, has sent her away unharmed after she 
stepped upon it, and rejoices that she is a virgin illegitimately. 
But for her alone is it possible to call the same people both 
friends and enemies within a hair’s breadth of time, and 
fictionalize both brothers and husbands who do not exist!” 
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Here the king echoes many of the statements by characters in our previous novels, who lay the 
responsibility for the novel’s plots and schemes at the feet of the title characters. Charikleia is, 
of course, responsible for these lies and misdirections, and the king’s befuddlement might echo 
that of the reader, who has had to keep straight an ever-evolving set of perspectives and stories 
concerning the two lovers for ten books on. The king wonders aloud how Charikleia can be 
anything but insane when she is uttering “strange” or quite literally “foreign” words (ἀλλόκοτα 
ῥήματα), reiterating a language barrier which has, of course, been a challenge for her ever since 
1.3, when she melodramatically dares a group of foreign brigands to go ahead and kill her and 
Theagenes, but to no avail (“Though she waxed tragically about these things, they understood 
not one thing said”/Ἡ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπετραγῴδει, οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν συνιέναι τῶν λεγομένων, 1.3.2). She 
will face another key moment of misperception a few chapters later, when Theagenes is 
dangerously attempting to wrangle a mad bull to prove his worth. Charikleia begs her mother 
Persinna to intervene and save his life, a request that Persinna misunderstands, assuming that 
Charikleia merely has some excitement about him “improper for her virginity” (παρθενίᾳ μὴ 
πρέπον, 10.29.4).255 Here again, Charikleia laments the imperceptions of those around her: 
Ἐπιδακρύσασα οὖν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἡ Χαρίκλεια "Καὶ τοῦτο" 
ἔφη "δυστυχῶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι καὶ τοῖς συνετοῖς ἀσύνετα 
φθέγγομαι καὶ λέγουσα τὰς ἑαυτῆς συμφορὰς οὔπω λέγειν 
νομίζομαι," 10.29.5 
 
And so, crying all the more, Charikleia said, “I am 
unfortunate in this in addition to other things, that even to 
intelligent people I sound unintelligible, and when speaking 
about my misfortunes I am thought to be speaking not at all.”   
 
Two chapters later, Theagenes himself tries to hint to the king about his relationship with his 
daughter, hoping aloud that by either striking or suffering some blow (τι ῥέξας ἢ παθὼν) in an 
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 Virginity is, of course, a major concern in both Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius, though peripheral to our 
concerns here. For an extensive treatment of this theme in both novels, see Ormand 2011, which builds 
off of Foucault’s conclusion that the novels introduced a new obsession with sexual integrity previously 
unknown.   
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armed contest he might “jolt Charikleia, who up till now has stubbornly remained silent about 
us” (ἐκπλήσσω Χαρίκλειαν, τὴν σιωπᾶν εἰς δεῦρο τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς καρτεροῦσαν, 10.31.1). Again, 
the king remains oblivious: “What is purposed by inserting Charikleia’s name only you would 
know” (Τί μὲν βούλεταί σοι" εἶπε "τὸ παραπλέκειν ὄνομα Χαρικλείας αὐτὸς ἂν γινώσκοις, 
10.31). In fact, it is not until 10.38 that Charikleia finally comes rushing toward her father and 
ultimately reveals the truth, which is confirmed by her mother, who has also just heard it. By 
10.39, the crowd is arguing for the acceptance of their marriage by asserting that the gods 
themselves have orchestrated the whole spectacle, “revealing as the climax of the drama that 
this foreign young man is the bridegroom of the maiden” (ὥσπερ λαμπάδιον δράματος τὸν 
νυμφίον τῆς κόρης τουτονὶ τὸν ξένον νεανίαν ἀναφήναντες, 10.39).256 The work then promptly 
stops, whether or not it truly “ends” (see below). 
 This admittedly short treatment of Heliodorus’ long novel is enough to illustrate how 
Achilles Tatius’ innovation in narrative could lead to storytelling strategies all but modern in 
their slow release of information. Rather than narrate the story from a character’s point of view 
to maintain suspense about what is really going on, Heliodorus himself conceals information 
from the readers for long periods within the novel, revealing it only eventually and through 
character flashbacks. This slow process is delayed even further by the sheer length of the novel, 
such that by the end, the rapid succession of unsuccessful resolutions explored above becomes 
almost absurd. If Winkler is correct that Calisiris’ narration is most akin to Heliodorus’ himself, 
then we, like Cnemon, are left also yearning for the story’s end (τέλος) as Heliodorus drags out 
                                                          
256
 With λαμπάδιον (“torch”) translated as “climax,” as suggested by Arnott (1965, 254-55): “In Old 
Comedy a komos procession, with torches blazing, was one of the characteristic methods of producing a 
memorable exodos. This feature, insofar as it often involved revelry with its visual symbolism of torch and 
garland, seems to have been preserved, perhaps in a fossilized form only, by New Comedy; and though 
our evidence is limited, it strongly suggests that torches and garlands were as traditional a feature of 
New-Comedy endings as the appeal for applause …” Montiglio (2013, 148-149) suggests that the torch, by 
whose light the lovers recognize each other in a number of scenes (3.5.4, 5.5.2, 7.7.7), harkens here back 
to those previous scenes. 
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his “prolonged narration” (διήγησιν μηκυνομένην). And indeed, this does not seem lost on 
Heliodorus: not long after the Ethiopians recognize that the identification of Theagenes as 
Charikleia’s husband serves as the climax of the novel in 10.39, the novel abruptly ends two very 
short chapters later, after which Heliodorus gives us his sphragis, introduced by the two words 
readers have perhaps longed to see for a time now: τοιόνδε πέρας, “this is the end.” 
 Τοιόνδε πέρας ἔσχε τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν περὶ Θεαγένην 
καὶ Χαρίκλειαν Αἰθιοπικῶν· ὃ συνέταξεν ἀνὴρ Φοῖνιξ Ἐμισηνός, 
τῶν ἀφ' Ἡλίου γένος, Θεοδοσίου παῖς Ἡλιόδωρος. 
  
This is the end of the story of the Ethiopica concerning 
Theagenes and Charikleia, which was written by a Phoenician 
man of Emesa, decended from those of the Sun, the child of 
Theodosius, Heliodorus. 
 
This strange ending is difficult to render, but in taking ἔσχε to mean, as it does often, to check or 
reign in, and πέρας to mean not so much an “end” as a boundary or limit, Heliodorus’ last line 
seems to again reference his novel’s inordinate length, as it could very well be translated: “this 
limit stops the story of the Ethiopica regarding Theagenes and Charikleia.”257 For even here 
Heliodorus has, as has been his trademark throughout the novel, left off telling the rest of it. 
Immediately prior to the ending, we are told that the two lovers are being escorted away “with 
the more mystical rites for the marriage to be finished more brilliantly down in the city” (τῶν ἐπὶ 
τῷ γάμῳ μυστικωτέρων κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ φαιδρότερον τελεσθησομένων). With τελεσθησομένων, 
Heliodorus essentially delays the end (τέλος) of the story (the marriage of the two heroes) to 
beyond (πέρα) the end of the book. Even after making it to the end of Book 10, then, we are still 
left with the most enthralling part of the story -- the one we have ostensibly waded through ten 
books to reach -- concealed from us. Heliodorus has thus pulled off perhaps the most artful 
deception of all: we read through ten books, awaiting the eventual τέλος, but instead we are 
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 Since both τοιόνδε πέρας and τὸ σύνταγμα are neuter, either could technically be the object or 
subject. This reading translates the aorist here as present, but thanks to the finality inherent in stop, it 
remains an aoristic aspect all the same. 
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given a πέρας, a boundary that stops the story – a boundary we are not permitted to cross in 
order to see the “more brilliant” (φαιδρότερον) wedding ceremony that is beyond the limit of 
our pages.  
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Chapter 6: Deception and Storytelling in the Latin Novel 
 
Hitherto we have examined all five of the extant Greek novelists, but the two extant 
Latin novelists, Petronius and Apuleius, also show a tendency to cast their storytelling against a 
spectrum of deception and truth. And like the Greek novelists, with the two Latin authors we 
also see many of the same differences in “sophistic” narration already outlined between the 
earlier Chariton and Xenophon on the one hand, and the later Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus on 
the other, with the ealier Petronius usually seen as presenting a more gritty and less sophistic 
(not to be confused with less sophisticated) narration than that of Apuleius, a contemporary of 
Achilles Tatius.258 Nevertheless, the two Roman novelists also discourse in their own ways on 
fable, storytelling, and deceit, sufficient enough to underscore that, whether they adopted their 
crafts from Greek models or not259, this nexus of narrative and deceit is not limited to only those 
ancient novels written in Greek.260 
                                                          
258
 Apuleius’ birth is fairly securely dated to the 120s CE using internal evidence referring to his age and 
that of others in his writing. For a detailed examination of this, see Harrison 2000, 3. 
259
 The recent discussions of the Greek novels’ influence on the Latin ones (perhaps the central 
preoccupation of scholarship on the latter) have focused mostly on whether the Latin works are parodies 
of the ideal romances handed down to us or whether they are merely comic novels in their own right. 
Two main problems face analysts on either side of the issue, both centering on limited evidence: the 
Satyricon that we have now is undoubtedly only a portion of a much larger whole, now lost, and it is 
impossible to conclude definitively whether the remainder of it would have focused on the same plot 
points or even featured many of the same characters (like Giton); likewise, we have extant only five 
examples of the Greek novel upon which to craft the portrait of a literary genre, yet many others were 
known to have existed (see below) and could have varied widely. Within these limitations, Collignon 
(1892, 324) was first to suggest a model for Petronius that may fall within a tradition of comic narrative 
not necessarily taking as its model the Greek novels (La forme générale de l'oeuvre n'est pas celle du 
roman grec, mais de la Ménippée, et cette combinaison tout à fait nouvelle suffirait à faire de Pétrone un 
créateur, quoi qu'il ait pu devoir à tel ou tel modèle). Heinze later (1899) suggested that while (to him) 
Petronius seemed to be missing the key element of the Greek romance – the lovers (das Liebespar) – es 
scheint nur so, since in fact, Encolpius and Giton fulfill this role: Sie wird denn auch in den Formen 
geschildert, die für das romanhafte Liebespaar typisch sind (495-96). For Heinze, then, the pair of lovers, 
because they were both male, must constitute an inversion, something untypisch. Sullivan pointed out the 
problems with this view in 1968, noting that if this is a parody of the Greek novel, it should be 
recognizable, yet a key feature of it (the separation of the lovers) is not present in the Satyricon: “Giton 
and Encolpius are separated in our extant narrative for a very short time and there is nothing to frustrate 
the reunion but lack of inclination,” and it is not clear that “Romans, particularly at the court of Nero, 
would regard homosexuality as a parody of heterosexuality” (95-96). Walsh, acknowledging at the time 
(1970) that the theory had fallen “out of favor,” nonetheless attempted to revive it, claiming it was a 
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Petronius and the Prose Mime 
Petronius’ Satyricon, most likely written in the late 60s C.E., is fragmentary and 
incomplete in our reception, but regardless contains enough of the work to chart its affinity with 
the intellectual discussions taking place and already outlined in the chapters on Lucian and the 
progymnasmata. The student Encolpius in Petronius’ story appears to be just that – a student of 
rhetoric, and he engages in frequent commentary on the nature of popular declamation and the 
schools of rhetoric of the author’s own time. Indeed, one such harangue opens the text as we 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“sustained skit on the Greek romance” (8), a “burlesque of the ideals and motifs of the Greek love-
romance” (79), in part because he believed that “the love-romance is the sole type of extended episodic 
fiction in Greek for which any evidence exists before Petronius” (8). However, almost immediately, 
papyrus finds (specifically POxy 3010, which features a cinaedus speaking with a gallus in a prosimetric 
work) shattered any notion of romantic parody when it was shown that comic models existed in Greek 
that were similar to Petronius’ narrative, without the need for an inversion (Parsons 1971). Nevertheless, 
whether Petronius drew upon Greek models, and precisely which ones if so, continues to be debated: in 
their commentary on the Iolaus fragment, Stephens and Winkler presume a bias against Petronian 
originality on the part of Hellenists (1995, 364), who, they suggest, believe that “Petronius ‘must have 
had’ a Greek antecedent.” Laird echoes such sentiments, accusing Hellenists of attempting to push back 
the dating of material otherwise only attested in the second century CE, or “even to posit material that 
has not been discovered,” due to a “Hellenocentric chauvinism” – a “‘natural reason’ which dictates that 
the author of the Satyricon could not create anything new, anything that lacked a clear precedent in 
Greek literary history” (in Paschalis 2007, 156).  Jensson, meanwhile, sees the bias tilting the other way: 
“It is not difficult to demonstrate that the truth is exactly the opposite, for a strong bias has existed for 
well over a century towards viewing Petronius as the quintessential Roman or ancient Italian author, 
whose artistic ‘originality,’ supposedly, was not compromised by ‘foreign’ Greek influence” (2004, 247). 
Regardless, whether Petronius was “original” or not bears little on the present discussion of how the 
author discourses on lies and fiction: surely he was conscious of crafting his story, whether originally or 
based on an existing literary model, and the ways in which his narrator and other characters tell stories 
and falsehoods allows us, like with our other authors, a chance to investigate his fictional program. For a 
useful summary of recent scholarship on the issue, see Zimmerman 2002.  
260
 Some have specifically connected Achilles Tatius’ novel with Petronius’: “Of all the novelists who have 
survived from antiquity, [Achilles Tatius’] fiction resembles Petronius’ Satyricon most closely” (Hilton 
2009, 102). See also Anderson (in Beaton 1988, 192): “Moreover of all the ideal novels that of Achilles 
stands closest to Petronius: both share an ethos of self-indulgent rhetoric and sexual opportunism.” 
Hilton goes beyond style and ethos to compare the two works’ use of the ego-narrator (cf. the discussion 
of Achilles Tatius’ first-person narration on 138-139), presented in both cases as “weak, naïve, gullible, 
and selfish” (2009, 105), and also specific scenes, such as Petronius’ exclamation in an art gallery to 
Eumolpus that “even the gods feel love” (ergo amor etiam deos tangit, 83), which is very similar to the 
episode that opens Achilles Tatius, in which the author (or initial narrator) exclaims much the same thing 
before a painting of Europa (οἷον’ εἶπον ‘ἄρχει βρέφος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, 1.2), drawing the 
attention of Clitophon, who ultimately then tells his tale.  
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now have it, complete with complaints about the novelistic nature of many declamatory 
speeches of the day:261 
 
Nunc et rerum tumore et sententiarum vanissimo strepitu 
hoc tantum proficiunt, ut cum in forum venerint, putent se in 
alium orbem terrarum delatos. Et ideo ego adulescentulos 
existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil ex his, quae in usu 
habemus, aut audiunt aut vident, sed piratas cum catenis in 
litore stantes, sed tyrannos edicta scribentes, quibus imperent 
filiis ut patrum suorum capita praecidant, sed responsa in 
pestilentiam data, ut virgines tres aut plures immolentur, sed 
mellitos verborum globulos et omnia dicta factaque quasi 
papavere et sesamo sparsa.262 (1) 
 
Even now with the exaggeration of matters and with utterly 
empty creaking of sentimentalities, they accomplish only this: 
that when they come into the forum, they may think 
themselves carried off into another world. And so I figure that 
the youth become wholly stupid in schools, because they 
neither hear nor see anything from them that we consider of 
use, but rather pirates standing on the shore in chains; rather 
kings writing edicts, in which they order that sons lop off the 
heads of their own fathers; rather oracular responses given 
against pestilence, that three virgins or more be sacrificed; 
rather honeyed globs of words, and everything spoken and 
done as though besprinkled with poppy and sesame seeds. 
 
The aspects of rhetorical education most lamented by the character Encolpius (and perhaps by 
Petronius also) are, in fact, novelistic tropes: the pirate on the shore, edicts by kings, and, as 
seen in the Greek novels, repeated attempts at virgin sacrifice. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
these quite literally feed the novelists their plot points and episodes, including none too few 
that Petronius himself will employ.263 Thus his narrator’s long harangue is laden with irony: 
                                                          
261
 Kennedy (1978, 173) notes that while Encolpius’ remarks are “declamatory in tone … they are not 
strictly speaking a declamation.” Rather, he appears to be outside the school of rhetoric where a 
declamation is taking place and accosts the teacher Agamemnon with this litany of complaints.  
262
 Schmeling (2011, 4) observes that this is the longest sentence in the extant Satyricon. 
263
 Ibid, 4, also notes these were no doubt motifs used in school exercises. 
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Encolpius is taking aim at a rhetorical education he is simultaneously using to craft his 
condemnation.264 
 The remarks are one of many throughout the work that reference the very storytelling 
and rhetorical narration Petronius himself is presenting to us. The rhetorician Agamemnon265 
seems to echo the sentiments in Lucian’s Teacher of Rhetoric when he laments that parents 
“drive the crude learning (of their children) into the forum and clothe their boys, while still 
babes, in eloquence, than which they confess nothing to be greater” (cruda adhuc studia in 
forum pellunt et eloquentiam, qua nihil esse maius confitentur, pueris induunt adhuc 
nascentibus): 
Quod si paterentur laborum gradus fieri, ut studiosi iuvenes 
lectione severa irrigarentur, ut sapientiae praeceptis animos 
componerent, ut verba atroci stilo effoderent, ut quod vellent 
imitari diu audirent, ut persuaderent sibi nihil esse magnificum, 
quod pueris placeret: iam illa grandis oratio haberet maiestatis 
suae pondus. Nunc pueri in scholis ludunt, iuvenes ridentur in 
foro … (4) 
 
But if they would allow the steps of labors to happen,266 so 
that eager youths might be nourished by serious reading, so 
that they might order their minds with the precepts of wisdom, 
so that they might unearth words with an exacting pen, so that 
they might listen for a long time to that which they wish to 
imitate, so that they might persuade themselves of nothing that 
                                                          
264
 Kennedy (1978, 176) however points out that Encolpius is acting a part – trying to win an invitation to 
dinner from Agamemnon, and so issues a list of criticisms he knows will suit Agamemnon well, and that 
his criticism should not be read necessarily as those of Petronius or even Encolpius himself. “The ploy 
works perfectly. It is important to note that Agamemnon is not at all offended, not at all hostile, as we 
might expect him to be, considering what is said about his profession. Quite the contrary, he is delighted, 
commends what has been said, flatters Encolpius, and takes him into his professional confidence …” 
265
 Salles (2002) sees Petronius as using both the character Agamemnon, and Trimalchio’s and the 
freedmen’s characterization of rhetorical instruction, as a means of providing us with what the general 
public thought of such education: “Pétrone a su tirer parti des confusions régnant dans le grand public à 
propos des finalites de l'enseignement pour introduire un savoureux personnage romanesque, le rheteur 
Agamemnon.” (207-08)  
266
 Cf. Lucian’s Teacher of Rhetoric, which presents the road of proper rhetorical training as a nearly 
unclimbable mountain: “When you draw near the mountain, you will despair that there is no way up … it 
is a narrow and thorny and jagged pathway, promising much sweat and thirst” (εἶτ᾽ ἐπειδὰν πλησιάσῃς τῷ 
ὄρει, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπογιγνώσκεις τὴν ἄνοδον … ἡ μὲν ἀτραπός ἐστι στενὴ καὶ ἀκανθώδης καὶ τραχεῖα, 
πολὺ τὸ δίψος ἐμφαίνουσα καὶ ἱδρῶτα, 7). 
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is fantastic, which might be pleasing to boys: now, then, that 
grand oratory might have the weight of its own majesty. But 
now the boys play in the schools, and the youths are laughed at 
in the forum. 
 
Here again, the base irony to which Petronius is appealing is the fact that this diatribe is placed 
in the mouth of a character within such a story of special magnificence, which will have, as 
already pointed out, many of the stock elements contained in the progymnasmata that the 
character appears to be specifically lamenting. This recurrant critique of the fictional qualities of 
rhetorical education, even while utilizing such training to himself narrate the story of stories, 
runs throughout the Satyricon, and virtually no character is immune from unconsciously voicing 
such censure. Petronius even manages to give the buffoon Trimalchio a somewhat offhand 
critique of the rhetorical exercises. When he asks Agamemnon to recount for him the 
controversia he spoke that day (sed narra tu mihi, Agamemnon, quam controversiam hodie 
declamasti? 48) and the teacher of rhetoric explains it was one involving a rich man and a poor 
man at odds (‘pauper et dives inimici erant’ … et nescio quam controversiam exposuit), 
Trimalchio replies, “This … if it happened, is not a controversia; if it did not happen, it is nothing” 
(Hoc … si factum est, controversia non est; si factum non est, nihil est). Trimalchio’s comments 
are at once both absurd and profound, but altogether in keeping with the characters’ continual 
remonstration of rhetorical training. A controversia was, of course, a fictional legal exercise in 
the rhetorical schools, often luridly and entertainingly fictional267 (like, again, the Satyricon 
itself), so of course Agamemnon’s controversia for that day did not “happen” (facta) in reality, 
but was instead crafted (ficta) for training and entertainment purposes, yet that is the 
measuring stick of Trimalchio, who with this statement reveals his ignorance of what a 
controversia is: by suggesting that a controversia should be judged on whether or not its events 
happened is as absurd as asserting the same with respect to a modern novel. Trimalchio thus 
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 Cf. 50 n.84 
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(unconsciously) invokes the controversia’s defining characteristic (its very fictiveness) in a 
humorously unschooled attempt to negate its usefulness, yet as we have seen, it is the very 
usefulness (or lack thereof) of rhetorical education, including the controversiae, that is an 
especial target in Petronius. Trimalchio’s overall critique, then, appears ignorantly paradoxical: 
on the other hand, it is precisely the sort of criticism both Encolpius and Agamemnon have 
themselves made against the schooling of the day: that is, if the matter happened, it is in fact 
not a rhetorical controversia because it is an actual case, not a fictional exercise; and if it did not 
happen, it is of no consequence whatsoever by way of the fact that it is “nothing of use” (nihil ex 
his, quae in usu) but rather a story designed to make the listeners think they have been carried 
into another world (putent se in alium orbem terrarum delatos), which is precisely Encolpius’ 
complaint about education from his opening rant. So here the cartoonish host services 
Petronius’ recurring rhetorical criticisms almost in spite of himself. And yet despite the fact that 
Trimalchio has just voiced (albeit perhaps unwittingly) the same criticisms as he himself did, 
Encolpius reports on the flattery bestowed upon the host with droll dismissiveness: “we 
followed up these and other things he said with effusive eulogies” (haec aliaque … effusissimis 
prosequeremur laudationibus, 48). As if to punctuate the host’s buffoonery, Encolpius follows 
this account with Trimalchio’s famous butchering of a host of well-known myths (fabulae), 
asking Agamemnon what he made of them.  
Such fabulae, like the μῦθοι of the Greek novels, are recurring targets of ironic derision 
in both Petronius and Apuleius’ novels, themselves fantastic fabulae in their own rights. Thus 
when Quartilla, the priestess of Priapus, berates Encolpius and his friends for their prior sins, she 
asks, “Where did you learn banditry surpassing even the fabulae?” (ubi fabulas etiam 
antecessura latrocinia didicistis, 17)268 And unlike the later Apuleius, whose story will be 
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 Schmeling (2011, 49) concurs that this likely refers to either “novels or the theater.” 
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predicated upon the supernatural, Petronius’ forays into the fantastic are for the most part 
confined to the inset narrations of his baser characters, leading some scholars to characterize 
his novel at large as borderline realism.269 When said characters do venture into the fantastic, it 
is with trepidation. In the famous Cena Trimalchionis, the diners at one point agree to tell ghost 
stories, but not without a bit of hand-wringing about the unbelievable nature of their tales. The 
freedman Niceros, who tells the story of a soldier-werewolf, fears that he will be laughed at for 
his account by the scholar friends of Trimalchio (timeo istos scholasticos, ne me rideant, 61), but 
decides to tell his tale anyway. After his unbelievable story, he swears he is telling the truth not 
only once (“Don’t think that I am joking; I make my patrimony of no account, should I be 
lying”/Nolite me iocari putare; ut mentiar, nullius patrimonium tanti facio), but twice (“If I am 
lying, may I anger your guardian spirits”/ego si mentior, genios vestros iratos habeam, 62), two 
of several “iterated protestations of sincerity” he appears to use for narrative effect.270 Maria 
Plaza argues that Niceros is sublimating his fear of the students’ mockery by symbolizing it via 
the fear of the werewolf, noting that the servile status of everyone but the werewolf-outsider is 
stressed in his story, and he ends his story with the determination never to eat with his shape-
                                                          
269
 Thomas (1893), offering one of the oldest examinations of the le réalisme dans Pétrone, concludes it is 
only half true (moitié vraie), and instead asserts it is more closely akin to (written) pornography, which he 
suggests resides on the underbelly of idealism: L'ouvrage de Pétrone appartient pour une bonne partie à 
ce genre de littérature licencieuses qui a reçu de nos jours l'épithète flétrissante de pornographique. Or, la 
pornographie n'a rien de commun avec le réalisme: c'est le produit artificiel d'une imagination dépravée, 
une sorte d'idéalisme à rebours (3-4). Abbott (1909), meanwhile, was among the first to champion the 
realistic thesis, comparing it to the realistic Spanish novels of his own day, and suggesting (perhaps a bit 
too strongly) that “magic, the supernatural, and the element of perilous adventure are carefully 
excluded.” (441) But as we have seen, the supernatural is present, albeit in the tales of the freedmen, and 
how else might one describe the Lichan episode, which ends in shipwreck, other than perilous adventure 
(even if acknowledging its comedic tone)? Nevertheless, Petronius as realist has maintained a steady 
following: in 1953, Auerbach deemed Petronius’ work “the ultimate limit to which realism attained in 
antiquity (31).” In this he followed Bakhtin’s characterization in 1941, which highlighted the Matron of 
Ephesus tale as one “completely credible” (1981, 222-23). However, with this specific observation Rimell 
(2002) takes issue, noting that this isolates the Matron tale from the rest of the novel and ignores its 
Virgilian allusions (138-139). Cf. the discussion on 180-181 below. 
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shifting friend again (nec postea cum illo panem gustare potui, 62.13).271 However, Niceros’ 
preceding remarks could also represent something we have seen repeatedly in our examinations 
of the ancient novels: a typical authenticating story-telling device. Boyce notes that while 
Niceros indeed feels an “uneasy sense of inferiority” seen also in other characters, he prefaces 
his story in this manner to “heighten the listener’s interest and arouse suspense.” Hence Niceros 
himself becomes a consummate storyteller much as the narrator Encolpius: “We must 
remember that the credulity and superstitiousness which he expresses belong to his narrative 
persona and not necessarily to Niceros himself, despite his protestations of sincerity.”272 It 
seems clear that Niceros is, indeed, relating a common folktale,273 perhaps even self-consciously 
performing the narration of the story as a persona in the first-person. But Niceros does more 
than merely assert his sincerity – he also authenticates the narrative by convincingly casting 
himself within it, including some geographical and first-person detail for persuasive effect:  
Cum adhuc servirem, habitabamus in vico angusto; nunc 
Gavillae domus est. Ibi, quomodo dii volunt, amare coepi 
uxorem Terentii coponis: noveratis Melissam Tarentinam, 
pulcherrimum bacciballum. (61.6) 
 
When I was still a slave, I was living on a narrow street – 
now it is the house of Gavilla. There, as the gods willed it, I 
began to desire the wife of Terentius the inn-keeper: you know 
Melissa Terentina274 – a most pretty little buttercup. 
 
Indeed, Niceros goes on even further to describe just what it was he liked about Terentina, and 
the nature of their relationship, before setting the scene of his story (which begins with her 
husband taking a trip away). As we have seen, superfluous amounts of unnecessary detail are 
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 Schmeling (2011, 254) sees further cause to see more literary than historical detail here. He notes that 
Melissa (whose name means “honeybee”) is also said to come from Tarentum, which is “noted for its 
honey.” That “her name is the same as that of a courtesan in Athenaeus 13.578c” also sets a “unified 
stage.” 
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often the hallmark of authenticating a (possibly untrue) story, and Niceros engages in such 
sophistry, even while worrying aloud that the sophistic students in his presence will mock him 
for it. Indeed, Sandy has suggested that Niceros is one of Trimalchio’s jesters, or scurrae, and 
that his tale is a recurring performance that clearly has been told before, since Trimalchio 
specifically requests it (61.2).275 Plaza sees Niceros’ statement that (as emended), he would 
rather be laughed with than laughed at (satius est rideri quam derideri, 61.4) as indicative that 
he is performing a set piece, and that “as an entertaining banquet buffoon offering his tale as 
hilaria mera (61.4) he does not mind theatrical laughter” directed at his tale, but fears the 
satirical mocking of the educated guests.276 Indeed, the theatrical quality of his tale is 
punctuated in parts by clear references to mimic characters,277 and at least one scholar has 
suggested that Niceros’ decision to tell the tale illustrates the comic character of the Satyricon 
as a whole.278 
However unbelievable Niceros’ tale, it is followed by another supernatural yarn by 
Trimalchio that ends in the guests’ “sense of wonder and a plea to the supernatural not to 
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intervene” in their own lives,279 as Encolpius narrates that they, “having kissed the table, prayed 
that these night spirits keep to themselves until we might return from dinner” (osculatique 
mensam rogamus Nocturas, ut suis se teneant, dum redimus a cena, 64.1). It should be borne in 
mind, then, that tales of the supernatural were not always greeted with skepticism by 
readers/listeners at large, even when or if the authors relaying such stories convey some doubt 
of their own.280 
Similar authentication accompanies Eumolpus’ two stories, which are no doubt both 
well-trodden Milesian tales.281 The story of the Pergamene boy in its original state probably 
begins and ends with the amorous overtures of the older man and the younger boy’s eventual 
desire for him, culminating in the punchline wherein the boy’s original threat to tell his father is 
hurled back at him by his exhausted older lover. The latter part of Eumpolpus’ version, however, 
contains no references to the frame that he set up, authenticating it by presenting it as 
biographical, and asserting that it took place once as he was hosted in Pergamum and became 
the guardian of the household’s son:  
“In Asiam cum a quaestore essem stipendio eductus, 
hospitium Pergami accepi. Ubi cum libenter habitarem non 
solum propter cultum aedicularum, sed etiam propter hospitis 
formosissimum filium, excogitavi rationem, qua non essem patri 
familiae suspectus amator. Quotiescunque enim in convivio de 
usu formosorum mentio facta est, tam vehementer excandui, 
tam severa tristitia violari aures meas obsceno sermone nolui, 
ut me mater praecipue tanquam unum ex philosophis 
intueretur. Iam ego coeperam ephebum in gymnasium 
deducere, ego studia eius ordinare, ego docere ac praecipere, 
ne quis praedator corporis admitteretur in domum …” (85) 
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 Frangoulidis 2008), 82, who goes on to suggest Trimalchio’s ghost story foreshadows his mock funeral 
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“When I had been led into Asia on a quaestor’s 
employment, I received hospitality in Pergamum. While there I 
was residing cheerfully not only because of the nice quarters, 
but also because of the most stunning son of my host, and I 
devised a plan whereby I would not be suspected a seducer by 
the father of the house. And so whenever at dinner mention 
was made about pretty boys taken advantage of, I burned with 
anger so vehemently, and I bid with such severe harshness that 
my ears not be violated with obscene talk, that the mother 
especially began to look upon me as though one from among 
the philosophers. And so now I began to lead the young lad to 
the gymnasium, I began to arrange his studies, and I began to 
teach and instruct him, lest some predator of his body might be 
admitted into the house …”282 
 
Not only does Eumolpus  begin the tale with some self-authenticating language, giving the story 
a specific provenance (in Pergamum) and himself a specific reason for being there (on the 
employ of a quaestor), but he then asserts his own presence in it repeatedly, including the 
manner he devised (excogitavi rationem) to gain the household’s trust (involving a bit of play-
acting that will serve Eumolpus well again in Croton , as will will see below), and the way in 
which he came to be a trusted companion of the young boy. In this last part, right before what 
must have been the stock tale Petronius has the old poet repeat as his own, Eumolpus is most 
emphatic about his involvement, continuing not only the first-person narration but repeating 
also the first-person pronoun for effect: “I began to lead … I began to arrange … I began to 
teach”/ ego coeperam … deducere … ego … ordinare … ego … docere. Of course, this serves not 
only to emphasize Eumolpus’ own part in the tale but also the frame of slow, conniving 
seduction he has used to get us to the well-known retelling of it and its ironic result within the 
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have had his beauty attracting prospective lovers from across the globe, as Callirhoe or Psyche do (cf. 
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narrative: the family’s most trusted guardian is himself the preadator he is employed to ward 
off. 
Eumolpus’ (re)telling of the Matron of Ephesus story, while not biographical in the way 
the Pergamene boy is, nonetheless also contains traces of authentication in spite of its stock 
Milesian roots.283 The narrator (Encolpius), before handing the telling of the tale off to 
Eumolpus, suggests that the examples of feminine fickleness which the poet was about to tell 
came “not from old tragedies or famous names through the ages, but a matter from his own 
memory that had happened (nec se tragoedias veteres curare aut nomina saeculis nota, sed rem 
sua memoria factam, 110). The story he then embarks upon, however, carries with it the 
obvious markings of a fabula: “There was a certain matron of Ephesus of such famous modesty, 
that she summoned the women from neighboring towns and clans to the spectacle of herself” 
(Matrona quaedam Ephesi tam notae erat pudicitiae, ut vicinarum quoque gentium feminas ad 
spectaculum sui evocaret, 111).284 Despite being a no-doubt recognizable fable, Eumolpus’ 
authenticating works on at least one member of his audience: even while most of the rest of 
those listening collapse into laughter (risu excepere fabulam nautae, 113), Lichas finds fault with 
the actions of the fictional characters, treating it as though a real occurrence: “‘If his 
commander had been just,’ he said, ‘he ought to have returned the body of that lord of the 
household to his tomb and fixed the woman to the cross’” (“Si iustus” inquit “imperator fuisset, 
debuit patris familiae corpus in monumentum referre, mulierem affigere cruci”). Such an obtuse 
observation of course misses the humor of the fantastically absurd climax entirely, allowing 
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Petronius to not only play with Eumolpus’ weak authentication at the start of his tale, but also 
give us a model of reading, much as Winkler suggests Heliodorus does,285 that we should 
decidedly not follow in Lichas, who appears unable to appreciate a good yarn. 
The characters’ inability to distinguish fiction from reality has been touched on 
before,286 but it would be remiss here not to turn such an observation onto the narrator himself: 
as outlined exhaustively by Conte, Encolpius, more than any other character, seems determined 
to interpret his petty adventures through the lens of epic heroicism, exalting himself by 
“identifying with heroic roles among the great mythical and literary characters of the past.”287 
For Conte, the hidden author (Petronius) takes pains to put the “mythomaniac narrator” 
(Encolpius) in ever more absurd situations, which the young student inevitably narrates with 
hyper-melodramatic flair for the pleasure of the reader. Hence the more obvious examples of 
characters “not getting it” (Trimalchio’s reaction to Agamemnon’s controversia; Lichas’ response 
to Eumolpus’ story above), told of course by Encolpius himself, is made further ironic by his own 
elevated, heroic interpretation of things farcically mundane.   
 Yet even while being deceived by their own narrative experiences, the characters 
nevertheless continue to deceive their fellow actors in the story through the skill of inventing 
fictions. This perhaps finds its ultimate fulfillment in the final episode available to us, when the 
party (Eumolpus along with Encolpius and Giton) approaches the town of Croton.288 Once there, 
a farm overseer tells them that there is no prosperity to be found there save one:289 
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“O mi” inquit “hospites, si negotiatores estis, mutate 
propositum aliudque vitae praesidium quaerite. Sin autem 
urbanioris notae homines sustinetis semper mentiri, recta ad 
lucrum curritis. In hac enim urbe non litterarum studia 
celebrantur, non eloquentia locum habet, non frugalitas 
sanctique mores laudibus ad fructum perveniunt, sed 
quoscunque homines in hac urbe videritis, scitote in duas partes 
esse divisos. Nam aut captantur aut captant. In hac urbe nemo 
liberos tollit, quia quisquis suos heredes habet, non ad cenas, 
non ad spectacula admittitur, sed omnibus prohibetur 
commodis, inter ignominiosos latitat. Qui vero nec uxores 
unquam duxerunt nec proximas necessitudines habent, ad 
summos honores perveniunt, id est soli militares, soli fortissimi 
atque etiam innocentes habentur. Adibitis” inquit “oppidum 
tanquam in pestilentia campos, in quibus nihil aliud est nisi 
cadavera, quae lacerantur, aut corvi, qui lacerant…” (116) 
 
“O, my strangers,” he said, “if you are businessmen, change 
your plan and seek out some other assistance for your life. But if 
you maintain that you are men of more urban prestige and liars 
always, you are running straightaway toward profit. For in fact, 
in this town the pursuits of literature are not celebrated, nor 
does eloquence have any place, nor do frugality and sacred 
customs come to any profit in praises, but whatever men you 
do see in this city, know that they are divided into two factions: 
those who take or those who get took. In this city, no one raises 
children, because someone who has his own heirs does not 
come to dinner, is not admitted to the games, but he is kept 
away from all opportunities; he is ignored among the disgraced. 
But those who have not ever taken a wife nor have next of kin, 
they arrive at the highest honors -- it is the case; they alone are 
considered patriots, they alone the bravest and even faultless. 
You will go,” he said, “to a town the likes of fields in pestilence, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hunting. Hence the “unreal world” of Croton is integrally linked to Petronius’ literary program: “Petronius 
has recourse to the model set by Horace in his Sermones—he adopts the metaphor of captation to 
describe and examine the process of participating in literary history, but from his own perspective. … The 
situation provided by Horace (Ulysses as a legacy hunter), derived from Homer (Odysseus in the 
Underworld) has been dramatized by Petronius (a legacy-hunter-hunter acts out an Odyssean role in a 
cannibalistic and Underworld-like setting)” (Woods 2012, 95). 
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a dystopia, and it thus meets certain formulaic criteria for qualifying as such, including its (albeit 
“inaccurate”) geography, which provides isolation, and it is this dystopia which puts us on the narrator’s 
side: “the characteristics of the city of Croton furnish a reason for empathizing with the antiheroes’ way of 
life. In this way, in spite of possessing nothing, they will offer themselves to the material exploitation by 
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where there is nothing but cadavers which are picked at, and 
crows doing the picking.”290 
 
Eumolpus takes this advice to heart and concocts with his two companions an elaborate ruse 
whereby he will be an heirless, dying man, with the other two men play-acting as his slaves.  
“Quid ergo” inquit Eumolpus “cessamus mimum 
componere? Facite ergo me dominum, si negotiatio placet.” 
Nemo ausus est artem damnare nihil auferentem. Itaque ut 
duraret inter omnes tutum mendacium, in verba Eumolpi 
sacramentum iuravimus: uri, vinciri, verberari ferroque necari, 
et quicquid aliud Eumolpus iussisset. Tanquam legitimi 
gladiatores domino corpora animasque religiosissime 
addicimus. Post peractum sacramentum serviliter ficti dominum 
consalutamus, elatumque ab Eumolpo filium pariter 
condiscimus, iuvenem ingentis eloquentiae et spei, ideoque de 
civitate sua miserrimum senem exisse, ne aut clientes 
sodalesque filii sui aut sepulcrum quotidie causam lacrimarum 
cerneret. Accessisse huic tristitiae proximum naufragium, quo 
amplius vicies sestertium amiserit; nec illum iactura moveri, sed 
destitutum ministerio non agnoscere dignitatem suam. 
Praeterea habere in Africa trecenties sestertium fundis 
nominibusque depositum; nam familiam quidem tam magnam 
per agros Numidiae esse sparsam, ut possit vel Carthaginem 
capere. Secundum hanc formulam imperamus Eumolpo, ut 
plurimum tussiat, ut sit modo solutioris stomachi cibosque 
omnes palam damnet; loquatur aurum et argentum fundosque 
mendaces et perpetuam terrarum sterilitatem; sedeat 
praeterea quotidie ad rationes tabulasque testamenti omnibus 
mensibus renovet. Et ne quid scaenae deesset, quotiescunque 
aliquem nostrum vocare temptasset, alium pro alio vocaret, ut 
facile appareret dominum etiam eorum meminisse, qui 
praesentes non essent. His ita ordinatis, “quod belle feliciterque 
eveniret” precati deos viam ingredimur. (117) 
 
“Why don’t we,” said Eumolpus, “compose a mime? So make 
me out to be your master, if the affair is pleasing to you.” No 
one dared to condemn this contrivance from being carried out. 
And so, that we might keep the lie safe among everyone, we 
swore surety in words to Eumolpus: to be burned, bound, 
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beaten, and killed with a sword, and whatever else Eumpolpus 
ordered.  As though actual gladiators, we swore most religiously 
our bodies and souls to our master. After the overdone oath, 
we saluted our master as fictitious slaves, and learned as well 
from Eumolpus that he had lost a son, a youth of great 
eloquence and promise, and that he had left his own city a 
thoroughly miserable old man, lest he look upon his son’s 
clients and companions, or his tomb, the daily cause of his 
tears; that a recent shipwreck had from here added to his 
sadness, by which he had lost two million sesterces, not that he 
was bothered by the loss, but bereft of a servant he now did not 
experience his own dignity; that meanwhile he had three 
hundred sesterces deposited in Africa in lands and debts, for his 
family was indeed spread so great throughout Numidia that he 
could all but capture Carthage. In accordance with this 
fabrication, we urged Eumolpus that he cough a lot; that he be 
as though with an upset stomach and that he condemn all his 
food openly; that he talk of gold and silver and his deceitful 
crops and the perpetual sterility of his lands; moreover, that he 
sit daily over his accounting books and make changes to his will 
every month. And lest something of the scene be missing, 
however often he should try to call upon one of us, he should 
call one by another’s name, so that it could easily appear that 
the master was remembering even those who were not 
present. With these things all framed, having prayed to the 
gods, “that it turn out well and lucky,” we made our way along 
the path. 
  
Here, just as in the many schemes in Chariton’s novel, the account is replete with the language 
of the stage and deceit.291 The entire scheme is called a “mime” (mimus) and the idea to have 
Eumolpus “mistakenly” remember fictitious slaves’ names in place of their own is added to 
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 Collignon 1892 was the first to posit a serious influence of mime on Petronius, something he thought 
Petronius must have genuinely enjoyed (La fréquence de l'emploi du mot mimus ou de termes analogues 
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complete the “scene” (scaena). Not only is the language describing their plot fictitious and 
dramatic, the story they concoct is itself a novelistic one, including the stock motifs of mourning 
by the tomb (sepulcrum quotidie causam lacrimarum), separation from one’s homeland (de 
civitate sua … exisse), and shipwreck (proximum naufragium), the latter two having already 
occurred to the protagonist himself,292 and the first one having already been narrated in 
Eumolpus’ story of the Matron of Ephesus (quotienscumque defecerat positum in monumento 
lumen renovabat, 111.5). Indeed, much of the “mime” the trio composes is in fact a sort of best-
of-Petronius compilation of his greatest hits. The caricature that Encolpius and Giton encourage 
Eumoplus to fulfill is in fact a picture-perfect description of a character we have already 
encountered at length: aside from the ailments that Eumolpus is expected to pretend, his other 
general attributes as the heirless old man seem remarkably similar to Trimalchio and his band of 
freedmen, who also talk of dried up crops and lands (Ganymedes at 44), call attention to the 
names of Trimalchio’s many and numerous slaves (Carpus, 36), and of course (sometimes) pay 
especial attention to his riches and acquisitions (53). Indeed, a dinner guest at Encolpius’ left all 
but describes Eumolplus’ character while informing Encolpius about Trimalchio: 
Ipse nescit quid habeat, adeo saplutus est. … Ipse Trimalchio 
fundos habet, qua milvi volant, nummorum nummos. ... Familia 
vero babae babae, non mehercules puto decumam partem esse 
quae dominum suum noverit. (37) 
 
“He himself doesn’t even know what he has, he’s that rich. 
Trimalchio has estates it would take birds to fly over, riches 
upon riches. … And his slaves – egad! By Hercules, I bet a tenth 
part of them wouldn’t know their own master.” 
 
 And just as Trimalchio requires his guests to pretend he has died (78), Eumolpus too concocts a 
sort of proleptic re-enactment when he details in his will the grisly task his inheritors are to 
perform with his corpse. 
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All of this is aside from the overt language of deceit that recurs throughout the Croton 
episode, from the mendacium they are committed to keep safe (ut duraret inter omnes tutum 
mendacium), to their performance as “fictive slaves” (serviliter ficti), to the use of ars to 
describe Eumolpus’ idea.293 Ars, or skill, holds much the same nexus of meanings as the Greek 
τέχνη at the heart of much of our earlier analyses: it is both the skill necessary to carry out a 
craft, or craftiness and thus contrivance itself.294 It is here where Encolpius and Eumolpus will 
supposedly be granted an opportunity to allow their respective rhetorical and poetical skills to 
dupe the unsuspecting legacy-hunters for their own personal gain. And immediately upon 
entering Croton (after Eumolpus’ lengthy poem on the Roman civil war during their journey 
there), the party is given its first chance to act out the ruse but falls short of a smooth rehearsal.   
postero die amplioris fortunae domum quaerentes 
incidimus in turbam heredipetarum sciscitantium, quod 
genus hominum aut unde veniremus. Ex praescripto 
ergo consilii communis exaggerata verborum 
volubilitate, unde aut qui essemus, haud dubie 
credentibus indicavimus. Qui statim opes suas summo 
cum certamine in Eumolpum congesserunt. (124) 
 
On the next day, seeking a house of more ample 
luck, we fell upon a throng of inheritance-hunters 
interrogating us as to what manner of men we were 
and whence we came. Therefore, from the script of our 
conspiracy and with an exaggerated whirlwind of 
words, we declared whence and who we were to these 
men, who believed our account without hesitation. 
They immediately gathered together all their resources 
on Eumolpus in an utmost contest.  
 
The passage is meant to convey both the clumsy torrent of rehearsed explanations from the 
three players (exaggerata verborum volubilitate) and the obvious gullibility of the men they fool, 
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 Schmeling (2011, 446) concurs with this general reading of the Croton episode: “The fiction created by 
Eumolpus … is a novel in the novel, fiction in the modern sense – Eumolpus’ tricks are akin to literature.” 
294
 Cf. Virgil of the Trojan horse in his Aeneid (instar montis equum divina Palladis arte, 4.15) or of Greek 
deception in general (ignari scelerum tantorum artisque Pelasgae, 4.106), and Sinon in particular (Ille, 
dolis instructus et arte Pelasga, 4.152). 
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who are “trusting hardly hesitantly” (haud dubie credentibus) their outlandish account. Yet even 
here Petronius, ever willing to knock his narrator down a peg, has Encolpius amusingly fret that 
a penniless yet shrewd (callidus) legacy-hunter might somehow have the resources to send a spy 
all the way to Africa to uncover their lies (quid… si callidus captator exploratorem in Africam 
miserit mendaciumque deprehenderit nostrum? 125). Whether they are eventually found out or 
not may never be known, as after an intervening episode regarding Encolpius and the matron 
Chrysis, the text ends with the legacy hunter Gorgias’ infamously gruesome description of 
cannibalism, which includes a sophistic defense (worthy of his namesake) of the taboo as it had 
been practiced historically, urging his fellows into agreeing to eat Eumolpus’ flesh once he 
passes away.295 
 Much like Chariton’s Callirhoe, then, the characters within Petronius’ Satyricon refer to 
stage devices and dramatic narratives in an ironic commentary on the novelistic process, and 
then scheme and plot their own such mimes to deceive the other characters in the narrative. 
And in the same way that later Greek novelists will expand this play-acting within the narrative 
to make the narrative itself a sort of play, titillating the readers with narrative sleights-of-hand, 
Petronius’ Latin successor in the genre, Apuleius (himself an accomplished orator), will take the 
Latin novel to new heights of authenticated and yet fantastical storytelling, combining inset 
narratives of deceit and intrigue with his own overarching “experiences” of magic, mysticism, 
and transformation – and all against continual assertions as to his tale’s validity.  
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 Some have considered this to be an actual posthumous joke on Eumolpus’ part, but a staged Scheintod 
is more likely, and more in keeping with the trio’s ruse and the conventions of the novel in general (see 
Conte 1987, 530). 
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Apuleius’ Fantastical History 
 That Apuleius, whose life “falls at the height of the Greek intellectual revival of the 
Second Sophistic,”296 should write a novel replete with discourses on the demarcation (or lack 
thereof) between fact and fiction, should perhaps be of no surprise. His novel, which shall be 
examined here, is merely one of his many works, and perhaps (at least in the eyes of his 
contemporaries) his most trivial. He is otherwise known as an accomplished orator and 
philosopher, and thus the Golden Ass, which revels in sophisticated narrative masquerading as 
history, and likewise includes an inset tale many see (often alongside the rest of the work)297 as 
a Platonic allegory, is not an unexpected production given his body of work. 
When evaluating Apuleius’ truth claims, it bears remembering that at least one learned 
reader of his from antiquity was himself apparently undecided as to whether the story 
recounted in The Golden Ass was history or fiction: Augustine, while discussing in his City of God 
the very real dangers that supernatural demons can pose, chides those who might discount such 
things by asserting that he has heard firsthand about tales similar to Apuleius’:  
Si enim dixerimus ea non esse credenda, non desunt etiam 
nunc, qui eius modi quaedam uel certissima audisse uel etiam 
expertos se esse adseuerent. Nam et nos cum essemus in Italia 
audiebamus talia de quadam regione illarum partium, ubi 
stabularias mulieres inbutas his malis artibus in caseo dare 
solere dicebant quibus uellent seu possent uiatoribus, unde in 
iumenta ilico uerterentur et necessaria quaeque portarent 
postque perfuncta opera iterum ad se redirent; nec tamen in eis 
mentem fieri bestialem, sed rationalem humanamque seruari, 
sicut Apuleius in libris, quos asini aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi 
accidisse, ut accepto ueneno humano animo permanente asinus 
fieret, aut indicauit aut finxit. (de Civitate Dei, 18.18) 
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 Harrison 2000, 3. 
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 See Smith 1972, 528: “In a novel of magical metamorphosis, nothing remains what it seems to be; and 
this factor of sudden change should be considered central to an explanation of the most unexpected 
surprise of all in the novel, the transformation of the Metamorphoses itself from a collection of anecdotes 
providing varied edification and entertainment into a fable about the journey of the soul through life.” Or 
Festugiere (1960), 77: “… he has there traced for us the story of a soul which fell, which suffered by 
reason of that fall, and which the merciful hand of Isis raised up and saved …”  
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But if we should say that these things are not to be believed, 
there are not absent those who even now would assert 
earnestly that they have heard definite things of this sort or 
have experienced them themselves. For indeed when I was in 
Italy I heard that there were such things in a region of those 
parts, where they said innkeeper women imbued with these 
malicious skills were accustomed to give to whichever travelers 
they wanted or were able something in a piece of cheese, 
whence they were turned into beasts of burden at that point 
and carried whatever was necessary and returned to 
themselves again after the work was done; and that 
nevertheless in these events they did not become of beastly 
mind, but preserved their human thinking, just as Apuleius 
either reported or invented happened to himself in his books 
(which he wrote under the title of “The Golden Ass”) when after 
a potion was taken he became an ass, though his human mind 
remained. 
 
Note that while Augustine cites Apuleius’ story as a mere illustration of the sorts of things he has 
heard that have actually happened, he does not discount the possibility that Apuleius’ account 
is, in fact, real, ending his remarks in this section with the chance that the book was “either 
reported” (indicavit) or “invented” (finxit – quite literally, “fictionalized”).298  
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 Apuleius subscribed to the basic Middle Platonic doctrine on demonology, namely that the world 
cannot tolerate “gaps” and thus there must be middle beings between God and humans. This is spelled 
out most elaborately in his de deo Socratis, “the most complete connected version of Middle Platonic 
demonology extant” (Dillon 1977, 320): “But there are certain middle divine powers between the highest 
ether and the lowermost lands in that space of intermediate air, through which both our desires and our 
rewards pass. The Greeks called these by name demons, conveyors through the lands and skies of 
petitions hence and aid thence …” /Ceterum sunt quaedam divinae mediae potestates inter summum 
aethera et infimas terras in isto intersitae aeris spatio, per quas et desideria nostra et merita ad eos 
commeant. Hos Graeci nomine daemonas nuncupant, inter terricolas caelicolasque vectores hinc 
petitiones inde suppetias (de deo Socratis, 6). Apuleius and Augustine thus both shared the “general 
concern of intellectuals in the first few centuries AD with ideas about intermediate divine powers” 
(Harrison 2000, 137). Thus the existence of such powers, or their intervention in human affairs, was taken 
for granted among most learned men of the time, even if they disagreed (especially between Christians 
and non-Christians) over what or who those semi-divine powers were. Augustine appears to be embracing 
a Christian demonology equating daimones with fallen angels that was only then recently established 
(Martin 2010, 675-77), whereas the Middle Platonists like Apuleius and even earlier Christians merely 
thought of them as intermediate spirits, whether good or bad. In the words of Apuleius himself: “I believe 
Plato that there are certain intermediate powers of divinities in the middle both in nature and space, and 
that these govern all the divinations and miracles of the magicians. (Platoni credam inter deos atque 
homines natura et loco medias quasdam diuorum potestates intersitas, easque diuinationes cunctas et 
magorum miracula gubernare, Apologia, 43.1). It should be pointed out, then, that it is not the content of 
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Augustine’s remarks are not surprising, in that Apuleius himself specifically plays with 
the distinction between fiction and reality throughout his novel. In Book 6, when as an ass he 
escapes from the bandits’ hideout with the maiden Charite, she sings his praises, promising that 
he will one day himself live on in tales and that his story will make people believe in myths: 
Nec … deerit tibi dignitas gloriosa: nam memoriam 
praesentis fortunae meae divinaeque providentiae 
perpetua testatione signabo, et depictam in tabula 
fugae praesentis imaginem meae domus atrio dedicabo. 
Visetur et in fabulis audietur doctorumque stilis rudis 
perpetuabitur historia ‘Asino vectore virgo regia fugiens 
captivitatem.’ Accedes antiquis et ipse miraculis et iam 
credemus exemplo tuae veritatis et Phrixum arieti 
supernatasse et Arionem delphinum gubernasse et 
Europam tauro supercubasse. Quod si vere Iupiter 
mugivit in bovem, potest in asino meo latere aliqui vel 
vultus hominis vel facies deorum. (6.29) 
 
“Nor will glorious merit be absent for you: for I will 
mark the memory of my present luck and divine 
providence with a lasting witness, and I will dedicate a 
painted image of my present flight in the atrium of my 
house. It will be seen and heard and our uncultivated 
story will be preserved by the pens of the cultivated: “A 
stately maiden fleeing captivity by her asinine 
conveyor.” You yourself enter the ancient wonders and 
we will believe by the example of your truth that 
Phrixus did swim across on a ram and that Arion did 
steer a dolphin and that Europa did rest atop a bull. But 
if Jupiter truly did low as a bull, it is possible that the 
face of some man lies hidden in my donkey, or even the 
image of the gods.” 
 
Apuleius here frames his story in conjunction with myths of old, all of which included miraculous 
participation by an animal in conveyance across the sea.299 The analogy is somewhat absurd, but  
Augustine’s apparent confusion is not hard to understand when one reads Apuleius’ narration as 
Lucius, much of which happens while he is an ass. Though the author starts out his novel 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Apuleius’ story that might perhaps cast it into doubt for Augustine, but rather the method of his telling of 
it, which, as this section attempts to demonstrate, skirts the boundaries between fiction and reality. 
299
 A favorite in the Second Sophistic as it was a favorite in art at the time. Cf. Achilles Tatius’ opening 
treatment of the painting featuring Europa on 138 above.  
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enumerating his plans to tell a “Greekish yarn” (fabulam Graecanicam incipimus) woven 
together in a “Milesian story” from “various tales” (sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas 
conseram, 1.1), his transition from (presumably) the author Apuleius to the character of Lucius is 
so seamless as to be nonexistent. Immediately after telling us he is beginning his Grecian story 
and bidding us to enjoy ourselves, he begins his tale, still in first person,300 and throws in some 
genealogy in conjunction with his geography – leading us to wonder if this is still the author or 
the narrator: 
Thessaliam, nam et illic originis maternae nostrae 
fundamenta a Plutarcho illo inclito ac mox Sexto 
philosopho nepote eius prodita gloriam nobis faciunt, 
eam Thessaliam ex negotio petebam. (1.2) 
 
Thessaly – for thence does the foundation of my 
maternal origin, sprung from that famous philosopher 
Plutarch and then his nephew, produce its glory for us – 
this Thessaly I was seeking on business. 
 
The tale will begin in Thessaly, the capital of magic in antiquity, as Lucius will point out (“the 
middle places of Thessaly … where the native enchantments of the magical arts are celebrated 
by the accordant acclaim of the whole world/media Thessaliae loca … quo artis magicae nativa 
contamina totius orbis consono ore celebrentur, 2.1), and while this allows for the above 
biographical digression for the narrator, we will not learn his name until a full twenty-two 
chapters later (‘Mi Luci’, 1.24), when a schoolmate from Athens recognizes him on the way to 
the baths. It appears thus no accident that the author’s identity so often blurred with his lead 
character,301 and he will keep up such a charade throughout the novel. It is clear, then, why 
Augustine himself remained noncommittal about the fictional quality of the work,302 much less 
the identity of the narrator, for Augustine suggests the events of the Golden Ass had happened 
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 Cf. the discussions of first-person narration regarding Achilles Tatius and Petronius above, 170, n.260. 
301
 Gaisser 2008, 29ff, nicely charts Apuleius’ reputation as it blended with that of his protagonist, earning 
him the reputation of a magician from late antiquity into the Middle Ages. 
302
 See Van Der Paardt in Harrison 1999, 237ff 
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to Apuleius himself (sibi ipsi accidisse), using both the reflexive and intensive pronouns as if to 
remove all doubt. No wonder: Lucius will address the readers many times during his narration in 
much the same authorial voice as that of the introduction, implying that he is, in fact, reporting 
on experiences that he himself had, while at times undermining just such an implication in the 
process.  
Some such undermining remark accompanies virtually all incursions by the narrator into 
the story when he addresses the reader: immediately after his verbally ornate and perhaps 
philosophically metaphorical tale of Cupid and Psyche (supposedly told by a “drunken old hag”), 
Lucius the ass laments that he had no tablets, whereby he might mark down so beautiful a tale 
(pugillares et stilum non habebam, qui tam bellam fabellam praenotarem, 6.25). Meanwhile, a 
young man telling of the death of the young maiden Charite makes a less-than-oblique 
reference to Apuleius (or Lucius) when embarking on her story: “But so that you might know 
everything, I will tell to you what happened from the top – things that more learned men, to 
whom Fortune has bestowed pens, might be able to appropriately roll open on sheets as a token 
of history” (sed ut cuncta noritis, referam vobis a capite quae gesta sunt, quaeque possent 
merito doctiores, quibus stilos Fortuna subministrat, in historiae specimen chartis involvere, 8.1). 
Yet in both of these instances, we are left wondering how we came to have the story, as the ass 
did not have tablets to write down the fairy tale, nor were there any “learned men” with “pens” 
available to jot down the young man’s story. Nevertheless, Apuleius will routinely invoke the 
exacting standards of historiography to authenticate his tale, even though said authentication is 
quite easy for the reader to puncture.  
For example, when events happen he could not have known about because his 
character was not around, Apuleius is careful to have his narrator acknowledge that to his 
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readers outright.303 Amid telling of the machinations of a miller’s cheating wife,304 the narrator 
abruptly interrupts his suspenseful story right as the wife’s hired witch has determined to raise a 
woman from the dead to attack her husband: 
Sed forsitan lector scrupulosus reprehendens 
narratum meum sic argumentaberis: ‘ Unde autem tu 
astutule asine, intra terminos pistrini contectus quid 
secreto, ut affirmas, mulieres gesserint scire potuisti?’ 
Accipe igitur quemadmodum homo curiosus iumenti 
faciem sustinens cuncta quae in perniciem pistoris mei 
gesta sunt cognovi. (9.30) 
 
But perchance you, a scrupulous reader faulting my 
narrative, might reprove thus: “But how, you astute 
little ass, were you able to know what the women were 
carrying out in secret when you were kept within the 
confines of the mill?” Therefore listen in what way I, a 
curious person holding the guise of a pack animal, 
learned everything that was carried out to the 
destruction of my miller. 
 
What Apuleius then tells the reader raises even more skepticism: as he watched, still an ass, the 
disheveled apparition of a woman appeared and led the miller inside, where he remained 
behind locked doors until his servants finally burst in and found him hanging from a noose. Then 
the next day, the miller’s daughter showed up in a piteous state: 
quae nullo quidem domus infortunium nuntiante 
cuncta cognorat, sed ei per quietem obtulit sese flebilis 
patris sui facies, adhuc nodo revincta cervice, eique 
totum novercae scelus aperuit, de adulterio, de 
maleficio, et quemadmodum larvatus ad inferos 
demeasset. (9.31) 
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 Cf. Achilles Tatius 5.23.1, where Clitophon acknowledges that he was in a jail cell and could not have 
heard what was said. 
304
 A common mime (cf. 98 n.171 above). The adultery mime, “by far the most popular motif of the mime 
from the classical to the late antique period,” is one of several such mimes retooled in the Golden Ass and 
recently examined by Kirichenko (2010, 21). As he notes, Apuleius’ humorous take on the adultery mime 
turns on the fact that the typical roles of the husband and adulterer (the former typically duped, the latter 
typically triumphant) are reversed, and the adulterer is made to satisfy the desires of the man he hoped 
to cuckold.   
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She had learned everything that had happened, 
indeed not from someone announcing the misfortune 
of the house, but rather during her sleep the image of 
her pitiable father, still bound about the neck by the 
noose, brought himself before her, and he revealed the 
entire scandal to her, about the adultery, about the 
witchcraft, and how the enchantment had dragged him 
down to the underworld. 
 
 Thus does Apuleius at once invoke the exacting standards of historical narrative (how 
and where did you learn of these events?),305 only to then immediately undermine them by 
giving us his answer: he learned it from the daughter, who had a dream, which featured her 
father’s ghost, who told us all about it! The attention to which he calls us with respect to the 
story’s credibility is thus directed toward the unbelievable provenance of the tale.  
Oftentimes, Lucius will couple these authenticating strategies with other 
acknowledgements about things he does not know and never found out (“What my master the 
gardener did the next day I do not know”/ die sequenti meus quidem dominus hortulanus quid 
egerit nescio, 10.1), but he routinely continues the charade that he is writing an account of 
things that happened (“After a few more days I remember a significant scandal and nefarious 
crime, but so that you might also read about it, I put it here in the book”/post dies plusculos 
ibidem dissignatum scelestum ac nefarium facinus memini, sed ut vos etiam legatis, ad librum 
profero, 10.2). A few short chapters after the miller’s demise, Lucius will again acknowledge that 
he was not present for the events he is about to tell (about a trial concerning yet another 
wretched woman, this time a stepmother who frames her stepson for murder), but in the 
accepted manner of historiography, he tells what he has learned from others: 
Haec ad istum modum gesta compluribus mutuo 
sermocinantibus cognovi: quibus autem verbis accusator 
urserit, quibus rebus diluerit reus, ac prorsus orationes 
altercationesque neque ipse absens apud praesepium scire 
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 Cf. 79 n.138 for the three traditional modes of historical investigation: to see for oneself, to experience 
oneself, or to learn from others (εἶδον … ἔπαθον … ἐπυθόμην). 
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neque ad vos quae ignoravi possum enuntiare, sed quae plane 
comperi ad istas litteras proferam. (10.7) 
 
The things that happened concerning this matter I learned in 
turn from several conversations: but what words the prosecutor 
made use of, and in what ways the defendant undermined 
them, the precise speeches and debates, being myself absent 
and in my stable, I cannot know and cannot report to you things 
which I do not know, but the things which I ascertained clearly I 
will set forth in these letters. 
 
And like before, Lucius’ protestations and supposed care are immediately undermined by the 
story that follows, in which the surprise turning point will come in the form of two ornate 
speeches (precisely what he has just confessed to have not heard and cannot report) given by a 
doctor, who narrates how he himself sold the poison used to supposedly infect the boy who has 
died (yet who is, of course, not really dead). The doctor informs the court that the “poison” he 
sold to the slave was not really poison at all, but rather only induced a death-like sleep, like the 
drug in Xenophon of Ephesus’ tale (θανάσιμον μὲν οὐχὶ φάρμακον, ὑπνωτικὸν δέ, 3.5.11), and 
when the boy is discovered fully alive, Lucius remarks that “now, with the crimes of the vile 
slave and the viler woman clearly laid bare, naked truth came forth into view” (Iamque liquido 
servi nequissimi atque mulieris nequioris patefactis sceleribus procedit in medium nuda veritas, 
10.12). That such a tale should have so great an investment in ultimate truth is perhaps the 
height of irony. 
 Even Apuleius’ beautiful, extended inset tale of Cupid and Psyche, the subject of 
philosophical treatises and Renaissance art despite supposedly coming from a drunken old 
woman,306 offers several discourses on deceit akin to those found in Longus’ similar fairy tale. 
This elaborate, sophisticated, and ornate tale, which some have seen as a Platonic allegory 
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 Though clearly based on several traditional, folkloric motifs as illustrated exhaustively by Swahn in 
1955, most consider Apuleius’ tale of Cupid and Psyche original enough in its adaptation that it should 
stand alone in analysis: “Apuleius has grafted on to the folk-tale a story of a love-encounter between Eros 
and Psyche which derives from a Platonist myth and which becomes popular in the Hellenistic age.” 
(Walsh 1970, 195). 
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about the soul’s (psyche) relationship with the divine,307 an allegory usually seen as reflective of 
the whole,308 is nonetheless presented to us by a less-than-sophisticated character, something 
which Apuleius will not let us forget, playfully framing the entire story with reminders of its 
provenance: 
“Sed ego te narrationibus lepidis anilibusque fabulis 
protinus avocabo.” et incipit: “erant in quadam civitate 
rex et regina …” (4.27-28) 
 
“But I will distract you with dainty narrations and 
old-lady tales straightaway.” And she began: “There 
were in a certain city a king and queen…” 
 
Despite its fabulistic beginning, the story will be no mere children’s tale, much less an old wives’ 
tale, as the old woman suggests, though its affinity with the Greek romances already examined 
cannot be denied.309 The ecphrases alone within the tale are worthy of Apuleius’ sophistic 
education: after Venus has ordered her son Cupid to make Psyche fall in love with a man 
condemned by Fortune (Fortuna damnavit, 4.31), she leaves her son and returns to the sea, in 
the process striking a pose with her retinue no doubt taken from any number of paintings of the 
love goddess:310 
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 Schlam (1970, 477-487) provides a helpful overview of much of the scholarship on this issue. DeFilippo, 
attempting to straddle two approaches to charting the Platonism of the Golden Ass (either culling its 
pages for Platonic references, or examining the whole work against the Middle Platonism contemporary 
with him) adds to the discussion a needed focus on curiositas (in Harrison 1999, 269ff). Meanwhile, 
Penwill summarizes the typical interpretation nicely (1975, 53). 
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 Wlosok (1969, 75), i.a., sees the fates of Psyche and Lucius wed by an initial folly owing to their similar 
curiositas: Die eigentliche bedeutung der Psyche-Erzählung liegt, wie wiederholt ausgesprochen wurde, in 
ihrer symbolischen Beziehung auf die Haupthandlung. Das Schicksal Psyches spiegelt im Großen das 
Schicksal des Lucius wider und trägt zu dessen Erhellung bei. Die entscheidende Parallele sehe ich in der 
Ursache für den Fall und den folgenden Leidensweg der beiden Helden: Psyche erliegt der gleichen 
curiositas wie Lucius. Cf. Hooper (1985, 399): “The tale of Cupid and Psyche is not an allegory about love 
or a stylish myth inserted for relief from the bandits’ cave: it is a miniature version of the whole novel, and 
a careful foreshadowing of its religious significance.” 
309
 Penwill 1975, 51: “The old woman who tells it calls it a narratio lepida (‘pleasant story’ 4.27); but 
perhaps the most telling way in which this atmosphere is created is in the obviously intentional similarity 
between its plot and that of the standard Greek romance.” 
310
 See Amat 1972, 125: “… la marine fameuse du cortège de Vénus, thème iconographique 
particulièrement à la mode en Africa.” 
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Sic effata,311 et osculis hiantibus filium diu ac 
pressule saviata proximas oras reflui litoris petit, 
plantisque roseis vibrantium fluctuum summo rore 
calcato, ecce iam profundum maris sudo resedit vertice, 
et, ipsum quod incipit velle, et statim, quasi pridem 
praeceperit, non moratur marinum obsequium. Adsunt 
Nerei filiae chorum canentes, et Portunus caerulis 
barbis hispidus, et gravis piscoso sinu Salacia, et auriga 
parvulus delphini Palaemon iam passim maria 
persultantes Tritonum catervae; hic concha sonaci 
leniter buccinat, ille serico tegmina flagrantiae solis 
obsistit inimici, alius sub oculis dominae speculum 
progerit, curru biiuges alii subnatant. Talis ad Oceanum 
pergentem Venerem comitatur exercitus, 4.31.4-7. 
 
Thus she spoke, and having kissed her son closely for 
a while with open lips, she seeks the nearby banks of 
the receding shore, and when the uppermost dew of 
the billowing waves was trodden by her rosy feet, 
behold! the depth of the sea calmed with a serene 
surface, and the thing which she had only begun to wish 
itself immediately happened, and her marine retinue 
tarried no more: there present were the daughters of 
Nereus, singing a chorus, and Portunus, bristly with his 
sea-blue beard, and Salacia, laden with her fish-full 
folds, and little Palaemon, the steersman of dolphins; 
and now throngs of Tritons were leaping through the 
seas here and there; this one was trumpeting lightly on 
a resounding conch shell, that one blocked the 
flagrance of the hostile sun with shields made from silk; 
another held forth a mirror under the eyes of his 
mistress; still others swam beneath her chariot, yoked 
two by two. Such was the company attending Venus as 
she drove toward the ocean. 
 
Far from being a narrative commonplace for drunken old women, the ecphrasis here and also at 
5.1 (the description of Cupid’s palace) and 6.6 (Venus’ departure for the sky) mirror those earlier 
in the work as told by Lucius, especially the description of Byrrhena’s atrium at 5.4.  
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 Kenney (1990, 126) suggests this, and others, are epicizing tags that underline Venus’ “Apollonian-
Virgilian persona,” which Apuleius is co-opting for his tale.  
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But the author does not undermine his inebriated and elderly narrator simply by making 
his tale sophisticated. He will also explicitly break through the supposedly secondhand narration 
when Apollo gives a prophecy regarding the fate of Psyche in a hexameter oracle: 
Sed Apollo, quanquam Gracus et Ionicus, propter 
Milesiae conditorem sic Latina sorte respondit. (4.32) 
 
But Apollo, although Greek and Ionian, on account of 
the author of a Milesian tale, responded thus in Latin. 
 
Yet as stated above, the entirety of the tale is framed by the old woman, and when the tale is 
done and Psyche has been apotheosized and her daughter Pleasure (Voluptas) introduced,312 
Apuleius, amidst this celestially serene scene, abruptly returns to her again, and again (as noted 
above) laments he did not have stilus and tablets to write down “so beautiful a tale”: 
Sic captivae puellae delira et temulenta illa narrabat 
anicula; sed astans ego non procul dolebam mehercules 
quod pugillares et stilum non habebam, qui tam bellam 
fabellam praenotarem. (6.25) 
 
That was the story that crazy and drunken old 
woman was telling to the captive girl; but I, standing not 
far off, was grieving, by Hercules, that I did not have 
tablets and a pen, with which I might jot down so 
beautiful a tale. 
 
Of course, Lucius undermines the narrative fiction of his own tale by suggesting he did not have 
a way to record such a story, since it ends up told to us here in great detail, and indeed one 
wonders how such a contradictory sentence can be written with a straight face: on the one 
hand, the tale was narrated by a crazy, drunken old woman (who had already warned us what 
sort of tale she would be telling), yet it was “so beautiful” (tam bellam) it leaves the ass wishing 
for writing apparatus. But chiefly undermining the narration of the wider tale (a supposedly 
delightful ditty meant only to entertain a young maiden) is of course the tale itself, which many 
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 Again seen as philosophically significant: “The birth of a child with this name, as the happy resolution 
to the tale of Psyche, represents the soul's discovery of spiritual joy at its  deliverance from the power of 
blind fortune (in Psyche's tale, represented by Venus),” Tatum 1969, 514. 
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have read as an allegory about the soul’s progress to divine perfection. However, even in the 
perennially simplex Psyche’s transformation from suffering mortal to apotheosized goddess, 
Apuleius manages to discourse on the nature of narrative deceit, deceit both unsuccessfully 
crude and sophisticatedly successful. 
 Like in the other novels and in Apuleius’ novel at large, deceit plays a chief role not only 
in authorial interventions, but within the narrative action of Cupid and Psyche itself. A much 
longer examination of these deceits (the tale is, after all, predicated upon the overarching deceit 
of Cupid hiding his identity from Psyche) could be offered here, but for the sake of brevity I will 
focus especially on the relationship between Psyche and her sisters, so archetypically wicked 
they will enjoy a long bookshelf life in folktales such as Cinderella. When the jealous sisters 
discover that Psyche is married to a rich man who has put her up in a breathtaking mansion, 
they inquire about him while “nourishing envy within their hearts” (praecordiis penitus nutrirent 
invidiam, 5.8). Because she has sworn to her husband Cupid (whose identity she still does not 
know) that she would not let them spark her curiosity as to his true identity, she lies when 
pressed about who he is:  
nec tamen Psyche coniugale illud praeceptum ullo 
pacto temerat vel pectoris arcanis exigit, sed e re nata 
confingit esse iuvenem quendam et speciosum, 
commodum lanoso barbitio genas inumbrantem, 
plerumque rurestribus313 ac montanis venatibus 
occupatum, et ne qua sermonis procedentis labe 
consilium tacitum proderetur, auro facto gemmosisque 
monilibus onustas eas statim vocato Zephyro, tradit 
reportandas. (5.8) 
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 Kenney notes that “the distinction between different types of hunting seems pointless and indeed 
improbable, since the mountains were the traditional scene of the sport” (1990, 150). And Watt (to whose 
conjecture, though unpublished at the time, Kenney was privy) went so far as to suggest the addition here 
of rebus in order to fulfill the typical distinction between farming and hunting (apud ibid, 150). Yet it’s 
possible that Psyche’s account is supposed to sound “improbable,” since as we will see, she fails to even 
remember this story when asked to describe him again shortly. As I will be arguing, Psyche’s 
transformation is not simply from human to divine: she also demonstrates a transformation from soft 
naiveté to harsh cleverness.  
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Nevertheless, Psyche did not dishonor that command 
of her husband in any manner nor did she expel it from 
the secret places of her heart, but spontaneously she 
fictionalized that he was a certain youth, handsome, 
just now darkening his cheeks with a wooly beard, 
occupied often with country and mountain hunts, and 
lest by some slip of proceeding speech she might betray 
her silent plan, she immediately handed them over, 
laden with gold-wrought work and gemmed necklaces, 
to summoned Zephyr to be carried back. 
 
Cupid himself recognizes the danger that the sisters pose, and attempts to warn Psyche about 
their designs, remarking on her natural naiveté:  
“Perfidae lupulae314 magnis conatibus nefarias insidias 
tibi comparant, quarum summa est, ut te suadeant 
meos explorare vultus, quos, ut tibi saepe praedixi, non 
videbis si videris. Ergo igitur si posthac pessimae illae 
lamiae noxiis animis armatae venerint—venient autem, 
scio—neque omnino sermonem conteras et, si id 
tolerare pro genuina simplicitate proque animi tui 
teneritudine non potueris, certe de marito nil quicquam 
vel audias vel respondeas.” (5.11) 
 
“The treacherous she-wolves are preparing insidious 
traps for you with great effort, the greatest of which is 
this: that they might persuade you to seek out my face, 
which as I have often warned you, you will not see again 
should you ever see it. And so, therefore, if after this 
those most destructive witches should come, armed 
with their noxious intents – and they will come, I know 
it – you must not waste words with them at all, and if 
you are not able to tolerate that because of your inborn 
naiveté and because of the softness of your brains, 
certainly you must respond to nothing about your 
husband and you must hear nothing of him.” 
 
When the sisters return and interrogate her again, simplex Psyche cannot even keep her lies 
straight, this time telling a completely different account of who her husband is: 
Tunc illa simplicitate nimia pristini sermonis oblita, 
novum commentum instruit atque maritum suum de 
provincia proxima magnis pecuniis negotiantem iam 
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medium cursum aetatis agere, interspersum rara 
canitie. Nec in sermone isto tantillum morata rursum 
opiparis muneribus eas onustas ventoso vehiculo 
reddidit. (5.15) 
 
Then she, with excessive naiveté, forgetful of her 
older story,315 constructed a new fabrication, that her 
husband was a businessman of great wealth, middle-
aged, and had lived through the middle stretch of his 
life, and that he was speckled with a few white hairs. 
Not delaying in that story for even a bit, she returned 
them back to their windy transport laden with rich gifts. 
 
The sisters are quick to note that the two accounts do not mesh, referring to her tales as a 
“monstrous mendacity” (monstruoso mendacio, 5.16). This of course leads ultimately to the 
sisters’ grandest design, an elaborate lie in which they convince Psyche, “naturally simple and of 
tender mind” (utpote simplex et animi tenella, 5.18) that her husband is really a giant serpent 
who will devour her once her child is born.  
‘Tu quidem felix et ipsa tanti mali ignorantia beata, 
sedes incuriosa periculi tui; nos autem, quae pervigili 
cura rebus tuis excubamus, cladibus tuis misere 
cruciamur. Pro vero namque comperimus nec te, sociae 
scilicet doloris casusque tui, celare possumus immanem 
colubrum multinodis voluminibus serpentem, veneno 
noxio colla sanguinantem hiantemque ingluvie 
profunda, tecum noctibus latenter acquiescere. Nunc 
recordare sortis Pythicae, quae te trucis bestiae nuptiis 
destinatam esse clamavit: et multi coloni, quique 
circumsecus venantur, et accolae plurimi viderunt eum 
vespera redeuntem e pastu proximique  fluminis vadis 
innatantem. Nec diu blandis alimoniarum obsequiis te 
saginaturum omnes affirmant, sed cum primum 
praegnationem tuam plenus maturaverit uterus, 
opimiore fructu praeditam devoraturum. Ad haec iam 
tua est existimatio, utrum sororibus pro tua cara salute 
sollicitis assentiri velis et declinata morte nobiscum 
secura periculi vivere, an saevissimac bestiae sepeliri 
visceribus: quod si te ruris huius vocalis solitudo vel 
clandestinae Veneris faetidi periculosique concubitus et 
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 As dryly noted by Kenney, “Something of an understatement … Pysche’s improvisations illustrate the 
age-old truth that liars should have a good memory” (1990, 160). 
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venenati serpentis amplexus delectant, certe piae 
sorores nostrum fecerimus.’ (5.17-18) 
 
You sit there all happy and blessed in ignorance of so 
great an evil and negligent of your own danger. But we, 
who lie awake with concern for your affairs, are 
tortured wretchedly by your misfortunes. For we know 
for a fact, nor are we able, as the sure allies of your pain 
and misfortune, to conceal from you, that it is a large 
creeping snake with many-knotted coils, bleeding about 
its neck with poisonous venom and gaping with its deep 
maw, that sleeps with you secretly every night. 
Remember the Pythian prophecy, which proclaimed 
that you were destined for the nuptials of a ferocious 
beast. Many farmers and those who hunt around these 
parts and several neighbors have seen him coming back 
in the evening from feeding and wading in the nearby 
shoals of the river. They all swear that it will not be long 
before you are fattened up with the charming 
complaisance of food, but once your full womb ripens 
to a full pregnancy, he will devour you, a meal gifted 
with fatter delight. As to these things it is now your 
decision, whether you wish to assent to your sisters 
concerned for your precious safety and live with us 
delivered from death and secure from danger, or 
whether you wish to be entombed in the viscera of a 
most savage beast. But if the sonorous solitude of this 
country or the fetid and dangerous copulations of 
clandestine love and the embraces of a poisonous 
serpent are more to your liking, at least your pious 
sisters will have done what they could. 
 
Psyche’s sisters are consummate liars, authenticating their tale by beginning it with their faux 
concern for her safety (pervigili cura rebus tuis excubamus; sociae scilicet doloris casusque tui), 
and protesting that they wish they could keep the matter concealed from her (nec te … celare 
possumus). For good measure, they invent eyewitness accounts of people who have seen her 
lover returning to their home, mimicking the strategy among historiographers, and likewise 
invest their tale with an air of authority by using comperimus, a word often used to express 
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certainty of knowledge.316 Their lies are of course aided by Psyche’s inborn simplicitas, but like 
all good liars, they also provide a proof text for their deception with a bit of truth: the prophecy 
that proclaimed Psyche would marry a beast, unbeknownst to anyone a reference to Cupid. 
Hence Psyche’s naiveté cannot and should not negate what amounts to a sophisticated 
narrative deceit on the sisters’ parts. And so unsurprisingly, Psyche at once believes them, and 
ultimately will burn her lover Cupid with the hot oil of a lamp she bore to his bedside to learn of 
his identity, leading to her trials by Venus. But before her trials commence, she gets her revenge 
on her sisters by telling them equally convincing lies, far more sophisticated than the ones she 
had unsuccessfully attempted before. Recounting how she had spilled the oil on Cupid, she 
narrates a slightly different account of how he reacted: 
‘Tu quidem ’ inquit ‘Ob istud tam dirum facinus 
confestim toro meo divorte tibique res tuas habeto,317 
ego vero sororem tuam ‘—et nomen quo tu censeris 
aiebat—’ Iam mihi confestim farreatis nuptiis 
coniugabo,’ et statim Zephyri praecipit ultra terminos 
me domus eius efflaret.’ (5.26) 
 
“‘Indeed, you,’ he said, ‘On account of that so dire a 
crime, immediately take yourself from my bed and take 
your things with you, but I will yoke your sister’ – and 
he said the name by which you are called – ‘to myself 
now immediately with solemn nuptials,’ and 
immediately he called upon Zephyrus to fly me beyond 
the walls of his house.” 
 
When Psyche gets to the part of her tale that is fiction, she invests it with high urgency, having 
the Cupid of her story repeat confestim – immediately – thrice for emphasis. This is all according 
to her plan, for the urgency is not lost on her sister, who, while Psyche was still speaking 
(necdum sermonem Psyche finierat), departs, deceives her husband with a lie (mendacio fallens 
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 And often in distinction from uncertainty and rumors: ‘non ego haec’ inquit ‘incertis iactata rumoribus 
et cupidius credita … adfero ad vos, patres conscripti, sed conperta et explorata’ (Livy 42.13). 
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 Psyche has gone from an “improbable” description of hunting to now quoting “technical and 
specifically Roman terminology. tuas res habeto was the regular formula for repudiation of a spouse” 
(Kenney 1990, 178). 
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maritum, 5.27), and then throws herself off the cliff where Zephyr had before conveyed her to 
Cupid’s house (but would not, unbidden, do so this time), plummeting to her death. Psyche 
follows up this vengeance with another, telling her other sister the exact same lie (ensuring she 
did not repeat her previous mistake of inconsistency) and getting the same results.  
 The sisters’ demise at the hands of Psyche has caused many scholars a bit of discomfort 
and aporia. I would agree with Walsh that the episode holds a “symbolic import in the context 
of Psyche’s pilgrimage,”318 but would depart from him on what the import is. For Walsh, Psyche 
has to dispense with her sisters to continue her Platonic journey toward divinity: “The sisters 
represent the earthly attachment which are the cause of her fall from grace, and which she must 
now slough off.”319 Perhaps, but by killing them? And what of Psyche’s parents? Both Walsh and 
Kenney consider the simplex puella’s behavior here “inconsistent” with her earlier 
characterization, “a yearning for revenge and a hitherto unknown craftiness.”320 While it is 
believable that the sisters should “overreach,” that “she, however, simplex et animi tenella, 
should suddenly become both vindictive and crafty to this degree is not.”321 Yet I would argue 
that her journey from naiveté to harsh reality, from gullibility to craftiness, is precisely the same 
journey witnessed in Daphnis and Chloe: that an evolution away from such simplicitas is – no 
matter how implausibly accelerated it occurs in the story – exactly one of the points of growth 
Apuleius is showing us here, and directly connected with the typical coming-of-age of a novel’s 
young protagonist(s), always ultimately symbolized by their induction into marriage. 
 Within simplex Psyche’s journey from mortal to divine, then, rests an equally powerful 
trajectory from unsophisticated gullibility to crafty sophist. While originally too daft to even 
remember the first set of lies she made up about her divine husband, a misstep her sisters seize 
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upon to prompt her troubles, her revenge against them not only involves a story that is 
believable to them and consistent, but also shrewdly takes into account her sisters’ enviously 
devious motivations – motivations to which she was naively blind before. Psyche’s primary 
quest may be that of mortal girl to divine goddess, a path that no doubt mirrors the inward 
transformations of Lucius himself, but she also at once undergoes maturation away from her 
trademark simplicitas and toward the calliditas necessary to take revenge on her scheming 
sisters and remove them as obstacles toward her heavenly destiny. Psyche thus goes through a 
psychological transformation similar to the one(s) we saw with Daphnis and Chloe,322 and her 
maturation to adulthood is punctuated by deceit in much the same way. For deceit is 
inextricably linked to sophistication – the sophistication to detect a lie being told, or the 
sophistication to tell a convincting, plausible lie. And in this way we have found here again, as 
we have so often throughout this investigation, an analogue to the author’s narrative program – 
a project aimed at creating a convincing, plausible story that will at its best fool its most 
unsophisticated readers into thinking it is fact, while in the very least aiding its most 
sophisticated readers in their suspension of disbelief.  The preoccupation with credible 
narration, therefore, even for fictional ends, was not one of the Greek novelists alone. It 
stretches into the western empire, no doubt fueled in part by the common rhetorical training 
undergone by the educated Roman and Greek alike. Wherever one stands on the originality of 
the Roman novel, then, and whether it springs from the Greek romances or is its own genre 
developed alongside them, it is clear both sets of novels contributed both individually and 
together as a group to the sorts of fantastical narrations now so prevalent in our own literary 
worlds.  
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Conclusion 
 
Telling stories is perhaps as old as humankind, but though it may seem such today, it 
was not inevitable that the ancient writers examined here would innovate the sorts of narratives 
that they did in the early imperial period, laying the groundwork for the most common literary 
expression known to us today, the modern novel. There were stories before the ancient novels, 
even written stories, which were understood to be just that – stories from the minds of their 
creators. But in casting their narratives in prose, and in mimicking the strategies of 
historiography, even for fantastical ends, the ancient novelists set about on a somewhat newer 
project: that of telling their stories in a way that would make them the most believable, that 
would make their readers more fully invested in the suspended disbelief that the digestion of all 
good fiction requires. 
When most of us are initially introduced to books, one of the first things we are taught 
is the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. Often this distinction is explained rather 
succinctly by a grammar school librarian, no doubt overworked and overwhelmed by children, 
who can therefore perhaps be excused for her somewhat flippant and categorical literary fail: 
“non-fiction is true, while fiction is not true.” 
Of course, well-written fiction, full of pathos and intrigue, can be just as true as a 
handbook of facts. But the overarching requirement for this to ring true is the story’s 
believability. Without believability, even amid a fantastic, impossible premise, readers are 
unable to relate to the story at all, and its function as fiction becomes limited. Believability and 
credibility, then, were two of the birth pangs of prose fiction, and two indispensable parts of 
enjoying fictional literary forms that we today take for granted. Without believability and 
credibility in narrative, suspension of disbelief is difficult (try reading bad fiction if you doubt this 
is true), and rather than being transported to and subsumed within another world, one finds 
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oneself continually and consciously aware that one is reading someone’s (badly) made-up story, 
centering on superficial characters in whom one has no emotional investment. To make a story 
believable, and to make its characters credible, and to make the reader care about what 
happens to them and believe enough in their travails so as to keep reading – this was the novel 
project, the new, groundbreaking goal, of the ancient writers of prose fiction. 
So how does one go about this? Initially, the ancient novelists simply wrote their stories 
in the manner of histories, peppering their narratives with historical places and people so as to 
leave their readers unsure of the story’s fictional or factual parts. As we have seen, boundaries 
existed between history and fiction among the learned elite, but these boundaries were not 
always appreciated by the readers of ancient fiction – even intelligent, learned readers like St. 
Augustine.323 Augustine and others exemplified this seemingly paradoxical (to us) attitude 
toward fiction in the ancient world – the paradox of at once recognizing that it is ficta (literally 
“made up”) and yet often so believable as to be taken as facta – things that actually happened.  
Yet why would Augustine at once recognize that plays, mimes, and poems are “full of lies” but 
not deceptive because they are not meant to deceive, while not apparently having such a 
conviction about Apuleius’ fantastical tale?324 The answer lies in the genre’s format: plays and 
mimes were performed on stage, the former in verse, and poems were also in verse (and also 
likely performed). But however one digested the ancient novel – whether reading it to oneself 
or hearing it read – it was not written in verse. It was not (for the most part) poetry, which 
would be typically recognized as literary. Instead, the novel was written in prose, a format up 
until now reserved for philosophy, rhetoric, and especially history – not “stories” or fables or 
tales. Again, this is where ancient understandings of fiction depart (usually) from ours: it was a 
new thing to read an “untrue” story in prose. For modern analogies, we have examined the 
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mockumentaries that present fictional movies or shows in the format of documentaries. This is 
now so common, with comedies such as The Office or Modern Family, that it is easy to forget 
that such a format has really only been in vogue for the past 15 years or so. Yet as we have seen, 
when The Blair Witch Project opened in 1999, thousands of viewers sharing their experiences of 
the film were convinced it was real footage of real people who had died in the woods, despite 
being just another movie with actors. We less often find people mistaking written fiction for 
fact, though one only need tally up the number of non-fiction books devoted to exposing the 
historical fallacies of Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code to realize we are not ourselves immune to 
deceptive fancies. 
 Regardless, in both ancient and modern fiction, the authors are engaging in a rhetorical 
exercise undeniably akin to lying: an attempt to make the unreal as real as possible; an attempt 
to make perhaps even the most sophisticated adult gain concern and investment in the 
plausible experiences of people and stories that do not in the most rigid sense exist. The ease 
with which a reader is able to suspend disbelief is in fact the true measuring stick of good 
fiction, no matter the genre, and the ancient novelists, with their various attempts at creating 
plausible, believable narratives out of the stories they invented, were among the first to hone 
and sharpen those skills, which still hold us in thrall today. 
 As we have seen, this process evolved over centuries. The novelists began this project 
by crafting more or less “realistic” narratives with few appeals to the supernatural and with 
generous amounts of history to give their stories a veneer of fact. But ever present in these 
novels is the specter of deceit, as characters make up stories to deceive one another. In 
Chariton’s Callirhoe, our earliest Greek novel, we get just that: eight books of the adventures of 
Chaereas and Callirhoe told by an omniscient narrator who makes us privy to the machinations 
and deceptions of his poor characters, who are oblivious to it all and helpless to find their happy 
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ending until said narrator finally relents and gives it to them. A century later, Achilles Tatius 
takes the same formula – boy meets girl, they experience a series of adventures amid their 
separation, both are deceived as to the whereabouts and fidelity of each other – but with a 
major twist that is now so commonplace as to be underappreciated: he hands the story over to 
one of the characters, his protagonist Cleitophon, and has him narrate the tale in the first 
person. Hence the deceptions aimed at his character become our deceptions as well, until the 
truth is eventually revealed to him sometime later. 
And by the time antiquity and the ancient novel were coming to a close, the last extant 
novelist we have, Heliodorus, had taken the project one step further. Returning to the third 
person, he nonetheless refuses to be our omniscient guide, and hence the characters do, in fact, 
end up telling their own stories. To make matters even more complicated, Heliodorus also 
refuses to give us a straight, chronological narrative. Instead, he starts the story right in the 
middle of things – a shipwreck with a host of slaughtered bodies, a woman with a bow and 
arrow looking sadly around her, spied by another group of men who don’t even speak her 
language. Heliodorus is thus all but modern in his slow release of information, and in the 
character-building narratives that help us piece together the backstories of the characters we 
love over long periods of time, enriching them as we go. And even amid Heliodorus’ globe-
spanning tale, with its incredible twists and turns and a supernatural purity test as one of its 
crowning episodes, the characters he builds are credible and believable, as they must be. 
That we should be talking about believability, even credibility, with respect to the 
romances is perhaps puzzling at first glace. The ancient novels, like the pulp fiction of today, are 
often unbelievable in their turns of fate, or in their idealistic assurances that the heroes will turn 
out fine, or that evil will lose. Yet such a structure appears to be engrained in our souls, and as 
such we return to hear variations on the romance time and again. It stands to reason, then, that 
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with each new visit, the author must strive to present it afresh, or his characters will be lost, or 
canceled, or denied publication, bereft of reader sympathy. Though many today prefer their 
stories to have a dose of realism, the fantastic, incarnated especially in today’s fantasy and 
science fiction, continues to draw us. As Oscar Wilde quipped a century ago, “M. Zola sits down 
to give us a picture of the Second Empire. Who cares for the Second Empire now? It is out of 
date. Life goes faster than Realism, but Romanticism is always in front of life.”325 
For Northrop Frye, the romance is a form of “secular scripture,” its formulae so deeply 
embedded within us that we intuitively know we are reading or watching the same tales over 
and again, but they nonetheless have authority and cultural currency – operating separately 
from sacred myth only by the lack of authoritarian support. More directly related to our study, 
Frye also contends that romance – this idealistic genre our writers formed from the stern roots 
of ancient prose – is at the heart of all fiction: 
Romance is the structural core of all fiction: being directly 
descended from folktale, it brings us closer than any other 
aspect of literature to the sense of fiction, considered as a 
whole, as the epic of the creature, man’s vision of his own life as 
a quest.326 
 
The study of the roots of fiction, then, is a viable study of the human condition, so eager to 
experience by proxy the same anxieties and hopes about life’s turns as have accompanied us 
from the beginning. “The improbable, desiring, erotic, and violent world of romance,” Frye 
continues, “reminds us that we are not awake when we have abolished the dream world: we are 
awake only when we have absorbed it again.”327 
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